From patchwork Sat Jul 6 10:54:48 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Salvatore Mesoraca X-Patchwork-Id: 11033639 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2E9A314F6 for ; Sat, 6 Jul 2019 10:56:33 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1EEFC2881B for ; Sat, 6 Jul 2019 10:56:33 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 11B1228A3F; Sat, 6 Jul 2019 10:56:33 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-5.3 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from mother.openwall.net (mother.openwall.net [195.42.179.200]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with SMTP id D32E42881B for ; Sat, 6 Jul 2019 10:56:31 +0000 (UTC) Received: (qmail 25671 invoked by uid 550); 6 Jul 2019 10:55:33 -0000 Mailing-List: contact kernel-hardening-help@lists.openwall.com; run by ezmlm Precedence: bulk List-Post: List-Help: List-Unsubscribe: List-Subscribe: List-ID: Delivered-To: mailing list kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Received: (qmail 24509 invoked from network); 6 Jul 2019 10:55:31 -0000 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references; bh=HSNnsoi40sXC9a5NBIzV0J+z/SUw5gqWPuXVFawRMYc=; b=V7AvK11reWJTiJ1DMourV1U4KNoutKJGDoiTGDXXM3R+PR5LpFynIPMuHGWbUmIT6N 62QOnfL7Spg5I7UppXlkG9bH566FlMkdYX2c5mITv+X49REEJ7TzTRD5C+iQfoN/4rPl UgKMTPNUamuI84pgZfGnM+KdecKNvQnLCdW9YiA5ieNyU+3CJjFBApwua+MKXWYTWR3W cDjDfWnzPiKTGrdUhnTZwNc+HFKvMUxWxCZ7CxTIxdI37rHw++WBf8TzZNY7DbiPJbPx Vi4i+Oh39vDEODfCMLRruFPTteb2P7fgj4MRU+BMXpmRVkxdZYPg4w23p2aEvnIp8KBu br5g== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references; bh=HSNnsoi40sXC9a5NBIzV0J+z/SUw5gqWPuXVFawRMYc=; b=O0LE3DNdGi9CykFQuBRIJj3Vi1oVAKIuTTB/z9uNu5TwTMWIqHTPOXabqXTFHLyy91 ZppcE7UlJC49isVp0x6Aig2xb1hq+4bL+t0QtJi/vFOYljaWNgqQlTE5L0IHE5E6BbAa frPRkHFm8CN3CFAriMAKVRUkvuzFhHsTc9WjDF2KvFKmVwSgn2cefFOJ4o9tY1xgZcnL X5V6U2ohDn0wifcCB7CqRfygXrCLNPrfgJFij2w41GxDXkT0YlDof5Yxv+a+pTIdRTzR 0ITuqZIguuNphAwujyx4Z9Sa9kCF25vlG/F6ou+z8zngwYtiJTkwpdW7PLl6ShzbA+CZ f+lg== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAWFRfr2MHQP8MMfmP18s1+Wa670ZVurC+nf/wZuQMJ6M6hX+WsQ w/Dwni7P0hFoz1pEYaDs1/0= X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqxTOz8ZdoRBiRrROUWhnI6SyewPlaUzoSCGW9GiCDm2WtNdoe4eOEEH3/a8B3ek3jvZ4FdMSg== X-Received: by 2002:a7b:cbc6:: with SMTP id n6mr8125351wmi.14.1562410519789; Sat, 06 Jul 2019 03:55:19 -0700 (PDT) From: Salvatore Mesoraca To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Alexander Viro , Brad Spengler , Casey Schaufler , Christoph Hellwig , James Morris , Jann Horn , Kees Cook , PaX Team , Salvatore Mesoraca , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Thomas Gleixner Subject: [PATCH v5 07/12] LSM: creation of "pagefault_handler" LSM hook Date: Sat, 6 Jul 2019 12:54:48 +0200 Message-Id: <1562410493-8661-8-git-send-email-s.mesoraca16@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.9.1 In-Reply-To: <1562410493-8661-1-git-send-email-s.mesoraca16@gmail.com> References: <1562410493-8661-1-git-send-email-s.mesoraca16@gmail.com> X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP Creation of a new hook to let LSM modules handle user-space pagefaults on x86. It can be used to avoid segfaulting the originating process. If it's the case it can modify process registers before returning. This is not a security feature by itself, it's a way to soften some unwanted side-effects of restrictive security features. In particular this is used by S.A.R.A. to implement what PaX call "trampoline emulation" that, in practice, allows for some specific code sequences to be executed even if they are in non executable memory. This may look like a bad thing at first, but you have to consider that: - This allows for strict memory restrictions (e.g. W^X) to stay on even when they should be turned off. And, even if this emulation makes those features less effective, it's still better than having them turned off completely. - The only code sequences emulated are trampolines used to make function calls. In many cases, when you have the chance to make arbitrary memory writes, you can already manipulate the control flow of the program by overwriting function pointers or return values. So, in many cases, "trampoline emulation" doesn't introduce new exploit vectors. - It's a feature that can be turned on only if needed, on a per executable file basis. Signed-off-by: Salvatore Mesoraca --- arch/Kconfig | 6 ++++++ arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 6 ++++++ include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 12 ++++++++++++ include/linux/security.h | 11 +++++++++++ security/security.c | 11 +++++++++++ 6 files changed, 47 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig index c47b328..16997c3 100644 --- a/arch/Kconfig +++ b/arch/Kconfig @@ -252,6 +252,12 @@ config ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE config ARCH_HAS_KEEPINITRD bool +config ARCH_HAS_LSM_PAGEFAULT + bool + help + An architecture should select this if it supports + "pagefault_handler" LSM hook. + # Select if arch has all set_memory_ro/rw/x/nx() functions in asm/cacheflush.h config ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY bool diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index 2bbbd4d..a3c7660 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ config X86 select ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE select ARCH_HAS_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL select ARCH_HAS_KCOV if X86_64 + select ARCH_HAS_LSM_PAGEFAULT select ARCH_HAS_MEMBARRIER_SYNC_CORE select ARCH_HAS_PMEM_API if X86_64 select ARCH_HAS_PTE_SPECIAL diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c index 46df4c6..7fe36f1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ #include /* faulthandler_disabled() */ #include /* efi_recover_from_page_fault()*/ #include +#include /* security_pagefault_handler */ #include /* boot_cpu_has, ... */ #include /* dotraplinkage, ... */ @@ -1360,6 +1361,11 @@ void do_user_addr_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, local_irq_enable(); } + if (unlikely(security_pagefault_handler(regs, + hw_error_code, + address))) + return; + perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS, 1, regs, address); if (hw_error_code & X86_PF_WRITE) diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h index 12ce609..478a187 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h @@ -518,6 +518,14 @@ * @vmflags contains the requested vmflags. * Return 0 if the operation is allowed to continue otherwise return * the appropriate error code. + * @pagefault_handler: + * Handle pagefaults on supported architectures, that is any architecture + * which defines CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_LSM_PAGEFAULT. + * @regs contains process' registers. + * @error_code contains error code for the pagefault. + * @address contains the address that caused the pagefault. + * Return 0 to let the kernel handle the pagefault as usually, any other + * value to let the process continue its execution. * @file_lock: * Check permission before performing file locking operations. * Note the hook mediates both flock and fcntl style locks. @@ -1603,6 +1611,9 @@ int (*file_mprotect)(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot); int (*check_vmflags)(vm_flags_t vmflags); + int (*pagefault_handler)(struct pt_regs *regs, + unsigned long error_code, + unsigned long address); int (*file_lock)(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd); int (*file_fcntl)(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg); @@ -1904,6 +1915,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads { struct hlist_head mmap_file; struct hlist_head file_mprotect; struct hlist_head check_vmflags; + struct hlist_head pagefault_handler; struct hlist_head file_lock; struct hlist_head file_fcntl; struct hlist_head file_set_fowner; diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index aed78eb..c287eb2 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -313,6 +313,9 @@ int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot); int security_check_vmflags(vm_flags_t vmflags); +int __maybe_unused security_pagefault_handler(struct pt_regs *regs, + unsigned long error_code, + unsigned long address); int security_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd); int security_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg); void security_file_set_fowner(struct file *file); @@ -865,6 +868,14 @@ static inline int security_check_vmflags(vm_flags_t vmflags) return 0; } +static inline int __maybe_unused security_pagefault_handler( + struct pt_regs *regs, + unsigned long error_code, + unsigned long address) +{ + return 0; +} + static inline int security_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd) { return 0; diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 3308e89..a8bdcf3 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -1426,6 +1426,17 @@ int security_check_vmflags(vm_flags_t vmflags) return call_int_hook(check_vmflags, 0, vmflags); } +int __maybe_unused security_pagefault_handler(struct pt_regs *regs, + unsigned long error_code, + unsigned long address) +{ + return call_int_hook(pagefault_handler, + 0, + regs, + error_code, + address); +} + int security_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd) { return call_int_hook(file_lock, 0, file, cmd);