From patchwork Wed Aug 15 23:53:55 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Schaufler, Casey" X-Patchwork-Id: 10567267 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 15090921 for ; Thu, 16 Aug 2018 09:52:05 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 01A0A28733 for ; Thu, 16 Aug 2018 09:52:05 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id E834D2AB2E; Thu, 16 Aug 2018 09:52:04 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-5.2 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from mother.openwall.net (mother.openwall.net [195.42.179.200]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with SMTP id E6B0C28733 for ; Thu, 16 Aug 2018 09:52:03 +0000 (UTC) Received: (qmail 20168 invoked by uid 550); 16 Aug 2018 09:52:01 -0000 Mailing-List: contact kernel-hardening-help@lists.openwall.com; run by ezmlm Precedence: bulk List-Post: List-Help: List-Unsubscribe: List-Subscribe: List-ID: Delivered-To: mailing list kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Delivered-To: moderator for kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Received: (qmail 11863 invoked from network); 15 Aug 2018 23:54:14 -0000 X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.53,245,1531810800"; d="scan'208";a="75694074" From: Casey Schaufler To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, SMACK-discuss@lists.01.org, casey.schaufler@intel.com, dave.hansen@intel.com, deneen.t.dock@intel.com, kristen@linux.intel.com, arjan@linux.intel.com Subject: [PATCH RFC 5/5] SELinux: Support SELinux determination of side-channel vulnerability Date: Wed, 15 Aug 2018 16:53:55 -0700 Message-Id: <20180815235355.14908-6-casey.schaufler@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.0 In-Reply-To: <20180815235355.14908-1-casey.schaufler@intel.com> References: <20180815235355.14908-1-casey.schaufler@intel.com> X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP SELinux considers tasks to be side-channel safe if they have PROCESS_SHARE access. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index a8bf324130f5..7fbd7d7ac1cb 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -4219,6 +4219,14 @@ static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, spin_unlock(&isec->lock); } +static int selinux_task_safe_sidechannel(struct task_struct *p) +{ + struct av_decision avd; + + return avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state, current_sid(), task_sid(p), + SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE, 0, &avd); +} + /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto) @@ -7002,6 +7010,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, selinux_task_movememory), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, selinux_task_kill), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, selinux_task_to_inode), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_safe_sidechannel, selinux_task_safe_sidechannel), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, selinux_ipc_permission), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, selinux_ipc_getsecid),