From patchwork Wed Oct 26 06:56:37 2016 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: =?utf-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= X-Patchwork-Id: 9396037 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E1A1160234 for ; Wed, 26 Oct 2016 06:59:13 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id AB7D32987D for ; Wed, 26 Oct 2016 06:59:13 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 9F29729889; Wed, 26 Oct 2016 06:59:13 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.2 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from mother.openwall.net (mother.openwall.net [195.42.179.200]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with SMTP id 73ADB2987D for ; Wed, 26 Oct 2016 06:59:12 +0000 (UTC) Received: (qmail 11325 invoked by uid 550); 26 Oct 2016 06:58:12 -0000 Mailing-List: contact kernel-hardening-help@lists.openwall.com; run by ezmlm Precedence: bulk List-Post: List-Help: List-Unsubscribe: List-Subscribe: List-ID: Reply-To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Delivered-To: mailing list kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Received: (qmail 10151 invoked from network); 26 Oct 2016 06:58:08 -0000 From: =?UTF-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl=20Sala=C3=BCn?= To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: =?UTF-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl=20Sala=C3=BCn?= , Alexei Starovoitov , Andy Lutomirski , Daniel Borkmann , Daniel Mack , David Drysdale , "David S . Miller" , "Eric W . Biederman" , James Morris , Jann Horn , Kees Cook , Paul Moore , Sargun Dhillon , "Serge E . Hallyn" , Tejun Heo , Thomas Graf , Will Drewry , kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org, cgroups@vger.kernel.org Date: Wed, 26 Oct 2016 08:56:37 +0200 Message-Id: <20161026065654.19166-2-mic@digikod.net> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.9.3 In-Reply-To: <20161026065654.19166-1-mic@digikod.net> References: <20161026065654.19166-1-mic@digikod.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Antivirus: Dr.Web (R) for Unix mail servers drweb plugin ver.6.0.2.8 X-Antivirus-Code: 0x100000 Subject: [kernel-hardening] [RFC v4 01/18] landlock: Add Kconfig X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP Initial Landlock Kconfig needed to split the Landlock eBPF and seccomp parts to ease the review. Changes from v2: * add seccomp filter or cgroups (with eBPF programs attached support) dependencies Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün Cc: James Morris Cc: Kees Cook Cc: Serge E. Hallyn --- security/Kconfig | 1 + security/landlock/Kconfig | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+) create mode 100644 security/landlock/Kconfig diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index 118f4549404e..c63194c561c5 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -164,6 +164,7 @@ source security/tomoyo/Kconfig source security/apparmor/Kconfig source security/loadpin/Kconfig source security/yama/Kconfig +source security/landlock/Kconfig source security/integrity/Kconfig diff --git a/security/landlock/Kconfig b/security/landlock/Kconfig new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..dec64270b06d --- /dev/null +++ b/security/landlock/Kconfig @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +config SECURITY_LANDLOCK + bool "Landlock sandbox support" + depends on SECURITY + depends on BPF_SYSCALL + depends on SECCOMP_FILTER || CGROUP_BPF + default y + help + Landlock is a stacked LSM which allows any user to load a security + policy to restrict their processes (i.e. create a sandbox). The + policy is a list of stacked eBPF programs for some LSM hooks. Each + program can do some access comparison to check if an access request + is legitimate. + + You need to enable seccomp filter and/or cgroups (with eBPF programs + attached support) to apply a security policy to either a process + hierarchy (e.g. application with built-in sandboxing) or a group of + processes (e.g. container sandboxing). It is recommended to enable + both seccomp filter and cgroups. + + Further information about eBPF can be found in + Documentation/networking/filter.txt + + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer Y.