Message ID | 20170225095648.GA4917@beast (mailing list archive) |
---|---|
State | New, archived |
Headers | show |
On Sat, Feb 25, 2017 at 01:56:48AM -0800, Kees Cook wrote: > As found in grsecurity, this avoids exposing a kernel pointer through > the cgroup debug entries. > > Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Applied to cgroup/for-4.11-fixes. Thanks.
diff --git a/kernel/cgroup.c b/kernel/cgroup.c index 53bbca7c4859..b794bcadefa4 100644 --- a/kernel/cgroup.c +++ b/kernel/cgroup.c @@ -6589,7 +6589,7 @@ static int cgroup_css_links_read(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) struct task_struct *task; int count = 0; - seq_printf(seq, "css_set %p\n", cset); + seq_printf(seq, "css_set %pK\n", cset); list_for_each_entry(task, &cset->tasks, cg_list) { if (count++ > MAX_TASKS_SHOWN_PER_CSS)
As found in grsecurity, this avoids exposing a kernel pointer through the cgroup debug entries. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> --- kernel/cgroup.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)