From patchwork Fri Oct 19 04:21:09 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Michael Ellerman X-Patchwork-Id: 10648649 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A4EB7109C for ; Fri, 19 Oct 2018 04:21:33 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9259128BBA for ; Fri, 19 Oct 2018 04:21:33 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 8322528BE0; Fri, 19 Oct 2018 04:21:33 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-5.2 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from mother.openwall.net (mother.openwall.net [195.42.179.200]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with SMTP id BC0EF28BBA for ; Fri, 19 Oct 2018 04:21:32 +0000 (UTC) Received: (qmail 26585 invoked by uid 550); 19 Oct 2018 04:21:28 -0000 Mailing-List: contact kernel-hardening-help@lists.openwall.com; run by ezmlm Precedence: bulk List-Post: List-Help: List-Unsubscribe: List-Subscribe: List-ID: Delivered-To: mailing list kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Received: (qmail 26288 invoked from network); 19 Oct 2018 04:21:26 -0000 From: Michael Ellerman To: rostedt@goodmis.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, jannh@google.com, keescook@chromium.org Subject: [PATCH v2 2/2] seq_buf: Use size_t for len in seq_buf_puts() Date: Fri, 19 Oct 2018 15:21:09 +1100 Message-Id: <20181019042109.8064-2-mpe@ellerman.id.au> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.2 In-Reply-To: <20181019042109.8064-1-mpe@ellerman.id.au> References: <20181019042109.8064-1-mpe@ellerman.id.au> X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP Jann Horn points out that we're using unsigned int for len in seq_buf_puts(), which could potentially overflow if we're passed a UINT_MAX sized string. The rest of the code already uses size_t, so we should also use that in seq_buf_puts() to avoid any issues. Suggested-by: Jann Horn Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman --- lib/seq_buf.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) v2: New in v2. diff --git a/lib/seq_buf.c b/lib/seq_buf.c index 6aabb609dd87..bd807f545a9d 100644 --- a/lib/seq_buf.c +++ b/lib/seq_buf.c @@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ int seq_buf_bprintf(struct seq_buf *s, const char *fmt, const u32 *binary) */ int seq_buf_puts(struct seq_buf *s, const char *str) { - unsigned int len = strlen(str); + size_t len = strlen(str); WARN_ON(s->size == 0);