From patchwork Sat Oct 21 13:45:57 2017 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Nicolas Belouin X-Patchwork-Id: 10021425 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id F2A89603B5 for ; Sat, 21 Oct 2017 14:01:59 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D8746285A4 for ; Sat, 21 Oct 2017 14:01:59 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id CB23028BCD; Sat, 21 Oct 2017 14:01:59 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.2 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from mother.openwall.net (mother.openwall.net [195.42.179.200]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with SMTP id 0F16B285A4 for ; Sat, 21 Oct 2017 14:01:58 +0000 (UTC) Received: (qmail 14218 invoked by uid 550); 21 Oct 2017 14:01:50 -0000 Mailing-List: contact kernel-hardening-help@lists.openwall.com; run by ezmlm Precedence: bulk List-Post: List-Help: List-Unsubscribe: List-Subscribe: List-ID: Delivered-To: mailing list kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Delivered-To: moderator for kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Received: (qmail 28577 invoked from network); 21 Oct 2017 13:47:47 -0000 From: Nicolas Belouin To: Jan Kara , "Theodore Ts'o" , Andreas Dilger , Jaegeuk Kim , Chao Yu , David Woodhouse , Dave Kleikamp , Mark Fasheh , Joel Becker , Miklos Szeredi , Phillip Lougher , Richard Weinberger , Artem Bityutskiy , Adrian Hunter , Alexander Viro , Serge Hallyn , Paul Moore , Stephen Smalley , Eric Paris , James Morris , linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org, jfs-discussion@lists.sourceforge.net, ocfs2-devel@oss.oracle.com, linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org, reiserfs-devel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: Nicolas Belouin Date: Sat, 21 Oct 2017 15:45:57 +0200 Message-Id: <20171021134558.21195-1-nicolas@belouin.fr> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.14.2 X-Antivirus: Dr.Web (R) for Unix mail servers drweb plugin ver.6.0.2.8 X-Antivirus-Code: 0x100000 Subject: [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 1/2] security, capabilities: create CAP_TRUSTED X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP with CAP_SYS_ADMIN being bloated, the usefulness of using it to flag a process to be entrusted for e.g reading and writing trusted xattr is near zero. CAP_TRUSTED aims to provide userland with a way to mark a process as entrusted to do specific (not specially admin-centered) actions. It would for example allow a process to red/write the trusted xattrs. Signed-off-by: Nicolas Belouin --- include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 6 +++++- security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 5 +++-- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h index ce230aa6d928..27e457b93c84 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h @@ -369,7 +369,11 @@ struct vfs_ns_cap_data { #define CAP_SYS_MOUNT 38 -#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_SYS_MOUNT +/* Allow read/write trusted xattr */ + +#define CAP_TRUSTED 39 + +#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_TRUSTED #define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP) diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h index a873dce97fd5..f5dc8e109f5a 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h @@ -24,9 +24,10 @@ "audit_control", "setfcap" #define COMMON_CAP2_PERMS "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", \ - "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read", "sys_mount" + "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read", "sys_mount", \ + "trusted" -#if CAP_LAST_CAP > CAP_SYS_MOUNT +#if CAP_LAST_CAP > CAP_TRUSTED #error New capability defined, please update COMMON_CAP2_PERMS. #endif