| Message ID | 151727420158.33451.11658324346540434635.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 390b3dc3d438..06f1d4c5ec6b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev, { if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1)) return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); - return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n"); + return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n"); } ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev,
Reflect the presence of get_user(), __get_user(), and 'syscall' protections in sysfs. The expectation is that new and better tooling will allow the kernel to grow more usages of array_index_nospec(), for now, only claim mitigation for __user pointer de-references. Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Reported-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)