From patchwork Sat Jul 6 10:54:46 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Salvatore Mesoraca X-Patchwork-Id: 11033635 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id EEBE913BD for ; Sat, 6 Jul 2019 10:56:12 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id DF5EA2881B for ; Sat, 6 Jul 2019 10:56:12 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id D267928A3F; Sat, 6 Jul 2019 10:56:12 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-5.3 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from mother.openwall.net (mother.openwall.net [195.42.179.200]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with SMTP id A65AF2881B for ; Sat, 6 Jul 2019 10:56:11 +0000 (UTC) Received: (qmail 24480 invoked by uid 550); 6 Jul 2019 10:55:30 -0000 Mailing-List: contact kernel-hardening-help@lists.openwall.com; run by ezmlm Precedence: bulk List-Post: List-Help: List-Unsubscribe: List-Subscribe: List-ID: Delivered-To: mailing list kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Received: (qmail 24411 invoked from network); 6 Jul 2019 10:55:28 -0000 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references; bh=tc9nxOt0YynZlg4DtgqDwIM4b55l1zqGz9yWCnOUqxc=; b=H/hv3oqlvBbndX96qLPf5yWClDQ6sRuTVt5tRUmkZdBjqfNT8QP6eSS48eMgnLnX3M WMQ4grRnDFsHfzcmJCa2NZW22qa3lXOGIluOW5jgh2LpcgL7DkJ54y1w0C6Xhkpp2ntZ I/av/JjLtKAzbQq7e3mH2IiGg67xxHpyAjtACqs2raUphqFhtSD3uoAU+89+iqorUH8i Taggjzu3zY8qh5GVcr/ruUdLkoTpT4zqR8vtjxaqQtGYSk/tQjq/DHcYhOTPMA3P0Zf2 4XSF8AjFUnGcVP26TnVi4uep/PBucOaPpgJiMZ2o/nHHHTtddc59KmP2z9DdGZLZZfYC 2KfA== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references; bh=tc9nxOt0YynZlg4DtgqDwIM4b55l1zqGz9yWCnOUqxc=; b=f/dc+eZ2fbx33bKuFNMW2c/ZVjnafQv9D+KgFuSYx7OpMU2sBAaxzg+3IvWWHWvUav BBc3XE0IJy3AWbtHjC8eJMniUM3nlwb0IEuDZZdujYzFeg6U0H8Oh7JyeqXS/wWn/0jG hoV9oc4+QPcF0WHjESsNpYoYoKzbTjt0Eg+yajcJ8MV2/9mljwAuLI0WI2nBpdAUX3xk ZFRgUMgNL3ZQ4D/clmLuIZWjPQp5rnepEHY3wIiOVidnW5q7mjPwfinAQ1rzTJBltI1d S3cEku9DZkCYICzMU+eUw7wcRt+ybds+p1Sl6d9UN/lCJ/889Zr6RMuYAbnDO6y/s3nA O5+A== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAXivCONwZqaao3DYEQ8nuGEnkQLyCNm0YUvVwh1dsChRnrqVD1t xXMovhxF/eRe9i+Zhyx4SOw= X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqwjn5IyS6SWM65IBzeh/bdnAqkvGqGa6i9TXN3uin56hMILK/3JcH3obevfA3uL9Qb6/jMB4g== X-Received: by 2002:a1c:4d6:: with SMTP id 205mr7201683wme.148.1562410517083; Sat, 06 Jul 2019 03:55:17 -0700 (PDT) From: Salvatore Mesoraca To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Alexander Viro , Brad Spengler , Casey Schaufler , Christoph Hellwig , James Morris , Jann Horn , Kees Cook , PaX Team , Salvatore Mesoraca , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Thomas Gleixner Subject: [PATCH v5 05/12] LSM: creation of "check_vmflags" LSM hook Date: Sat, 6 Jul 2019 12:54:46 +0200 Message-Id: <1562410493-8661-6-git-send-email-s.mesoraca16@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.9.1 In-Reply-To: <1562410493-8661-1-git-send-email-s.mesoraca16@gmail.com> References: <1562410493-8661-1-git-send-email-s.mesoraca16@gmail.com> X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP Creation of a new LSM hook to check if a given configuration of vmflags, for a new memory allocation request, should be allowed or not. It's placed in "do_mmap", "do_brk_flags", "__install_special_mapping" and "setup_arg_pages". When loading an ELF, this hook is also used to determine what to do with an RWE PT_GNU_STACK header. This allows LSM to force the loader to silently ignore executable stack markings, which is useful a thing to do when trampoline emulation is available. Signed-off-by: Salvatore Mesoraca --- fs/binfmt_elf.c | 3 ++- fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c | 3 ++- fs/exec.c | 4 ++++ include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 7 +++++++ include/linux/security.h | 6 ++++++ mm/mmap.c | 13 +++++++++++++ security/security.c | 5 +++++ 7 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/binfmt_elf.c b/fs/binfmt_elf.c index 8264b46..1d98737 100644 --- a/fs/binfmt_elf.c +++ b/fs/binfmt_elf.c @@ -806,7 +806,8 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm) for (i = 0; i < loc->elf_ex.e_phnum; i++, elf_ppnt++) switch (elf_ppnt->p_type) { case PT_GNU_STACK: - if (elf_ppnt->p_flags & PF_X) + if (elf_ppnt->p_flags & PF_X && + !security_check_vmflags(VM_EXEC|VM_READ|VM_WRITE)) executable_stack = EXSTACK_ENABLE_X; else executable_stack = EXSTACK_DISABLE_X; diff --git a/fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c b/fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c index d86ebd0d..6e0dee1 100644 --- a/fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c +++ b/fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c @@ -163,7 +163,8 @@ static int elf_fdpic_fetch_phdrs(struct elf_fdpic_params *params, if (phdr->p_type != PT_GNU_STACK) continue; - if (phdr->p_flags & PF_X) + if (phdr->p_flags & PF_X && + !security_check_vmflags(VM_EXEC|VM_READ|VM_WRITE)) params->flags |= ELF_FDPIC_FLAG_EXEC_STACK; else params->flags |= ELF_FDPIC_FLAG_NOEXEC_STACK; diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c index 89a500b..abf770a 100644 --- a/fs/exec.c +++ b/fs/exec.c @@ -756,6 +756,10 @@ int setup_arg_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm, vm_flags |= mm->def_flags; vm_flags |= VM_STACK_INCOMPLETE_SETUP; + ret = security_check_vmflags(vm_flags); + if (ret) + goto out_unlock; + ret = mprotect_fixup(vma, &prev, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end, vm_flags); if (ret) diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h index 47f58cf..12ce609 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h @@ -513,6 +513,11 @@ * @reqprot contains the protection requested by the application. * @prot contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel. * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @check_vmflags: + * Check if the requested @vmflags are allowed. + * @vmflags contains the requested vmflags. + * Return 0 if the operation is allowed to continue otherwise return + * the appropriate error code. * @file_lock: * Check permission before performing file locking operations. * Note the hook mediates both flock and fcntl style locks. @@ -1597,6 +1602,7 @@ unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags); int (*file_mprotect)(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot); + int (*check_vmflags)(vm_flags_t vmflags); int (*file_lock)(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd); int (*file_fcntl)(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg); @@ -1897,6 +1903,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads { struct hlist_head mmap_addr; struct hlist_head mmap_file; struct hlist_head file_mprotect; + struct hlist_head check_vmflags; struct hlist_head file_lock; struct hlist_head file_fcntl; struct hlist_head file_set_fowner; diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 659071c..aed78eb 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -312,6 +312,7 @@ int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr); int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot); +int security_check_vmflags(vm_flags_t vmflags); int security_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd); int security_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg); void security_file_set_fowner(struct file *file); @@ -859,6 +860,11 @@ static inline int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, return 0; } +static inline int security_check_vmflags(vm_flags_t vmflags) +{ + return 0; +} + static inline int security_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd) { return 0; diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c index 7e8c3e8a..ec9c0e3d 100644 --- a/mm/mmap.c +++ b/mm/mmap.c @@ -1390,6 +1390,7 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr, { struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; int pkey = 0; + int error; *populate = 0; @@ -1453,6 +1454,10 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr, vm_flags |= calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey) | calc_vm_flag_bits(flags) | mm->def_flags | VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC; + error = security_check_vmflags(vm_flags); + if (error) + return error; + if (flags & MAP_LOCKED) if (!can_do_mlock()) return -EPERM; @@ -2996,6 +3001,10 @@ static int do_brk_flags(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len, unsigned long fla return -EINVAL; flags |= VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS | VM_ACCOUNT | mm->def_flags; + error = security_check_vmflags(flags); + if (error) + return error; + error = get_unmapped_area(NULL, addr, len, 0, MAP_FIXED); if (offset_in_page(error)) return error; @@ -3393,6 +3402,10 @@ static struct vm_area_struct *__install_special_mapping( int ret; struct vm_area_struct *vma; + ret = security_check_vmflags(vm_flags); + if (ret) + return ERR_PTR(ret); + vma = vm_area_alloc(mm); if (unlikely(vma == NULL)) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index f493db0..3308e89 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -1421,6 +1421,11 @@ int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, return call_int_hook(file_mprotect, 0, vma, reqprot, prot); } +int security_check_vmflags(vm_flags_t vmflags) +{ + return call_int_hook(check_vmflags, 0, vmflags); +} + int security_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd) { return call_int_hook(file_lock, 0, file, cmd);