@@ -987,6 +987,11 @@ void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size)
unsigned long time = random_get_entropy() ^ jiffies;
unsigned long flags;
+ if (!crng_ready()) {
+ crng_fast_load(buf, size);
+ return;
+ }
+
trace_add_device_randomness(size, _RET_IP_);
spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
_mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, buf, size);
@@ -497,6 +497,7 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init start_kernel(void)
/*
* Set up the initial canary ASAP:
*/
+ add_latent_entropy();
boot_init_stack_canary();
cgroup_init_early();
The add_device_randomness() function would ignore incoming bytes if the crng wasn't ready. This additionally makes sure to make an early enough call to add_latent_entropy() to influence the initial stack canary, which is especially important on non-x86 systems where it stays the same through the life of the boot. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> --- drivers/char/random.c | 5 +++++ init/main.c | 1 + 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+)