From patchwork Mon Jun 5 03:47:56 2017 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Jason A. Donenfeld" X-Patchwork-Id: 9765415 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E901460353 for ; Mon, 5 Jun 2017 03:49:30 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id DA117205F7 for ; Mon, 5 Jun 2017 03:49:30 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id CEBA2209CE; Mon, 5 Jun 2017 03:49:30 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.1 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED,T_DKIM_INVALID autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from mother.openwall.net (mother.openwall.net [195.42.179.200]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with SMTP id C6DDB205F7 for ; Mon, 5 Jun 2017 03:49:29 +0000 (UTC) Received: (qmail 11596 invoked by uid 550); 5 Jun 2017 03:48:58 -0000 Mailing-List: contact kernel-hardening-help@lists.openwall.com; run by ezmlm Precedence: bulk List-Post: List-Help: List-Unsubscribe: List-Subscribe: List-ID: Delivered-To: mailing list kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Received: (qmail 10208 invoked from network); 5 Jun 2017 03:48:55 -0000 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha1; c=relaxed; d=zx2c4.com; h=from:to:cc :subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references; s=mail; bh=qA1n hj8o4yOmH47ajW2jNN1/2fA=; b=NesA3eJiSvNe5oTmSZMIT5u6PdmGNuFxeuqm l28Wk/UDWzXg4xdtAtXVpdDa63Ld29bGXDcJvDikJXsLDT3+a4OR0rMj0f9lPoP7 Z8gjhACub5259wxIkb6CcThLDgTXt3ChWlW4jZGxcJzDsTK4PHx3GCWrjtmFU4X5 71FvDS67cEgZnrBFgLqIfTHetsmH0yzXxgzqkYz3yFHgAHu85Ji0BiXhRLSLRBso 0kMnN6aLMD2eyMtt6cELm4U6V/HHAZkU1KyafznXNyr3QEQRaYkTlP5vLG+Y+47+ XnnETzpowvHp6eFCIEh7daJxeUAj3mp0JfRHuwmYxys9OzlNQQ== From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" To: Theodore Ts'o , Linux Crypto Mailing List , LKML , kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, Greg Kroah-Hartman Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" , Marcel Holtmann , Gustavo Padovan , Johan Hedberg Date: Mon, 5 Jun 2017 05:47:56 +0200 Message-Id: <20170605034757.4803-8-Jason@zx2c4.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.13.0 In-Reply-To: <20170605034757.4803-1-Jason@zx2c4.com> References: <20170605034757.4803-1-Jason@zx2c4.com> Subject: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH RFC v2 7/8] bluetooth/smp: ensure RNG is properly seeded before ECDH use X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP This protocol uses lots of complex cryptography that relies on securely generated random numbers. Thus, it's important that the RNG is actually seeded before use. Fortuantely, it appears we're always operating in process context (there are many GFP_KERNEL allocations and other sleeping operations), and so we can simply demand that the RNG is seeded before we use it. We take two strategies in this commit. The first is for the library code that's called from other modules like hci or mgmt: here we just change the call to get_random_bytes_wait, and return the result of the wait to the caller, along with the other error codes of those functions like usual. Then there's the SMP protocol handler itself, which makes many many many calls to get_random_bytes during different phases. For this, rather than have to change all the calls to get_random_bytes_wait and propagate the error result, it's actually enough to just put a single call to wait_for_random_bytes() at the beginning of the handler, to ensure that all the subsequent invocations are safe, without having to actually change them. Likewise, for the random address changing function, we'd rather know early on in the function whether the RNG initialization has been interrupted, rather than later, so we call wait_for_random_bytes() at the top, so that later on the call to get_random_bytes() is acceptable. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Cc: Marcel Holtmann Cc: Gustavo Padovan Cc: Johan Hedberg --- net/bluetooth/hci_request.c | 6 ++++++ net/bluetooth/smp.c | 18 ++++++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_request.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_request.c index b5faff458d8b..4078057c4fd7 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_request.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_request.c @@ -1406,6 +1406,12 @@ int hci_update_random_address(struct hci_request *req, bool require_privacy, struct hci_dev *hdev = req->hdev; int err; + if (require_privacy) { + err = wait_for_random_bytes(); + if (unlikely(err)) + return err; + } + /* If privacy is enabled use a resolvable private address. If * current RPA has expired or there is something else than * the current RPA in use, then generate a new one. diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c index 14585edc9439..5fef1bc96f42 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c @@ -537,7 +537,9 @@ int smp_generate_rpa(struct hci_dev *hdev, const u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *rpa) smp = chan->data; - get_random_bytes(&rpa->b[3], 3); + err = get_random_bytes_wait(&rpa->b[3], 3); + if (unlikely(err)) + return err; rpa->b[5] &= 0x3f; /* Clear two most significant bits */ rpa->b[5] |= 0x40; /* Set second most significant bit */ @@ -570,7 +572,9 @@ int smp_generate_oob(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 hash[16], u8 rand[16]) } else { while (true) { /* Seed private key with random number */ - get_random_bytes(smp->local_sk, 32); + err = get_random_bytes_wait(smp->local_sk, 32); + if (unlikely(err)) + return err; /* Generate local key pair for Secure Connections */ if (!generate_ecdh_keys(smp->local_pk, smp->local_sk)) @@ -589,7 +593,9 @@ int smp_generate_oob(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 hash[16], u8 rand[16]) SMP_DBG("OOB Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->local_pk + 32); SMP_DBG("OOB Private Key: %32phN", smp->local_sk); - get_random_bytes(smp->local_rand, 16); + err = get_random_bytes_wait(smp->local_rand, 16); + if (unlikely(err)) + return err; err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->local_pk, smp->local_rand, 0, hash); @@ -2831,7 +2837,11 @@ static int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb) struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; struct smp_chan *smp; __u8 code, reason; - int err = 0; + int err; + + err = wait_for_random_bytes(); + if (unlikely(err)) + return err; if (skb->len < 1) return -EILSEQ;