diff mbox

[v2,04/20] gcc-plugins: Add the randstruct plugin

Message ID 1495829844-69341-5-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org (mailing list archive)
State New, archived
Headers show

Commit Message

Kees Cook May 26, 2017, 8:17 p.m. UTC
This feature is ported from grsecurity. The implementation is almost
entirely identical to the original code written by the PaX Team and
Brad Spengler.

The new plugin randomizes the layout of selected structures at compile
time. This is a probabilistic defense against attacks that need to
know the layout of structures within the kernel. While less useful for
distribution kernels (where the randomization seed must be exposed for
third party kernel module builds), it still has some value there since
now all kernel builds would need to be tracked by an attacker. This is
most useful in situations where kernel build artifacts have not been
published (i.e. in-house kernel builds).

This defines two annotations __randomize_layout and __no_randomize_layout,
which respectively tell the plugin to either randomize or not to randomize
the struct in question. Follow-on patches enable the auto-detection
logic for selecting structures that contain only function pointers. It
is disabled here to assist with bisection.

Since any randomized structs must be initialized using designated
initializers, __randomize_layout includes the __designated_init
annotation even when the plugin is disabled so that all builds will
require the needed initialization. (The plugin adds the annotation
for automatically chosen structures.)

The main differences between this implemenation and grsecurity are:
- disable automatic struct selection (enabled in follow-up patch)
- add designated_init attribute at runtime and for manual marking
- clarify debugging output to differentiate bad cast warnings
- add whitelisting infrastructure
- support gcc 7's DECL_ALIGN and DECL_MODE changes (Laura Abbott)
- raise minimum required GCC version to 4.7

Earlier versions of this patch were ported by Michael Leibowitz.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 Documentation/dontdiff                        |    2 +
 arch/Kconfig                                  |   39 +
 include/linux/compiler-gcc.h                  |    5 +
 include/linux/compiler.h                      |    8 +
 include/linux/vermagic.h                      |    9 +-
 scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins                  |    4 +
 scripts/gcc-plugins/.gitignore                |    1 +
 scripts/gcc-plugins/Makefile                  |    8 +
 scripts/gcc-plugins/gcc-common.h              |    5 +
 scripts/gcc-plugins/gen-random-seed.sh        |    8 +
 scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_plugin.c | 1017 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
 11 files changed, 1105 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 scripts/gcc-plugins/.gitignore
 create mode 100644 scripts/gcc-plugins/gen-random-seed.sh
 create mode 100644 scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_plugin.c

Comments

Arnd Bergmann June 29, 2017, 10:08 p.m. UTC | #1
On Fri, May 26, 2017 at 10:17 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> This feature is ported from grsecurity. The implementation is almost
> entirely identical to the original code written by the PaX Team and
> Brad Spengler.

Hi Kees,

I noticed new build errors that bisected back to this patch, which has
now showed up
in linux-next again:


/git/arm-soc/arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.S: Assembler messages:
/git/arm-soc/arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.S:800: Error: bad immediate
value for offset (4644)
/git/arm-soc/scripts/Makefile.build:403: recipe for target
'arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.o' failed
make[3]: *** [arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.o] Error 1
/git/arm-soc/arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.S: Assembler messages:
/git/arm-soc/arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.S:800: Error: bad immediate
value for offset (5584)
/git/arm-soc/scripts/Makefile.build:403: recipe for target
'arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.o' failed
make[3]: *** [arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.o] Error 1
/git/arm-soc/arch/arm/mm/tlb-v4.S: Assembler messages:
/git/arm-soc/arch/arm/mm/tlb-v4.S:35: Error: bad immediate value for
offset (4928)
/git/arm-soc/scripts/Makefile.build:403: recipe for target
'arch/arm/mm/tlb-v4.o' failed
make[3]: *** [arch/arm/mm/tlb-v4.o] Error 1
/git/arm-soc/arch/arm/mm/tlb-v4wbi.S: Assembler messages:
/git/arm-soc/arch/arm/mm/tlb-v4wbi.S:34: Error: bad immediate value
for offset (4928)
/git/arm-soc/scripts/Makefile.build:403: recipe for target
'arch/arm/mm/tlb-v4wbi.o' failed

So far, that's the only thing that goes wrong for me though, and this
is probably
easy to fix.

        Arnd
Kees Cook June 29, 2017, 10:53 p.m. UTC | #2
On Thu, Jun 29, 2017 at 3:08 PM, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> wrote:
> On Fri, May 26, 2017 at 10:17 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> I noticed new build errors that bisected back to this patch, which has
> now showed up
> in linux-next again:

(FWIW this is randstruct not initify, and has been in -next for a
couple weeks now.)

> /git/arm-soc/arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.S: Assembler messages:
> /git/arm-soc/arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.S:800: Error: bad immediate
> value for offset (4644)
> /git/arm-soc/scripts/Makefile.build:403: recipe for target
> 'arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.o' failed
> make[3]: *** [arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.o] Error 1
> /git/arm-soc/arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.S: Assembler messages:
> /git/arm-soc/arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.S:800: Error: bad immediate
> value for offset (5584)

arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.S:   ldr     r7, [r7, #TSK_STACK_CANARY]
arch/arm/kernel/asm-offsets.c:  DEFINE(TSK_STACK_CANARY,
offsetof(struct task_struct, stack_canary));

This would imply that stack_canary got randomized to an offset within
struct task_struct beyond the "ldr" immediate range (4096). Yay for
giant structs.

I'm surprised this didn't bisect to "task_struct: Allow randomized layout".

> /git/arm-soc/scripts/Makefile.build:403: recipe for target
> 'arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.o' failed
> make[3]: *** [arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.o] Error 1
> /git/arm-soc/arch/arm/mm/tlb-v4.S: Assembler messages:
> /git/arm-soc/arch/arm/mm/tlb-v4.S:35: Error: bad immediate value for
> offset (4928)

Similar:

        act_mm  r3                              @ get current->active_mm
...
        .macro  act_mm, rd
        ldr     \rd, [\rd, #TSK_ACTIVE_MM]
...
kernel/asm-offsets.c:  DEFINE(TSK_ACTIVE_MM,
offsetof(struct task_struct, active_mm));

> /git/arm-soc/scripts/Makefile.build:403: recipe for target
> 'arch/arm/mm/tlb-v4.o' failed
> make[3]: *** [arch/arm/mm/tlb-v4.o] Error 1
> /git/arm-soc/arch/arm/mm/tlb-v4wbi.S: Assembler messages:
> /git/arm-soc/arch/arm/mm/tlb-v4wbi.S:34: Error: bad immediate value
> for offset (4928)
> /git/arm-soc/scripts/Makefile.build:403: recipe for target
> 'arch/arm/mm/tlb-v4wbi.o' failed

Same as above.

> So far, that's the only thing that goes wrong for me though, and this
> is probably
> easy to fix.

Thanks for letting me know! These haven't shown up in my tests since I
haven't gotten "unlucky" in randomizing the task_struct, it seems.

I see a few possible solutions:

- ignore it and try your build again with a fresh tree and a new
randomization seed ;)
- remove "depends on !COMPILE_TEST" from
GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE, which will leave most stuff near
their original locations
- add a new annotation __randomize_cacheline which performs the same
logic as above, but only for the marked structure
- build new logic to keep certain fields (with some special marking)
within a given range of their original position
- rewrite the ARM code to handle larger immediates

The first obviously won't fly. The second just bypasses the problem
forcing it to be exposed by other people later. The third is likely
easiest to do now, but reduces the effectiveness of randomization for
architectures that don't have sensitive immediate values. The fourth
sounds not generally useful. The fifth may be unacceptable to arm
maintainers due to performance impacts.

Can you verify that reverting "task_struct: Allow randomized layout"
fixes a bugged build for you?

-Kees
Arnd Bergmann June 30, 2017, 7:35 a.m. UTC | #3
On Fri, Jun 30, 2017 at 12:53 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 29, 2017 at 3:08 PM, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> wrote:
>> On Fri, May 26, 2017 at 10:17 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
>> I noticed new build errors that bisected back to this patch, which has
>> now showed up
>> in linux-next again:
>
> (FWIW this is randstruct not initify, and has been in -next for a
> couple weeks now.)

I first saw it last week and only now got around to looking any deeper,
as I had assumed that one of my own patches caused it.

>> /git/arm-soc/arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.S: Assembler messages:
>> /git/arm-soc/arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.S:800: Error: bad immediate
>> value for offset (4644)
>> /git/arm-soc/scripts/Makefile.build:403: recipe for target
>> 'arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.o' failed
>> make[3]: *** [arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.o] Error 1
>> /git/arm-soc/arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.S: Assembler messages:
>> /git/arm-soc/arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.S:800: Error: bad immediate
>> value for offset (5584)
>
> arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.S:   ldr     r7, [r7, #TSK_STACK_CANARY]
> arch/arm/kernel/asm-offsets.c:  DEFINE(TSK_STACK_CANARY,
> offsetof(struct task_struct, stack_canary));
>
> This would imply that stack_canary got randomized to an offset within
> struct task_struct beyond the "ldr" immediate range (4096). Yay for
> giant structs.
>
> I'm surprised this didn't bisect to "task_struct: Allow randomized layout".

The bisection was a bit tricky, it's very possible that this should have
been the one to report.

>> /git/arm-soc/scripts/Makefile.build:403: recipe for target
>> 'arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.o' failed
>> make[3]: *** [arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.o] Error 1
>> /git/arm-soc/arch/arm/mm/tlb-v4.S: Assembler messages:
>> /git/arm-soc/arch/arm/mm/tlb-v4.S:35: Error: bad immediate value for
>> offset (4928)
>
> Similar:
>
>         act_mm  r3                              @ get current->active_mm
> ...
>         .macro  act_mm, rd
>         ldr     \rd, [\rd, #TSK_ACTIVE_MM]
> ...
> kernel/asm-offsets.c:  DEFINE(TSK_ACTIVE_MM,
> offsetof(struct task_struct, active_mm));
>
>> /git/arm-soc/scripts/Makefile.build:403: recipe for target
>> 'arch/arm/mm/tlb-v4.o' failed
>> make[3]: *** [arch/arm/mm/tlb-v4.o] Error 1
>> /git/arm-soc/arch/arm/mm/tlb-v4wbi.S: Assembler messages:
>> /git/arm-soc/arch/arm/mm/tlb-v4wbi.S:34: Error: bad immediate value
>> for offset (4928)
>> /git/arm-soc/scripts/Makefile.build:403: recipe for target
>> 'arch/arm/mm/tlb-v4wbi.o' failed
>
> Same as above.
>
>> So far, that's the only thing that goes wrong for me though, and this
>> is probably
>> easy to fix.
>
> Thanks for letting me know! These haven't shown up in my tests since I
> haven't gotten "unlucky" in randomizing the task_struct, it seems.

I've only hit it a couple of times a few thousand builds.

> I see a few possible solutions:
>
> - ignore it and try your build again with a fresh tree and a new
> randomization seed ;)
> - remove "depends on !COMPILE_TEST" from
> GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE, which will leave most stuff near
> their original locations
> - add a new annotation __randomize_cacheline which performs the same
> logic as above, but only for the marked structure
> - build new logic to keep certain fields (with some special marking)
> within a given range of their original position
> - rewrite the ARM code to handle larger immediates
>
> The first obviously won't fly. The second just bypasses the problem
> forcing it to be exposed by other people later. The third is likely
> easiest to do now, but reduces the effectiveness of randomization for
> architectures that don't have sensitive immediate values. The fourth
> sounds not generally useful. The fifth may be unacceptable to arm
> maintainers due to performance impacts.

I was thinking of the fifth solution, but don't know exactly how to
do it. If performance is a concern, I guess we could have separate
implementations for randstruct and traditional builds.

I've added a few more people to Cc that may know exactly how to
do it right.

> Can you verify that reverting "task_struct: Allow randomized layout"
> fixes a bugged build for you?

Confirmed.

      Arnd
Ard Biesheuvel June 30, 2017, 7:55 a.m. UTC | #4
On 30 June 2017 at 07:35, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> wrote:
> On Fri, Jun 30, 2017 at 12:53 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
>> On Thu, Jun 29, 2017 at 3:08 PM, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> wrote:
>>> On Fri, May 26, 2017 at 10:17 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
>>> I noticed new build errors that bisected back to this patch, which has
>>> now showed up
>>> in linux-next again:
>>
>> (FWIW this is randstruct not initify, and has been in -next for a
>> couple weeks now.)
>
> I first saw it last week and only now got around to looking any deeper,
> as I had assumed that one of my own patches caused it.
>
>>> /git/arm-soc/arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.S: Assembler messages:
>>> /git/arm-soc/arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.S:800: Error: bad immediate
>>> value for offset (4644)
>>> /git/arm-soc/scripts/Makefile.build:403: recipe for target
>>> 'arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.o' failed
>>> make[3]: *** [arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.o] Error 1
>>> /git/arm-soc/arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.S: Assembler messages:
>>> /git/arm-soc/arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.S:800: Error: bad immediate
>>> value for offset (5584)
>>
>> arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.S:   ldr     r7, [r7, #TSK_STACK_CANARY]
>> arch/arm/kernel/asm-offsets.c:  DEFINE(TSK_STACK_CANARY,
>> offsetof(struct task_struct, stack_canary));
>>
>> This would imply that stack_canary got randomized to an offset within
>> struct task_struct beyond the "ldr" immediate range (4096). Yay for
>> giant structs.
>>
>> I'm surprised this didn't bisect to "task_struct: Allow randomized layout".
>
> The bisection was a bit tricky, it's very possible that this should have
> been the one to report.
>
>>> /git/arm-soc/scripts/Makefile.build:403: recipe for target
>>> 'arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.o' failed
>>> make[3]: *** [arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.o] Error 1
>>> /git/arm-soc/arch/arm/mm/tlb-v4.S: Assembler messages:
>>> /git/arm-soc/arch/arm/mm/tlb-v4.S:35: Error: bad immediate value for
>>> offset (4928)
>>
>> Similar:
>>
>>         act_mm  r3                              @ get current->active_mm
>> ...
>>         .macro  act_mm, rd
>>         ldr     \rd, [\rd, #TSK_ACTIVE_MM]
>> ...
>> kernel/asm-offsets.c:  DEFINE(TSK_ACTIVE_MM,
>> offsetof(struct task_struct, active_mm));
>>
>>> /git/arm-soc/scripts/Makefile.build:403: recipe for target
>>> 'arch/arm/mm/tlb-v4.o' failed
>>> make[3]: *** [arch/arm/mm/tlb-v4.o] Error 1
>>> /git/arm-soc/arch/arm/mm/tlb-v4wbi.S: Assembler messages:
>>> /git/arm-soc/arch/arm/mm/tlb-v4wbi.S:34: Error: bad immediate value
>>> for offset (4928)
>>> /git/arm-soc/scripts/Makefile.build:403: recipe for target
>>> 'arch/arm/mm/tlb-v4wbi.o' failed
>>
>> Same as above.
>>
>>> So far, that's the only thing that goes wrong for me though, and this
>>> is probably
>>> easy to fix.
>>
>> Thanks for letting me know! These haven't shown up in my tests since I
>> haven't gotten "unlucky" in randomizing the task_struct, it seems.
>
> I've only hit it a couple of times a few thousand builds.
>
>> I see a few possible solutions:
>>
>> - ignore it and try your build again with a fresh tree and a new
>> randomization seed ;)
>> - remove "depends on !COMPILE_TEST" from
>> GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE, which will leave most stuff near
>> their original locations
>> - add a new annotation __randomize_cacheline which performs the same
>> logic as above, but only for the marked structure
>> - build new logic to keep certain fields (with some special marking)
>> within a given range of their original position
>> - rewrite the ARM code to handle larger immediates
>>
>> The first obviously won't fly. The second just bypasses the problem
>> forcing it to be exposed by other people later. The third is likely
>> easiest to do now, but reduces the effectiveness of randomization for
>> architectures that don't have sensitive immediate values. The fourth
>> sounds not generally useful. The fifth may be unacceptable to arm
>> maintainers due to performance impacts.
>
> I was thinking of the fifth solution, but don't know exactly how to
> do it. If performance is a concern, I guess we could have separate
> implementations for randstruct and traditional builds.
>

Does this not apply to *all* entries in asm-offsets? If so, I don't
see how it is tractable to fix this in the code, unless we add some
instrumentation to asm-offsets to whitelist some huge structs and
error out on new ones. Or perhaps there's really only a handful?

In any case, these particular examples are fairly straightforward,
since there is no need to preserve the register's value.

ldr     r7, [r7, #TSK_STACK_CANARY]

could be replaced with

.if TSK_STACK_CANARAY >= PAGE_SIZE
add r7, r7, #TSK_STACK_CANARY & PAGE_MASK
.endif
ldr r7, [r7, #TSK_STACK_CANARY & ~PAGE_MASK]
Arnd Bergmann June 30, 2017, 8:27 a.m. UTC | #5
On Fri, Jun 30, 2017 at 9:55 AM, Ard Biesheuvel
<ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> wrote:
> On 30 June 2017 at 07:35, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> wrote:
>> On Fri, Jun 30, 2017 at 12:53 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
>>> The first obviously won't fly. The second just bypasses the problem
>>> forcing it to be exposed by other people later. The third is likely
>>> easiest to do now, but reduces the effectiveness of randomization for
>>> architectures that don't have sensitive immediate values. The fourth
>>> sounds not generally useful. The fifth may be unacceptable to arm
>>> maintainers due to performance impacts.
>>
>> I was thinking of the fifth solution, but don't know exactly how to
>> do it. If performance is a concern, I guess we could have separate
>> implementations for randstruct and traditional builds.
>>
>
> Does this not apply to *all* entries in asm-offsets? If so, I don't
> see how it is tractable to fix this in the code, unless we add some
> instrumentation to asm-offsets to whitelist some huge structs and
> error out on new ones. Or perhaps there's really only a handful?

I think the other structs are all small enough:

* thread_info is at most 720 bytes (including crunch+vfp3, which
  you wouldn't find in one combined kernel) and not randomized
  at the moment
* pt_regs is 72 bytes and I don't see how that would be randomized
* machine_desc would be a candidate for randomizing, but is only
  108 bytes
* proc_info_list is 52 bytes and not currently randomized
* vm_area_struct is randomized but only 96 bytes.
* task_struct is clearly large enough, but we only use TSK_ACTIVE_MM
  and TSK_STACK_CANARY, both can be fixed with your trick.

> In any case, these particular examples are fairly straightforward,
> since there is no need to preserve the register's value.
>
> ldr     r7, [r7, #TSK_STACK_CANARY]
>
> could be replaced with
>
> .if TSK_STACK_CANARAY >= PAGE_SIZE
> add r7, r7, #TSK_STACK_CANARY & PAGE_MASK
> .endif
> ldr r7, [r7, #TSK_STACK_CANARY & ~PAGE_MASK]

Nice!

      Arnd
Kees Cook June 30, 2017, 2:41 p.m. UTC | #6
On Fri, Jun 30, 2017 at 1:27 AM, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> wrote:
> On Fri, Jun 30, 2017 at 9:55 AM, Ard Biesheuvel
> <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> wrote:
>> On 30 June 2017 at 07:35, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> wrote:
>>> On Fri, Jun 30, 2017 at 12:53 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
>>>> The first obviously won't fly. The second just bypasses the problem
>>>> forcing it to be exposed by other people later. The third is likely
>>>> easiest to do now, but reduces the effectiveness of randomization for
>>>> architectures that don't have sensitive immediate values. The fourth
>>>> sounds not generally useful. The fifth may be unacceptable to arm
>>>> maintainers due to performance impacts.
>>>
>>> I was thinking of the fifth solution, but don't know exactly how to
>>> do it. If performance is a concern, I guess we could have separate
>>> implementations for randstruct and traditional builds.
>>>
>>
>> Does this not apply to *all* entries in asm-offsets? If so, I don't
>> see how it is tractable to fix this in the code, unless we add some
>> instrumentation to asm-offsets to whitelist some huge structs and
>> error out on new ones. Or perhaps there's really only a handful?
>
> I think the other structs are all small enough:
>
> * thread_info is at most 720 bytes (including crunch+vfp3, which
>   you wouldn't find in one combined kernel) and not randomized
>   at the moment
> * pt_regs is 72 bytes and I don't see how that would be randomized
> * machine_desc would be a candidate for randomizing, but is only
>   108 bytes
> * proc_info_list is 52 bytes and not currently randomized
> * vm_area_struct is randomized but only 96 bytes.
> * task_struct is clearly large enough, but we only use TSK_ACTIVE_MM
>   and TSK_STACK_CANARY, both can be fixed with your trick.

Yup, that matches what I found. task_struct is the only truly giant struct.

>> In any case, these particular examples are fairly straightforward,
>> since there is no need to preserve the register's value.
>>
>> ldr     r7, [r7, #TSK_STACK_CANARY]
>>
>> could be replaced with
>>
>> .if TSK_STACK_CANARAY >= PAGE_SIZE
>> add r7, r7, #TSK_STACK_CANARY & PAGE_MASK
>> .endif
>> ldr r7, [r7, #TSK_STACK_CANARY & ~PAGE_MASK]
>
> Nice!

Oh, very cool. This'll make it only an asm change in the case where
it's required for randstruct. Perfect. I'll send a patch and carry it
in the randstruct tree.

(In looking at this, it seems tsk_mm is unused in mm/proc-macros.S, so
I'll remove that code unless someone sees something I don't.)

-Kees
diff mbox

Patch

diff --git a/Documentation/dontdiff b/Documentation/dontdiff
index 77b92221f951..e10a484629e4 100644
--- a/Documentation/dontdiff
+++ b/Documentation/dontdiff
@@ -207,6 +207,8 @@  r200_reg_safe.h
 r300_reg_safe.h
 r420_reg_safe.h
 r600_reg_safe.h
+randomize_layout_hash.h
+randomize_layout_seed.h
 recordmcount
 relocs
 rlim_names.h
diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig
index e0dced4da4bf..3eac97a4c7b3 100644
--- a/arch/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/Kconfig
@@ -443,6 +443,45 @@  config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_VERBOSE
 	  initialized. Since not all existing initializers are detected
 	  by the plugin, this can produce false positive warnings.
 
+config GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT
+	bool "Randomize layout of sensitive kernel structures"
+	depends on GCC_PLUGINS
+	select MODVERSIONS if MODULES
+	help
+	  If you say Y here, the layouts of structures explicitly
+	  marked by __randomize_layout will be randomized at
+	  compile-time.  This can introduce the requirement of an
+	  additional information exposure vulnerability for exploits
+	  targeting these structure types.
+
+	  Enabling this feature will introduce some performance impact,
+	  slightly increase memory usage, and prevent the use of forensic
+	  tools like Volatility against the system (unless the kernel
+	  source tree isn't cleaned after kernel installation).
+
+	  The seed used for compilation is located at
+	  scripts/gcc-plgins/randomize_layout_seed.h.  It remains after
+	  a make clean to allow for external modules to be compiled with
+	  the existing seed and will be removed by a make mrproper or
+	  make distclean.
+
+	  Note that the implementation requires gcc 4.7 or newer.
+
+	  This plugin was ported from grsecurity/PaX. More information at:
+	   * https://grsecurity.net/
+	   * https://pax.grsecurity.net/
+
+config GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE
+	bool "Use cacheline-aware structure randomization"
+	depends on GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT
+	depends on !COMPILE_TEST
+	help
+	  If you say Y here, the RANDSTRUCT randomization will make a
+	  best effort at restricting randomization to cacheline-sized
+	  groups of elements.  It will further not randomize bitfields
+	  in structures.  This reduces the performance hit of RANDSTRUCT
+	  at the cost of weakened randomization.
+
 config HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
 	bool
 	help
diff --git a/include/linux/compiler-gcc.h b/include/linux/compiler-gcc.h
index 386caf6771ed..7deaae3dc87d 100644
--- a/include/linux/compiler-gcc.h
+++ b/include/linux/compiler-gcc.h
@@ -223,6 +223,11 @@ 
 /* Mark a function definition as prohibited from being cloned. */
 #define __noclone	__attribute__((__noclone__, __optimize__("no-tracer")))
 
+#ifdef RANDSTRUCT_PLUGIN
+#define __randomize_layout __attribute__((randomize_layout))
+#define __no_randomize_layout __attribute__((no_randomize_layout))
+#endif
+
 #endif /* GCC_VERSION >= 40500 */
 
 #if GCC_VERSION >= 40600
diff --git a/include/linux/compiler.h b/include/linux/compiler.h
index bbe881054bf0..219f82f3ec1a 100644
--- a/include/linux/compiler.h
+++ b/include/linux/compiler.h
@@ -444,6 +444,14 @@  static __always_inline void __write_once_size(volatile void *p, void *res, int s
 # define __latent_entropy
 #endif
 
+#ifndef __randomize_layout
+# define __randomize_layout __designated_init
+#endif
+
+#ifndef __no_randomize_layout
+# define __no_randomize_layout
+#endif
+
 /*
  * Tell gcc if a function is cold. The compiler will assume any path
  * directly leading to the call is unlikely.
diff --git a/include/linux/vermagic.h b/include/linux/vermagic.h
index 6f8fbcf10dfb..af6c03f7f986 100644
--- a/include/linux/vermagic.h
+++ b/include/linux/vermagic.h
@@ -24,10 +24,17 @@ 
 #ifndef MODULE_ARCH_VERMAGIC
 #define MODULE_ARCH_VERMAGIC ""
 #endif
+#ifdef RANDSTRUCT_PLUGIN
+#include <generated/randomize_layout_hash.h>
+#define MODULE_RANDSTRUCT_PLUGIN "RANDSTRUCT_PLUGIN_" RANDSTRUCT_HASHED_SEED
+#else
+#define MODULE_RANDSTRUCT_PLUGIN
+#endif
 
 #define VERMAGIC_STRING 						\
 	UTS_RELEASE " "							\
 	MODULE_VERMAGIC_SMP MODULE_VERMAGIC_PREEMPT 			\
 	MODULE_VERMAGIC_MODULE_UNLOAD MODULE_VERMAGIC_MODVERSIONS	\
-	MODULE_ARCH_VERMAGIC
+	MODULE_ARCH_VERMAGIC						\
+	MODULE_RANDSTRUCT_PLUGIN
 
diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins b/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins
index 82335533620e..2e0e2eaa397f 100644
--- a/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins
+++ b/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins
@@ -29,6 +29,10 @@  ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGINS
   gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_VERBOSE)	+= -fplugin-arg-structleak_plugin-verbose
   gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK)	+= -DSTRUCTLEAK_PLUGIN
 
+  gcc-plugin-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT)	+= randomize_layout_plugin.so
+  gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT)	+= -DRANDSTRUCT_PLUGIN
+  gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE)	+= -fplugin-arg-randomize_layout_plugin-performance-mode
+
   GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS := $(strip $(addprefix -fplugin=$(objtree)/scripts/gcc-plugins/, $(gcc-plugin-y)) $(gcc-plugin-cflags-y))
 
   export PLUGINCC GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS GCC_PLUGIN GCC_PLUGIN_SUBDIR
diff --git a/scripts/gcc-plugins/.gitignore b/scripts/gcc-plugins/.gitignore
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..de92ed9e3d83
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/gcc-plugins/.gitignore
@@ -0,0 +1 @@ 
+randomize_layout_seed.h
diff --git a/scripts/gcc-plugins/Makefile b/scripts/gcc-plugins/Makefile
index 8b29dc17c73c..214eb2335c31 100644
--- a/scripts/gcc-plugins/Makefile
+++ b/scripts/gcc-plugins/Makefile
@@ -18,6 +18,14 @@  endif
 
 export HOSTLIBS
 
+$(obj)/randomize_layout_plugin.o: $(objtree)/$(obj)/randomize_layout_seed.h
+quiet_cmd_create_randomize_layout_seed = GENSEED $@
+cmd_create_randomize_layout_seed = \
+  $(CONFIG_SHELL) $(srctree)/$(src)/gen-random-seed.sh $@ $(objtree)/include/generated/randomize_layout_hash.h
+$(objtree)/$(obj)/randomize_layout_seed.h: FORCE
+	$(call if_changed,create_randomize_layout_seed)
+targets = randomize_layout_seed.h randomize_layout_hash.h
+
 $(HOSTLIBS)-y := $(foreach p,$(GCC_PLUGIN),$(if $(findstring /,$(p)),,$(p)))
 always := $($(HOSTLIBS)-y)
 
diff --git a/scripts/gcc-plugins/gcc-common.h b/scripts/gcc-plugins/gcc-common.h
index 918953ca4527..6948898b3cdf 100644
--- a/scripts/gcc-plugins/gcc-common.h
+++ b/scripts/gcc-plugins/gcc-common.h
@@ -953,4 +953,9 @@  static inline void debug_gimple_stmt(const_gimple s)
 	get_inner_reference(exp, pbitsize, pbitpos, poffset, pmode, punsignedp, preversep, pvolatilep)
 #endif
 
+#if BUILDING_GCC_VERSION < 7000
+#define SET_DECL_ALIGN(decl, align)	DECL_ALIGN(decl) = (align)
+#define SET_DECL_MODE(decl, mode)	DECL_MODE(decl) = (mode)
+#endif
+
 #endif
diff --git a/scripts/gcc-plugins/gen-random-seed.sh b/scripts/gcc-plugins/gen-random-seed.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..7514850f4815
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/gcc-plugins/gen-random-seed.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ 
+#!/bin/sh
+
+if [ ! -f "$1" ]; then
+	SEED=`od -A n -t x8 -N 32 /dev/urandom | tr -d ' \n'`
+	echo "const char *randstruct_seed = \"$SEED\";" > "$1"
+	HASH=`echo -n "$SEED" | sha256sum | cut -d" " -f1 | tr -d ' \n'`
+	echo "#define RANDSTRUCT_HASHED_SEED \"$HASH\"" > "$2"
+fi
diff --git a/scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_plugin.c b/scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_plugin.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..bccbec2af0e4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_plugin.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1017 @@ 
+/*
+ * Copyright 2014-2016 by Open Source Security, Inc., Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
+ *                   and PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
+ * Licensed under the GPL v2
+ *
+ * Note: the choice of the license means that the compilation process is
+ *       NOT 'eligible' as defined by gcc's library exception to the GPL v3,
+ *       but for the kernel it doesn't matter since it doesn't link against
+ *       any of the gcc libraries
+ *
+ * Usage:
+ * $ # for 4.5/4.6/C based 4.7
+ * $ gcc -I`gcc -print-file-name=plugin`/include -I`gcc -print-file-name=plugin`/include/c-family -fPIC -shared -O2 -o randomize_layout_plugin.so randomize_layout_plugin.c
+ * $ # for C++ based 4.7/4.8+
+ * $ g++ -I`g++ -print-file-name=plugin`/include -I`g++ -print-file-name=plugin`/include/c-family -fPIC -shared -O2 -o randomize_layout_plugin.so randomize_layout_plugin.c
+ * $ gcc -fplugin=./randomize_layout_plugin.so test.c -O2
+ */
+
+#include "gcc-common.h"
+#include "randomize_layout_seed.h"
+
+#if BUILDING_GCC_MAJOR < 4 || (BUILDING_GCC_MAJOR == 4 && BUILDING_GCC_MINOR < 7)
+#error "The RANDSTRUCT plugin requires GCC 4.7 or newer."
+#endif
+
+#define ORIG_TYPE_NAME(node) \
+	(TYPE_NAME(TYPE_MAIN_VARIANT(node)) != NULL_TREE ? ((const unsigned char *)IDENTIFIER_POINTER(TYPE_NAME(TYPE_MAIN_VARIANT(node)))) : (const unsigned char *)"anonymous")
+
+__visible int plugin_is_GPL_compatible;
+
+static int performance_mode;
+
+static struct plugin_info randomize_layout_plugin_info = {
+	.version	= "201402201816vanilla",
+	.help		= "disable\t\t\tdo not activate plugin\n"
+			  "performance-mode\tenable cacheline-aware layout randomization\n"
+};
+
+struct whitelist_entry {
+	const char *pathname;
+	const char *lhs;
+	const char *rhs;
+};
+
+static const struct whitelist_entry whitelist[] = {
+	{ }
+};
+
+/* from old Linux dcache.h */
+static inline unsigned long
+partial_name_hash(unsigned long c, unsigned long prevhash)
+{
+	return (prevhash + (c << 4) + (c >> 4)) * 11;
+}
+static inline unsigned int
+name_hash(const unsigned char *name)
+{
+	unsigned long hash = 0;
+	unsigned int len = strlen((const char *)name);
+	while (len--)
+		hash = partial_name_hash(*name++, hash);
+	return (unsigned int)hash;
+}
+
+static tree handle_randomize_layout_attr(tree *node, tree name, tree args, int flags, bool *no_add_attrs)
+{
+	tree type;
+
+	*no_add_attrs = true;
+	if (TREE_CODE(*node) == FUNCTION_DECL) {
+		error("%qE attribute does not apply to functions (%qF)", name, *node);
+		return NULL_TREE;
+	}
+
+	if (TREE_CODE(*node) == PARM_DECL) {
+		error("%qE attribute does not apply to function parameters (%qD)", name, *node);
+		return NULL_TREE;
+	}
+
+	if (TREE_CODE(*node) == VAR_DECL) {
+		error("%qE attribute does not apply to variables (%qD)", name, *node);
+		return NULL_TREE;
+	}
+
+	if (TYPE_P(*node)) {
+		type = *node;
+	} else {
+		gcc_assert(TREE_CODE(*node) == TYPE_DECL);
+		type = TREE_TYPE(*node);
+	}
+
+	if (TREE_CODE(type) != RECORD_TYPE) {
+		error("%qE attribute used on %qT applies to struct types only", name, type);
+		return NULL_TREE;
+	}
+
+	if (lookup_attribute(IDENTIFIER_POINTER(name), TYPE_ATTRIBUTES(type))) {
+		error("%qE attribute is already applied to the type %qT", name, type);
+		return NULL_TREE;
+	}
+
+	*no_add_attrs = false;
+
+	return NULL_TREE;
+}
+
+/* set on complete types that we don't need to inspect further at all */
+static tree handle_randomize_considered_attr(tree *node, tree name, tree args, int flags, bool *no_add_attrs)
+{
+	*no_add_attrs = false;
+	return NULL_TREE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * set on types that we've performed a shuffle on, to prevent re-shuffling
+ * this does not preclude us from inspecting its fields for potential shuffles
+ */
+static tree handle_randomize_performed_attr(tree *node, tree name, tree args, int flags, bool *no_add_attrs)
+{
+	*no_add_attrs = false;
+	return NULL_TREE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * 64bit variant of Bob Jenkins' public domain PRNG
+ * 256 bits of internal state
+ */
+
+typedef unsigned long long u64;
+
+typedef struct ranctx { u64 a; u64 b; u64 c; u64 d; } ranctx;
+
+#define rot(x,k) (((x)<<(k))|((x)>>(64-(k))))
+static u64 ranval(ranctx *x) {
+	u64 e = x->a - rot(x->b, 7);
+	x->a = x->b ^ rot(x->c, 13);
+	x->b = x->c + rot(x->d, 37);
+	x->c = x->d + e;
+	x->d = e + x->a;
+	return x->d;
+}
+
+static void raninit(ranctx *x, u64 *seed) {
+	int i;
+
+	x->a = seed[0];
+	x->b = seed[1];
+	x->c = seed[2];
+	x->d = seed[3];
+
+	for (i=0; i < 30; ++i)
+		(void)ranval(x);
+}
+
+static u64 shuffle_seed[4];
+
+struct partition_group {
+	tree tree_start;
+	unsigned long start;
+	unsigned long length;
+};
+
+static void partition_struct(tree *fields, unsigned long length, struct partition_group *size_groups, unsigned long *num_groups)
+{
+	unsigned long i;
+	unsigned long accum_size = 0;
+	unsigned long accum_length = 0;
+	unsigned long group_idx = 0;
+
+	gcc_assert(length < INT_MAX);
+
+	memset(size_groups, 0, sizeof(struct partition_group) * length);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < length; i++) {
+		if (size_groups[group_idx].tree_start == NULL_TREE) {
+			size_groups[group_idx].tree_start = fields[i];
+			size_groups[group_idx].start = i;
+			accum_length = 0;
+			accum_size = 0;
+		}
+		accum_size += (unsigned long)int_size_in_bytes(TREE_TYPE(fields[i]));
+		accum_length++;
+		if (accum_size >= 64) {
+			size_groups[group_idx].length = accum_length;
+			accum_length = 0;
+			group_idx++;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (size_groups[group_idx].tree_start != NULL_TREE &&
+	    !size_groups[group_idx].length) {
+		size_groups[group_idx].length = accum_length;
+		group_idx++;
+	}
+
+	*num_groups = group_idx;
+}
+
+static void performance_shuffle(tree *newtree, unsigned long length, ranctx *prng_state)
+{
+	unsigned long i, x;
+	struct partition_group size_group[length];
+	unsigned long num_groups = 0;
+	unsigned long randnum;
+
+	partition_struct(newtree, length, (struct partition_group *)&size_group, &num_groups);
+	for (i = num_groups - 1; i > 0; i--) {
+		struct partition_group tmp;
+		randnum = ranval(prng_state) % (i + 1);
+		tmp = size_group[i];
+		size_group[i] = size_group[randnum];
+		size_group[randnum] = tmp;
+	}
+
+	for (x = 0; x < num_groups; x++) {
+		for (i = size_group[x].start + size_group[x].length - 1; i > size_group[x].start; i--) {
+			tree tmp;
+			if (DECL_BIT_FIELD_TYPE(newtree[i]))
+				continue;
+			randnum = ranval(prng_state) % (i + 1);
+			// we could handle this case differently if desired
+			if (DECL_BIT_FIELD_TYPE(newtree[randnum]))
+				continue;
+			tmp = newtree[i];
+			newtree[i] = newtree[randnum];
+			newtree[randnum] = tmp;
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+static void full_shuffle(tree *newtree, unsigned long length, ranctx *prng_state)
+{
+	unsigned long i, randnum;
+
+	for (i = length - 1; i > 0; i--) {
+		tree tmp;
+		randnum = ranval(prng_state) % (i + 1);
+		tmp = newtree[i];
+		newtree[i] = newtree[randnum];
+		newtree[randnum] = tmp;
+	}
+}
+
+/* modern in-place Fisher-Yates shuffle */
+static void shuffle(const_tree type, tree *newtree, unsigned long length)
+{
+	unsigned long i;
+	u64 seed[4];
+	ranctx prng_state;
+	const unsigned char *structname;
+
+	if (length == 0)
+		return;
+
+	gcc_assert(TREE_CODE(type) == RECORD_TYPE);
+
+	structname = ORIG_TYPE_NAME(type);
+
+#ifdef __DEBUG_PLUGIN
+	fprintf(stderr, "Shuffling struct %s %p\n", (const char *)structname, type);
+#ifdef __DEBUG_VERBOSE
+	debug_tree((tree)type);
+#endif
+#endif
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
+		seed[i] = shuffle_seed[i];
+		seed[i] ^= name_hash(structname);
+	}
+
+	raninit(&prng_state, (u64 *)&seed);
+
+	if (performance_mode)
+		performance_shuffle(newtree, length, &prng_state);
+	else
+		full_shuffle(newtree, length, &prng_state);
+}
+
+static bool is_flexible_array(const_tree field)
+{
+	const_tree fieldtype;
+	const_tree typesize;
+	const_tree elemtype;
+	const_tree elemsize;
+
+	fieldtype = TREE_TYPE(field);
+	typesize = TYPE_SIZE(fieldtype);
+
+	if (TREE_CODE(fieldtype) != ARRAY_TYPE)
+		return false;
+
+	elemtype = TREE_TYPE(fieldtype);
+	elemsize = TYPE_SIZE(elemtype);
+
+	/* size of type is represented in bits */
+
+	if (typesize == NULL_TREE && TYPE_DOMAIN(fieldtype) != NULL_TREE &&
+	    TYPE_MAX_VALUE(TYPE_DOMAIN(fieldtype)) == NULL_TREE)
+		return true;
+
+	if (typesize != NULL_TREE &&
+	    (TREE_CONSTANT(typesize) && (!tree_to_uhwi(typesize) ||
+	     tree_to_uhwi(typesize) == tree_to_uhwi(elemsize))))
+		return true;
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+static int relayout_struct(tree type)
+{
+	unsigned long num_fields = (unsigned long)list_length(TYPE_FIELDS(type));
+	unsigned long shuffle_length = num_fields;
+	tree field;
+	tree newtree[num_fields];
+	unsigned long i;
+	tree list;
+	tree variant;
+	tree main_variant;
+	expanded_location xloc;
+	bool has_flexarray = false;
+
+	if (TYPE_FIELDS(type) == NULL_TREE)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (num_fields < 2)
+		return 0;
+
+	gcc_assert(TREE_CODE(type) == RECORD_TYPE);
+
+	gcc_assert(num_fields < INT_MAX);
+
+	if (lookup_attribute("randomize_performed", TYPE_ATTRIBUTES(type)) ||
+	    lookup_attribute("no_randomize_layout", TYPE_ATTRIBUTES(TYPE_MAIN_VARIANT(type))))
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Workaround for 3rd-party VirtualBox source that we can't modify ourselves */
+	if (!strcmp((const char *)ORIG_TYPE_NAME(type), "INTNETTRUNKFACTORY") ||
+	    !strcmp((const char *)ORIG_TYPE_NAME(type), "RAWPCIFACTORY"))
+		return 0;
+
+	/* throw out any structs in uapi */
+	xloc = expand_location(DECL_SOURCE_LOCATION(TYPE_FIELDS(type)));
+
+	if (strstr(xloc.file, "/uapi/"))
+		error(G_("attempted to randomize userland API struct %s"), ORIG_TYPE_NAME(type));
+
+	for (field = TYPE_FIELDS(type), i = 0; field; field = TREE_CHAIN(field), i++) {
+		gcc_assert(TREE_CODE(field) == FIELD_DECL);
+		newtree[i] = field;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * enforce that we don't randomize the layout of the last
+	 * element of a struct if it's a 0 or 1-length array
+	 * or a proper flexible array
+	 */
+	if (is_flexible_array(newtree[num_fields - 1])) {
+		has_flexarray = true;
+		shuffle_length--;
+	}
+
+	shuffle(type, (tree *)newtree, shuffle_length);
+
+	/*
+	 * set up a bogus anonymous struct field designed to error out on unnamed struct initializers
+	 * as gcc provides no other way to detect such code
+	 */
+	list = make_node(FIELD_DECL);
+	TREE_CHAIN(list) = newtree[0];
+	TREE_TYPE(list) = void_type_node;
+	DECL_SIZE(list) = bitsize_zero_node;
+	DECL_NONADDRESSABLE_P(list) = 1;
+	DECL_FIELD_BIT_OFFSET(list) = bitsize_zero_node;
+	DECL_SIZE_UNIT(list) = size_zero_node;
+	DECL_FIELD_OFFSET(list) = size_zero_node;
+	DECL_CONTEXT(list) = type;
+	// to satisfy the constify plugin
+	TREE_READONLY(list) = 1;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < num_fields - 1; i++)
+		TREE_CHAIN(newtree[i]) = newtree[i+1];
+	TREE_CHAIN(newtree[num_fields - 1]) = NULL_TREE;
+
+	main_variant = TYPE_MAIN_VARIANT(type);
+	for (variant = main_variant; variant; variant = TYPE_NEXT_VARIANT(variant)) {
+		TYPE_FIELDS(variant) = list;
+		TYPE_ATTRIBUTES(variant) = copy_list(TYPE_ATTRIBUTES(variant));
+		TYPE_ATTRIBUTES(variant) = tree_cons(get_identifier("randomize_performed"), NULL_TREE, TYPE_ATTRIBUTES(variant));
+		TYPE_ATTRIBUTES(variant) = tree_cons(get_identifier("designated_init"), NULL_TREE, TYPE_ATTRIBUTES(variant));
+		if (has_flexarray)
+			TYPE_ATTRIBUTES(type) = tree_cons(get_identifier("has_flexarray"), NULL_TREE, TYPE_ATTRIBUTES(type));
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * force a re-layout of the main variant
+	 * the TYPE_SIZE for all variants will be recomputed
+	 * by finalize_type_size()
+	 */
+	TYPE_SIZE(main_variant) = NULL_TREE;
+	layout_type(main_variant);
+	gcc_assert(TYPE_SIZE(main_variant) != NULL_TREE);
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/* from constify plugin */
+static const_tree get_field_type(const_tree field)
+{
+	return strip_array_types(TREE_TYPE(field));
+}
+
+/* from constify plugin */
+static bool is_fptr(const_tree fieldtype)
+{
+	if (TREE_CODE(fieldtype) != POINTER_TYPE)
+		return false;
+
+	return TREE_CODE(TREE_TYPE(fieldtype)) == FUNCTION_TYPE;
+}
+
+/* derived from constify plugin */
+static int is_pure_ops_struct(const_tree node)
+{
+	const_tree field;
+
+	gcc_assert(TREE_CODE(node) == RECORD_TYPE || TREE_CODE(node) == UNION_TYPE);
+
+	/* XXX: Do not apply randomization to all-ftpr structs yet. */
+	return 0;
+
+	for (field = TYPE_FIELDS(node); field; field = TREE_CHAIN(field)) {
+		const_tree fieldtype = get_field_type(field);
+		enum tree_code code = TREE_CODE(fieldtype);
+
+		if (node == fieldtype)
+			continue;
+
+		if (!is_fptr(fieldtype))
+			return 0;
+
+		if (code != RECORD_TYPE && code != UNION_TYPE)
+			continue;
+
+		if (!is_pure_ops_struct(fieldtype))
+			return 0;
+	}
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static void randomize_type(tree type)
+{
+	tree variant;
+
+	gcc_assert(TREE_CODE(type) == RECORD_TYPE);
+
+	if (lookup_attribute("randomize_considered", TYPE_ATTRIBUTES(type)))
+		return;
+
+	if (lookup_attribute("randomize_layout", TYPE_ATTRIBUTES(TYPE_MAIN_VARIANT(type))) || is_pure_ops_struct(type))
+		relayout_struct(type);
+
+	for (variant = TYPE_MAIN_VARIANT(type); variant; variant = TYPE_NEXT_VARIANT(variant)) {
+		TYPE_ATTRIBUTES(type) = copy_list(TYPE_ATTRIBUTES(type));
+		TYPE_ATTRIBUTES(type) = tree_cons(get_identifier("randomize_considered"), NULL_TREE, TYPE_ATTRIBUTES(type));
+	}
+#ifdef __DEBUG_PLUGIN
+	fprintf(stderr, "Marking randomize_considered on struct %s\n", ORIG_TYPE_NAME(type));
+#ifdef __DEBUG_VERBOSE
+	debug_tree(type);
+#endif
+#endif
+}
+
+static void update_decl_size(tree decl)
+{
+	tree lastval, lastidx, field, init, type, flexsize;
+	unsigned HOST_WIDE_INT len;
+
+	type = TREE_TYPE(decl);
+
+	if (!lookup_attribute("has_flexarray", TYPE_ATTRIBUTES(type)))
+		return;
+
+	init = DECL_INITIAL(decl);
+	if (init == NULL_TREE || init == error_mark_node)
+		return;
+
+	if (TREE_CODE(init) != CONSTRUCTOR)
+		return;
+
+	len = CONSTRUCTOR_NELTS(init);
+        if (!len)
+		return;
+
+	lastval = CONSTRUCTOR_ELT(init, CONSTRUCTOR_NELTS(init) - 1)->value;
+	lastidx = CONSTRUCTOR_ELT(init, CONSTRUCTOR_NELTS(init) - 1)->index;
+
+	for (field = TYPE_FIELDS(TREE_TYPE(decl)); TREE_CHAIN(field); field = TREE_CHAIN(field))
+		;
+
+	if (lastidx != field)
+		return;
+
+	if (TREE_CODE(lastval) != STRING_CST) {
+		error("Only string constants are supported as initializers "
+		      "for randomized structures with flexible arrays");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	flexsize = bitsize_int(TREE_STRING_LENGTH(lastval) *
+		tree_to_uhwi(TYPE_SIZE(TREE_TYPE(TREE_TYPE(lastval)))));
+
+	DECL_SIZE(decl) = size_binop(PLUS_EXPR, TYPE_SIZE(type), flexsize);
+
+	return;
+}
+
+
+static void randomize_layout_finish_decl(void *event_data, void *data)
+{
+	tree decl = (tree)event_data;
+	tree type;
+
+	if (decl == NULL_TREE || decl == error_mark_node)
+		return;
+
+	type = TREE_TYPE(decl);
+
+	if (TREE_CODE(decl) != VAR_DECL)
+		return;
+
+	if (TREE_CODE(type) != RECORD_TYPE && TREE_CODE(type) != UNION_TYPE)
+		return;
+
+	if (!lookup_attribute("randomize_performed", TYPE_ATTRIBUTES(type)))
+		return;
+
+	DECL_SIZE(decl) = 0;
+	DECL_SIZE_UNIT(decl) = 0;
+	SET_DECL_ALIGN(decl, 0);
+	SET_DECL_MODE (decl, VOIDmode);
+	SET_DECL_RTL(decl, 0);
+	update_decl_size(decl);
+	layout_decl(decl, 0);
+}
+
+static void finish_type(void *event_data, void *data)
+{
+	tree type = (tree)event_data;
+
+	if (type == NULL_TREE || type == error_mark_node)
+		return;
+
+	if (TREE_CODE(type) != RECORD_TYPE)
+		return;
+
+	if (TYPE_FIELDS(type) == NULL_TREE)
+		return;
+
+	if (lookup_attribute("randomize_considered", TYPE_ATTRIBUTES(type)))
+		return;
+
+#ifdef __DEBUG_PLUGIN
+	fprintf(stderr, "Calling randomize_type on %s\n", ORIG_TYPE_NAME(type));
+#endif
+#ifdef __DEBUG_VERBOSE
+	debug_tree(type);
+#endif
+	randomize_type(type);
+
+	return;
+}
+
+static struct attribute_spec randomize_layout_attr = {
+	.name		= "randomize_layout",
+	// related to args
+	.min_length	= 0,
+	.max_length	= 0,
+	.decl_required	= false,
+	// need type declaration
+	.type_required	= true,
+	.function_type_required = false,
+	.handler		= handle_randomize_layout_attr,
+#if BUILDING_GCC_VERSION >= 4007
+	.affects_type_identity  = true
+#endif
+};
+
+static struct attribute_spec no_randomize_layout_attr = {
+	.name		= "no_randomize_layout",
+	// related to args
+	.min_length	= 0,
+	.max_length	= 0,
+	.decl_required	= false,
+	// need type declaration
+	.type_required	= true,
+	.function_type_required = false,
+	.handler		= handle_randomize_layout_attr,
+#if BUILDING_GCC_VERSION >= 4007
+	.affects_type_identity  = true
+#endif
+};
+
+static struct attribute_spec randomize_considered_attr = {
+	.name		= "randomize_considered",
+	// related to args
+	.min_length	= 0,
+	.max_length	= 0,
+	.decl_required	= false,
+	// need type declaration
+	.type_required	= true,
+	.function_type_required = false,
+	.handler		= handle_randomize_considered_attr,
+#if BUILDING_GCC_VERSION >= 4007
+	.affects_type_identity  = false
+#endif
+};
+
+static struct attribute_spec randomize_performed_attr = {
+	.name		= "randomize_performed",
+	// related to args
+	.min_length	= 0,
+	.max_length	= 0,
+	.decl_required	= false,
+	// need type declaration
+	.type_required	= true,
+	.function_type_required = false,
+	.handler		= handle_randomize_performed_attr,
+#if BUILDING_GCC_VERSION >= 4007
+	.affects_type_identity  = false
+#endif
+};
+
+static void register_attributes(void *event_data, void *data)
+{
+	register_attribute(&randomize_layout_attr);
+	register_attribute(&no_randomize_layout_attr);
+	register_attribute(&randomize_considered_attr);
+	register_attribute(&randomize_performed_attr);
+}
+
+static void check_bad_casts_in_constructor(tree var, tree init)
+{
+	unsigned HOST_WIDE_INT idx;
+	tree field, val;
+	tree field_type, val_type;
+
+	FOR_EACH_CONSTRUCTOR_ELT(CONSTRUCTOR_ELTS(init), idx, field, val) {
+		if (TREE_CODE(val) == CONSTRUCTOR) {
+			check_bad_casts_in_constructor(var, val);
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		/* pipacs' plugin creates franken-arrays that differ from those produced by
+		   normal code which all have valid 'field' trees. work around this */
+		if (field == NULL_TREE)
+			continue;
+		field_type = TREE_TYPE(field);
+		val_type = TREE_TYPE(val);
+
+		if (TREE_CODE(field_type) != POINTER_TYPE || TREE_CODE(val_type) != POINTER_TYPE)
+			continue;
+
+		if (field_type == val_type)
+			continue;
+
+		field_type = TYPE_MAIN_VARIANT(strip_array_types(TYPE_MAIN_VARIANT(TREE_TYPE(field_type))));
+		val_type = TYPE_MAIN_VARIANT(strip_array_types(TYPE_MAIN_VARIANT(TREE_TYPE(val_type))));
+
+		if (field_type == void_type_node)
+			continue;
+		if (field_type == val_type)
+			continue;
+		if (TREE_CODE(val_type) != RECORD_TYPE)
+			continue;
+
+		if (!lookup_attribute("randomize_performed", TYPE_ATTRIBUTES(val_type)))
+			continue;
+		inform(DECL_SOURCE_LOCATION(var), "found mismatched constructor struct pointer types: %qT and %qT\n", TYPE_MAIN_VARIANT(field_type), TYPE_MAIN_VARIANT(val_type));
+	}
+}
+
+/* derived from the constify plugin */
+static void check_global_variables(void *event_data, void *data)
+{
+	struct varpool_node *node;
+	tree init;
+
+	FOR_EACH_VARIABLE(node) {
+		tree var = NODE_DECL(node);
+		init = DECL_INITIAL(var);
+		if (init == NULL_TREE)
+			continue;
+
+		if (TREE_CODE(init) != CONSTRUCTOR)
+			continue;
+
+		check_bad_casts_in_constructor(var, init);
+	}
+}
+
+static bool dominated_by_is_err(const_tree rhs, basic_block bb)
+{
+	basic_block dom;
+	gimple dom_stmt;
+	gimple call_stmt;
+	const_tree dom_lhs;
+	const_tree poss_is_err_cond;
+	const_tree poss_is_err_func;
+	const_tree is_err_arg;
+
+	dom = get_immediate_dominator(CDI_DOMINATORS, bb);
+	if (!dom)
+		return false;
+
+	dom_stmt = last_stmt(dom);
+	if (!dom_stmt)
+		return false;
+
+	if (gimple_code(dom_stmt) != GIMPLE_COND)
+		return false;
+
+	if (gimple_cond_code(dom_stmt) != NE_EXPR)
+		return false;
+
+	if (!integer_zerop(gimple_cond_rhs(dom_stmt)))
+		return false;
+
+	poss_is_err_cond = gimple_cond_lhs(dom_stmt);
+
+	if (TREE_CODE(poss_is_err_cond) != SSA_NAME)
+		return false;
+
+	call_stmt = SSA_NAME_DEF_STMT(poss_is_err_cond);
+
+	if (gimple_code(call_stmt) != GIMPLE_CALL)
+		return false;
+
+	dom_lhs = gimple_get_lhs(call_stmt);
+	poss_is_err_func = gimple_call_fndecl(call_stmt);
+	if (!poss_is_err_func)
+		return false;
+	if (dom_lhs != poss_is_err_cond)
+		return false;
+	if (strcmp(DECL_NAME_POINTER(poss_is_err_func), "IS_ERR"))
+		return false;
+
+	is_err_arg = gimple_call_arg(call_stmt, 0);
+	if (!is_err_arg)
+		return false;
+
+	if (is_err_arg != rhs)
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static void handle_local_var_initializers(void)
+{
+	tree var;
+	unsigned int i;
+
+	FOR_EACH_LOCAL_DECL(cfun, i, var) {
+		tree init = DECL_INITIAL(var);
+		if (!init)
+			continue;
+		if (TREE_CODE(init) != CONSTRUCTOR)
+			continue;
+		check_bad_casts_in_constructor(var, init);
+	}
+}
+
+static bool type_name_eq(gimple stmt, const_tree type_tree, const char *wanted_name)
+{
+	const char *type_name;
+
+	if (type_tree == NULL_TREE)
+		return false;
+
+	switch (TREE_CODE(type_tree)) {
+	case RECORD_TYPE:
+		type_name = TYPE_NAME_POINTER(type_tree);
+		break;
+	case INTEGER_TYPE:
+		if (TYPE_PRECISION(type_tree) == CHAR_TYPE_SIZE)
+			type_name = "char";
+		else {
+			inform(gimple_location(stmt), "found non-char INTEGER_TYPE cast comparison: %qT\n", type_tree);
+			debug_tree(type_tree);
+			return false;
+		}
+		break;
+	case POINTER_TYPE:
+		if (TREE_CODE(TREE_TYPE(type_tree)) == VOID_TYPE) {
+			type_name = "void *";
+			break;
+		} else {
+			inform(gimple_location(stmt), "found non-void POINTER_TYPE cast comparison %qT\n", type_tree);
+			debug_tree(type_tree);
+			return false;
+		}
+	default:
+		inform(gimple_location(stmt), "unhandled cast comparison: %qT\n", type_tree);
+		debug_tree(type_tree);
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	return strcmp(type_name, wanted_name) == 0;
+}
+
+static bool whitelisted_cast(gimple stmt, const_tree lhs_tree, const_tree rhs_tree)
+{
+	const struct whitelist_entry *entry;
+	expanded_location xloc = expand_location(gimple_location(stmt));
+
+	for (entry = whitelist; entry->pathname; entry++) {
+		if (!strstr(xloc.file, entry->pathname))
+			continue;
+
+		if (type_name_eq(stmt, lhs_tree, entry->lhs) && type_name_eq(stmt, rhs_tree, entry->rhs))
+			return true;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * iterate over all statements to find "bad" casts:
+ * those where the address of the start of a structure is cast
+ * to a pointer of a structure of a different type, or a
+ * structure pointer type is cast to a different structure pointer type
+ */
+static unsigned int find_bad_casts_execute(void)
+{
+	basic_block bb;
+
+	handle_local_var_initializers();
+
+	FOR_EACH_BB_FN(bb, cfun) {
+		gimple_stmt_iterator gsi;
+
+		for (gsi = gsi_start_bb(bb); !gsi_end_p(gsi); gsi_next(&gsi)) {
+			gimple stmt;
+			const_tree lhs;
+			const_tree lhs_type;
+			const_tree rhs1;
+			const_tree rhs_type;
+			const_tree ptr_lhs_type;
+			const_tree ptr_rhs_type;
+			const_tree op0;
+			const_tree op0_type;
+			enum tree_code rhs_code;
+
+			stmt = gsi_stmt(gsi);
+
+#ifdef __DEBUG_PLUGIN
+#ifdef __DEBUG_VERBOSE
+			debug_gimple_stmt(stmt);
+			debug_tree(gimple_get_lhs(stmt));
+#endif
+#endif
+
+			if (gimple_code(stmt) != GIMPLE_ASSIGN)
+				continue;
+
+#ifdef __DEBUG_PLUGIN
+#ifdef __DEBUG_VERBOSE
+			debug_tree(gimple_assign_rhs1(stmt));
+#endif
+#endif
+
+
+			rhs_code = gimple_assign_rhs_code(stmt);
+
+			if (rhs_code != ADDR_EXPR && rhs_code != SSA_NAME)
+				continue;
+
+			lhs = gimple_get_lhs(stmt);
+			lhs_type = TREE_TYPE(lhs);
+			rhs1 = gimple_assign_rhs1(stmt);
+			rhs_type = TREE_TYPE(rhs1);
+
+			if (TREE_CODE(rhs_type) != POINTER_TYPE ||
+			    TREE_CODE(lhs_type) != POINTER_TYPE)
+				continue;
+
+			ptr_lhs_type = TYPE_MAIN_VARIANT(strip_array_types(TYPE_MAIN_VARIANT(TREE_TYPE(lhs_type))));
+			ptr_rhs_type = TYPE_MAIN_VARIANT(strip_array_types(TYPE_MAIN_VARIANT(TREE_TYPE(rhs_type))));
+
+			if (ptr_rhs_type == void_type_node)
+				continue;
+
+			if (ptr_lhs_type == void_type_node)
+				continue;
+
+			if (dominated_by_is_err(rhs1, bb))
+				continue;
+
+			if (TREE_CODE(ptr_rhs_type) != RECORD_TYPE) {
+#ifndef __DEBUG_PLUGIN
+				if (lookup_attribute("randomize_performed", TYPE_ATTRIBUTES(ptr_lhs_type)))
+#endif
+				{
+					if (!whitelisted_cast(stmt, ptr_lhs_type, ptr_rhs_type))
+						inform(gimple_location(stmt), "found mismatched rhs struct pointer types: %qT and %qT\n", ptr_lhs_type, ptr_rhs_type);
+				}
+				continue;
+			}
+
+			if (rhs_code == SSA_NAME && ptr_lhs_type == ptr_rhs_type)
+				continue;
+
+			if (rhs_code == ADDR_EXPR) {
+				op0 = TREE_OPERAND(rhs1, 0);
+
+				if (op0 == NULL_TREE)
+					continue;
+
+				if (TREE_CODE(op0) != VAR_DECL)
+					continue;
+
+				op0_type = TYPE_MAIN_VARIANT(strip_array_types(TYPE_MAIN_VARIANT(TREE_TYPE(op0))));
+				if (op0_type == ptr_lhs_type)
+					continue;
+
+#ifndef __DEBUG_PLUGIN
+				if (lookup_attribute("randomize_performed", TYPE_ATTRIBUTES(op0_type)))
+#endif
+				{
+					if (!whitelisted_cast(stmt, ptr_lhs_type, op0_type))
+						inform(gimple_location(stmt), "found mismatched op0 struct pointer types: %qT and %qT\n", ptr_lhs_type, op0_type);
+				}
+			} else {
+				const_tree ssa_name_var = SSA_NAME_VAR(rhs1);
+				/* skip bogus type casts introduced by container_of */
+				if (ssa_name_var != NULL_TREE && DECL_NAME(ssa_name_var) && 
+				    !strcmp((const char *)DECL_NAME_POINTER(ssa_name_var), "__mptr"))
+					continue;
+#ifndef __DEBUG_PLUGIN
+				if (lookup_attribute("randomize_performed", TYPE_ATTRIBUTES(ptr_rhs_type)))
+#endif
+				{
+					if (!whitelisted_cast(stmt, ptr_lhs_type, ptr_rhs_type))
+						inform(gimple_location(stmt), "found mismatched ssa struct pointer types: %qT and %qT\n", ptr_lhs_type, ptr_rhs_type);
+				}
+			}
+
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#define PASS_NAME find_bad_casts
+#define NO_GATE
+#define TODO_FLAGS_FINISH TODO_dump_func
+#include "gcc-generate-gimple-pass.h"
+
+__visible int plugin_init(struct plugin_name_args *plugin_info, struct plugin_gcc_version *version)
+{
+	int i;
+	const char * const plugin_name = plugin_info->base_name;
+	const int argc = plugin_info->argc;
+	const struct plugin_argument * const argv = plugin_info->argv;
+	bool enable = true;
+	int obtained_seed = 0;
+	struct register_pass_info find_bad_casts_pass_info;
+
+	find_bad_casts_pass_info.pass			= make_find_bad_casts_pass();
+	find_bad_casts_pass_info.reference_pass_name	= "ssa";
+	find_bad_casts_pass_info.ref_pass_instance_number	= 1;
+	find_bad_casts_pass_info.pos_op			= PASS_POS_INSERT_AFTER;
+
+	if (!plugin_default_version_check(version, &gcc_version)) {
+		error(G_("incompatible gcc/plugin versions"));
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	if (strncmp(lang_hooks.name, "GNU C", 5) && !strncmp(lang_hooks.name, "GNU C+", 6)) {
+		inform(UNKNOWN_LOCATION, G_("%s supports C only, not %s"), plugin_name, lang_hooks.name);
+		enable = false;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < argc; ++i) {
+		if (!strcmp(argv[i].key, "disable")) {
+			enable = false;
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (!strcmp(argv[i].key, "performance-mode")) {
+			performance_mode = 1;
+			continue;
+		}
+		error(G_("unknown option '-fplugin-arg-%s-%s'"), plugin_name, argv[i].key);
+	}
+
+	if (strlen(randstruct_seed) != 64) {
+		error(G_("invalid seed value supplied for %s plugin"), plugin_name);
+		return 1;
+	}
+	obtained_seed = sscanf(randstruct_seed, "%016llx%016llx%016llx%016llx",
+		&shuffle_seed[0], &shuffle_seed[1], &shuffle_seed[2], &shuffle_seed[3]);
+	if (obtained_seed != 4) {
+		error(G_("Invalid seed supplied for %s plugin"), plugin_name);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	register_callback(plugin_name, PLUGIN_INFO, NULL, &randomize_layout_plugin_info);
+	if (enable) {
+		register_callback(plugin_name, PLUGIN_ALL_IPA_PASSES_START, check_global_variables, NULL);
+		register_callback(plugin_name, PLUGIN_PASS_MANAGER_SETUP, NULL, &find_bad_casts_pass_info);
+		register_callback(plugin_name, PLUGIN_FINISH_TYPE, finish_type, NULL);
+		register_callback(plugin_name, PLUGIN_FINISH_DECL, randomize_layout_finish_decl, NULL);
+	}
+	register_callback(plugin_name, PLUGIN_ATTRIBUTES, register_attributes, NULL);
+
+	return 0;
+}