From patchwork Sat Jan 27 07:56:02 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Dan Williams X-Patchwork-Id: 10187367 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 875A760385 for ; Sat, 27 Jan 2018 08:06:35 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 798E928D43 for ; Sat, 27 Jan 2018 08:06:35 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 6D56C28CBD; Sat, 27 Jan 2018 08:06:35 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.2 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from mother.openwall.net (mother.openwall.net [195.42.179.200]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with SMTP id 7F1F428C0C for ; Sat, 27 Jan 2018 08:06:34 +0000 (UTC) Received: (qmail 21615 invoked by uid 550); 27 Jan 2018 08:05:21 -0000 Mailing-List: contact kernel-hardening-help@lists.openwall.com; run by ezmlm Precedence: bulk List-Post: List-Help: List-Unsubscribe: List-Subscribe: List-ID: Delivered-To: mailing list kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Received: (qmail 21524 invoked from network); 27 Jan 2018 08:05:19 -0000 X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.46,421,1511856000"; d="scan'208";a="196642790" From: Dan Williams To: tglx@linutronix.de Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, Al Viro , torvalds@linux-foundation.org, alan@linux.intel.com Date: Fri, 26 Jan 2018 23:56:02 -0800 Message-ID: <151703976200.26578.16181908340589076165.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com> In-Reply-To: <151703971300.26578.1185595719337719486.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com> References: <151703971300.26578.1185595719337719486.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com> User-Agent: StGit/0.17.1-9-g687f MIME-Version: 1.0 Subject: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 09/12] vfs, fdtable: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP 'fd' is a user controlled value that is used as a data dependency to read from the 'fdt->fd' array. In order to avoid potential leaks of kernel memory values, block speculative execution of the instruction stream that could issue reads based on an invalid 'file *' returned from __fcheck_files. Cc: Al Viro Co-developed-by: Elena Reshetova Signed-off-by: Dan Williams --- include/linux/fdtable.h | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/linux/fdtable.h b/include/linux/fdtable.h index 1c65817673db..c61f06c77fdf 100644 --- a/include/linux/fdtable.h +++ b/include/linux/fdtable.h @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -82,8 +83,10 @@ static inline struct file *__fcheck_files(struct files_struct *files, unsigned i { struct fdtable *fdt = rcu_dereference_raw(files->fdt); - if (fd < fdt->max_fds) + if (fd < fdt->max_fds) { + fd = array_idx(fd, fdt->max_fds); return rcu_dereference_raw(fdt->fd[fd]); + } return NULL; }