From patchwork Fri Jan 12 00:47:02 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Dan Williams X-Patchwork-Id: 10160251 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 053F860327 for ; Fri, 12 Jan 2018 11:29:02 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E509B28985 for ; Fri, 12 Jan 2018 11:29:01 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id D656B28987; Fri, 12 Jan 2018 11:29:01 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.2 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from mother.openwall.net (mother.openwall.net [195.42.179.200]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with SMTP id B414128985 for ; Fri, 12 Jan 2018 11:29:00 +0000 (UTC) Received: (qmail 15418 invoked by uid 550); 12 Jan 2018 11:28:29 -0000 Mailing-List: contact kernel-hardening-help@lists.openwall.com; run by ezmlm Precedence: bulk List-Post: List-Help: List-Unsubscribe: List-Subscribe: List-ID: Delivered-To: mailing list kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Delivered-To: moderator for kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Received: (qmail 23695 invoked from network); 12 Jan 2018 00:55:29 -0000 X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.46,346,1511856000"; d="scan'208";a="18575731" From: Dan Williams To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, Andi Kleen , Kees Cook , kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, x86@kernel.org, Ingo Molnar , Al Viro , "H. Peter Anvin" , tglx@linutronix.de, torvalds@linux-foundation.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org, alan@linux.intel.com Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2018 16:47:02 -0800 Message-ID: <151571802258.27429.932636277047687877.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com> In-Reply-To: <151571798296.27429.7166552848688034184.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com> References: <151571798296.27429.7166552848688034184.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com> User-Agent: StGit/0.17.1-9-g687f MIME-Version: 1.0 Subject: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 07/19] x86: introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec and ASM_IFENCE X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP For 'get_user' paths, do not allow the kernel to speculate on the value of a user controlled pointer. In addition to the 'stac' instruction for Supervisor Mode Access Protection, an 'ifence' causes the 'access_ok' result to resolve in the pipeline before the cpu might take any speculative action on the pointer value. Since this is a major kernel interface that deals with user controlled data, the '__uaccess_begin_nospec' mechanism will prevent speculative execution past an 'access_ok' permission check. While speculative execution past 'access_ok' is not enough to lead to a kernel memory leak, it is a necessary precondition. To be clear, '__uaccess_begin_nospec' and ASM_IFENCE are not addressing any known issues with 'get_user' they are addressing a class of potential problems that could be near 'get_user' usages. In other words, these helpers are for hygiene not clinical fixes. There are no functional changes in this patch. Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds Suggested-by: Andi Kleen Cc: Al Viro Cc: Kees Cook Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: x86@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Dan Williams --- arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h | 4 ++++ arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 10 ++++++++++ 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h index db333300bd4b..0b59707e0b46 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h @@ -40,6 +40,10 @@ #endif /* CONFIG_X86_SMAP */ +#define ASM_IFENCE \ + ALTERNATIVE_2 "", "mfence", X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC, \ + "lfence", X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC + #else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ #include diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h index 574dff4d2913..a31fd4fc6483 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -124,6 +124,11 @@ extern int __get_user_bad(void); #define __uaccess_begin() stac() #define __uaccess_end() clac() +#define __uaccess_begin_nospec() \ +({ \ + stac(); \ + ifence(); \ +}) /* * This is a type: either unsigned long, if the argument fits into @@ -487,6 +492,11 @@ struct __large_struct { unsigned long buf[100]; }; __uaccess_begin(); \ barrier(); +#define uaccess_try_nospec do { \ + current->thread.uaccess_err = 0; \ + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); \ + barrier(); + #define uaccess_catch(err) \ __uaccess_end(); \ (err) |= (current->thread.uaccess_err ? -EFAULT : 0); \