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[v2,10/19] ipv4: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution

Message ID 151571803884.27429.7578279171286065970.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com (mailing list archive)
State New, archived
Headers show

Commit Message

Dan Williams Jan. 12, 2018, 12:47 a.m. UTC
Static analysis reports that 'offset' may be a user controlled value
that is used as a data dependency reading from a raw_frag_vec buffer.
In order to avoid potential leaks of kernel memory values, block
speculative execution of the instruction stream that could issue further
reads based on an invalid '*(rfv->c + offset)' value.

Based on an original patch by Elena Reshetova.

Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru>
Cc: Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
---
 net/ipv4/raw.c |   10 ++++++----
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

Comments

Dan Williams Jan. 12, 2018, 6:47 p.m. UTC | #1
On Thu, Jan 11, 2018 at 11:59 PM, Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 11, 2018 at 04:47:18PM -0800, Dan Williams wrote:
>> Static analysis reports that 'offset' may be a user controlled value
>> that is used as a data dependency reading from a raw_frag_vec buffer.
>> In order to avoid potential leaks of kernel memory values, block
>> speculative execution of the instruction stream that could issue further
>> reads based on an invalid '*(rfv->c + offset)' value.
>>
>> Based on an original patch by Elena Reshetova.
>
> There is the "Co-Developed-by:" tag now, if you want to use it...

Ok, thanks.

>
>> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
>> Cc: Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru>
>> Cc: Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
>> Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
>> Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
>> ---
>>  net/ipv4/raw.c |   10 ++++++----
>>  1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> Ugh, what is this, the 4th time I've said "I don't think this is an
> issue, so why are you changing this code." to this patch.  To be
> followed by a "oh yeah, you are right, I'll drop it", only to see it
> show back up in the next time this patch series is sent out?
>
> Same for the other patches in this series that I have reviewed 4, maybe
> 5, times already.  The "v2" is not very true here...

The theme of the review feedback on v1 was 'don't put ifence in any
net/ code', and that was addressed.

I honestly thought the new definition of array_ptr() changed the
calculus on this patch. Given the same pattern appears in the ipv6
case, and I have yet to hear that we should drop the ipv6 patch, make
the code symmetric just for readability purposes. Otherwise we need a
comment saying why this is safe for ipv4, but maybe not safe for ipv6,
I think 'array_ptr' is effectively that comment. I.e. 'array_ptr()' is
designed to be low impact for instrumenting false positives. If that
new argument does not hold water I will definitely drop this patch.
Greg KH Jan. 13, 2018, 8:56 a.m. UTC | #2
On Fri, Jan 12, 2018 at 10:47:44AM -0800, Dan Williams wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 11, 2018 at 11:59 PM, Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> >> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
> >> Cc: Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru>
> >> Cc: Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
> >> Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
> >> Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
> >> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
> >> ---
> >>  net/ipv4/raw.c |   10 ++++++----
> >>  1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> >
> > Ugh, what is this, the 4th time I've said "I don't think this is an
> > issue, so why are you changing this code." to this patch.  To be
> > followed by a "oh yeah, you are right, I'll drop it", only to see it
> > show back up in the next time this patch series is sent out?
> >
> > Same for the other patches in this series that I have reviewed 4, maybe
> > 5, times already.  The "v2" is not very true here...
> 
> The theme of the review feedback on v1 was 'don't put ifence in any
> net/ code', and that was addressed.
> 
> I honestly thought the new definition of array_ptr() changed the
> calculus on this patch. Given the same pattern appears in the ipv6
> case, and I have yet to hear that we should drop the ipv6 patch, make
> the code symmetric just for readability purposes. Otherwise we need a
> comment saying why this is safe for ipv4, but maybe not safe for ipv6,
> I think 'array_ptr' is effectively that comment. I.e. 'array_ptr()' is
> designed to be low impact for instrumenting false positives. If that
> new argument does not hold water I will definitely drop this patch.

I also argued, again in an older review of this same patch series, that
the ipv6 patch should be dropped as well for this same exact reason.

I didn't think you wanted to hear me rant about the same thing on both
patches :)

greg k-h
diff mbox

Patch

diff --git a/net/ipv4/raw.c b/net/ipv4/raw.c
index 125c1eab3eaa..91091a10294f 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/raw.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/raw.c
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ 
 #include <linux/in_route.h>
 #include <linux/route.h>
 #include <linux/skbuff.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 #include <linux/igmp.h>
 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
 #include <net/dst.h>
@@ -472,17 +473,18 @@  static int raw_getfrag(void *from, char *to, int offset, int len, int odd,
 		       struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	struct raw_frag_vec *rfv = from;
+	char *rfv_buf;
 
-	if (offset < rfv->hlen) {
+	rfv_buf = array_ptr(rfv->hdr.c, offset, rfv->hlen);
+	if (rfv_buf) {
 		int copy = min(rfv->hlen - offset, len);
 
 		if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL)
-			memcpy(to, rfv->hdr.c + offset, copy);
+			memcpy(to, rfv_buf, copy);
 		else
 			skb->csum = csum_block_add(
 				skb->csum,
-				csum_partial_copy_nocheck(rfv->hdr.c + offset,
-							  to, copy, 0),
+				csum_partial_copy_nocheck(rfv_buf, to, copy, 0),
 				odd);
 
 		odd = 0;