From patchwork Fri Jul 1 08:24:33 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Xiu Jianfeng X-Patchwork-Id: 12902956 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id DFA90CCA47F for ; Fri, 1 Jul 2022 08:28:50 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S235608AbiGAI2t (ORCPT ); Fri, 1 Jul 2022 04:28:49 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:58988 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S237043AbiGAI2S (ORCPT ); Fri, 1 Jul 2022 04:28:18 -0400 Received: from szxga02-in.huawei.com (szxga02-in.huawei.com [45.249.212.188]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 86D2470E43; Fri, 1 Jul 2022 01:27:15 -0700 (PDT) Received: from dggpeml500023.china.huawei.com (unknown [172.30.72.56]) by szxga02-in.huawei.com (SkyGuard) with ESMTP id 4LZ7Wd62dZzTgCq; Fri, 1 Jul 2022 16:23:41 +0800 (CST) Received: from ubuntu1804.huawei.com (10.67.174.58) by dggpeml500023.china.huawei.com (7.185.36.114) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) id 15.1.2375.24; Fri, 1 Jul 2022 16:27:13 +0800 From: Xiu Jianfeng To: , , , , , , CC: , , Subject: [PATCH -next v3 0/2] powerpc: add support for syscall stack randomization Date: Fri, 1 Jul 2022 16:24:33 +0800 Message-ID: <20220701082435.126596-1-xiujianfeng@huawei.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Originating-IP: [10.67.174.58] X-ClientProxiedBy: dggems701-chm.china.huawei.com (10.3.19.178) To dggpeml500023.china.huawei.com (7.185.36.114) X-CFilter-Loop: Reflected Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org Hi, This patchset adds support for syscall stack randomization for powerpc, which can make harder the various stack-based attacks that rely on deterministic stack structure. Changes in v3: -add a lead-up patch to move system_call_exception() to syscall.c to avoid disabling stack protector for all functions in interrupt.c Changes in v2: -move choose choose_random_kstack_offset() to the end of system_call_exception -allow full 6 (10) bits of entropy -disable stack-protector for interrupt.c Xiu Jianfeng (2): powerpc: Move system_call_exception() to syscall.c powerpc: add support for syscall stack randomization arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 1 + arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile | 9 +- arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt.c | 161 --------------------------- arch/powerpc/kernel/syscall.c | 190 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 199 insertions(+), 162 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/kernel/syscall.c