From patchwork Mon Aug 28 21:34:45 2017 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Kees Cook X-Patchwork-Id: 9926229 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 626F360375 for ; Mon, 28 Aug 2017 21:35:32 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 56DBE287CE for ; Mon, 28 Aug 2017 21:35:32 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 4B9CD287D1; Mon, 28 Aug 2017 21:35:32 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.1 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED,T_DKIM_INVALID autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from mother.openwall.net (mother.openwall.net [195.42.179.200]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with SMTP id 76B2D287CE for ; Mon, 28 Aug 2017 21:35:31 +0000 (UTC) Received: (qmail 11710 invoked by uid 550); 28 Aug 2017 21:35:29 -0000 Mailing-List: contact kernel-hardening-help@lists.openwall.com; run by ezmlm Precedence: bulk List-Post: List-Help: List-Unsubscribe: List-Subscribe: List-ID: Delivered-To: mailing list kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Received: (qmail 11673 invoked from network); 28 Aug 2017 21:35:28 -0000 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=chromium.org; s=google; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references; bh=AItuPkxoXP2lQMo2mwVBJC43AWaOTOyiRxkn5bbYjPo=; b=P82+WhcJ2w4t0itXvdr5hrcwttx2wLYcKQKPfoTJhEa0icshScC90UKxjdjIXCoe8U g4RKsT3grBA80FOefTMgzSptgRah6RR/sPaTKxqVxYDBpob2NGgoAWq8+ytSlOqrT4VK 5CPnJmmrFneXjKqS2iJNja1PXx4WfOPmG7rMI= X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references; bh=AItuPkxoXP2lQMo2mwVBJC43AWaOTOyiRxkn5bbYjPo=; b=kBsrqv3fGkV0s46LqRyGO8AXkGUp643HBxOPFqIczcUyVESm3oZiCcEc3uU+dew5z9 YGn7vnaTjV+Uz53kZuOA3Hg9BW7J/oSIg/KNqvY73tJBgWMoqrZdyd6xbdpoQkm4vn/A /VuT/3mHYIvB1lkeuQKnYSUO2kmswyMt0N/QRmetlHQ2mw5RvGFkHq2JfCGLSvMlTZw/ a4IfYOGb0lrYCdBb5aG4N+TUUpc9jFG3fG5aIaHoQtCr4ePsyeXOe/S7FJmpL+vcCDam +t/LxltsnmaGNGrR9+5xsxtRx6c8o/CE9XBzv/b0ko9wrAAHTvjgpK9xG3RGmvtJHkQo 17JA== X-Gm-Message-State: AHYfb5gIz4vT1HKbLOwdM+uM1ZqFzSSO+2B40U3SnRmvorYDeICkJ8uG KnCtgadVOIIwHqe1 X-Received: by 10.84.215.197 with SMTP id g5mr2335440plj.71.1503956117200; Mon, 28 Aug 2017 14:35:17 -0700 (PDT) From: Kees Cook To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Kees Cook , David Windsor , Alexander Viro , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2017 14:34:45 -0700 Message-Id: <1503956111-36652-5-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.7.4 In-Reply-To: <1503956111-36652-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> References: <1503956111-36652-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> Subject: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 04/30] dcache: Define usercopy region in dentry_cache slab cache X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP From: David Windsor When a dentry name is short enough, it can be stored directly in the dentry itself (instead in a separate kmalloc allocation). These dentry short names, stored in struct dentry.d_iname and therefore contained in the dentry_cache slab cache, need to be coped to userspace. cache object allocation: fs/dcache.c: __d_alloc(...): ... dentry = kmem_cache_alloc(dentry_cache, ...); ... dentry->d_name.name = dentry->d_iname; example usage trace: filldir+0xb0/0x140 dcache_readdir+0x82/0x170 iterate_dir+0x142/0x1b0 SyS_getdents+0xb5/0x160 fs/readdir.c: (called via ctx.actor by dir_emit) filldir(..., const char *name, ...): ... copy_to_user(..., name, namlen) fs/libfs.c: dcache_readdir(...): ... next = next_positive(dentry, p, 1) ... dir_emit(..., next->d_name.name, ...) In support of usercopy hardening, this patch defines a region in the dentry_cache slab cache in which userspace copy operations are allowed. This region is known as the slab cache's usercopy region. Slab caches can now check that each copy operation involving cache-managed memory falls entirely within the slab's usercopy region. This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Signed-off-by: David Windsor [kees: adjust hunks for kmalloc-specific things moved later] [kees: adjust commit log, provide usage trace] Cc: Alexander Viro Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook --- fs/dcache.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/dcache.c b/fs/dcache.c index f90141387f01..5f5e7c1fcf4b 100644 --- a/fs/dcache.c +++ b/fs/dcache.c @@ -3603,8 +3603,9 @@ static void __init dcache_init(void) * but it is probably not worth it because of the cache nature * of the dcache. */ - dentry_cache = KMEM_CACHE(dentry, - SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT|SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_MEM_SPREAD|SLAB_ACCOUNT); + dentry_cache = KMEM_CACHE_USERCOPY(dentry, + SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT|SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_MEM_SPREAD|SLAB_ACCOUNT, + d_iname); /* Hash may have been set up in dcache_init_early */ if (!hashdist)