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[v5,09/12] vfs, fdtable: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution

Message ID 151703976200.26578.16181908340589076165.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com (mailing list archive)
State New, archived
Headers show

Commit Message

Dan Williams Jan. 27, 2018, 7:56 a.m. UTC 
'fd' is a user controlled value that is used as a data dependency to
read from the 'fdt->fd' array.  In order to avoid potential leaks of
kernel memory values, block speculative execution of the instruction
stream that could issue reads based on an invalid 'file *' returned from
__fcheck_files.

Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Co-developed-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
---
 include/linux/fdtable.h |    5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff mbox

Patch

diff --git a/include/linux/fdtable.h b/include/linux/fdtable.h
index 1c65817673db..c61f06c77fdf 100644
--- a/include/linux/fdtable.h
+++ b/include/linux/fdtable.h
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ 
 #include <linux/compiler.h>
 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
 #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/fs.h>
@@ -82,8 +83,10 @@  static inline struct file *__fcheck_files(struct files_struct *files, unsigned i
 {
 	struct fdtable *fdt = rcu_dereference_raw(files->fdt);
 
-	if (fd < fdt->max_fds)
+	if (fd < fdt->max_fds) {
+		fd = array_idx(fd, fdt->max_fds);
 		return rcu_dereference_raw(fdt->fd[fd]);
+	}
 	return NULL;
 }