@@ -107,7 +107,14 @@
*/
#define elf_check_arch(x) ((x)->e_machine == EM_AARCH64)
-#define elf_read_implies_exec(ex,stk) (stk != EXSTACK_DISABLE_X)
+/*
+ * 64-bit processes should not automatically gain READ_IMPLIES_EXEC. Only
+ * 32-bit processes without PT_GNU_STACK should trigger READ_IMPLIES_EXEC
+ * out of an abundance of caution against ancient toolchains not knowing
+ * how to mark memory protection flags correctly.
+ */
+#define elf_read_implies_exec(ex, stk) \
+ (is_compat_task() && stk == EXSTACK_DEFAULT)
#define CORE_DUMP_USE_REGSET
#define ELF_EXEC_PAGESIZE PAGE_SIZE
@@ -280,10 +280,28 @@ extern u32 elf_hwcap2;
/*
* An executable for which elf_read_implies_exec() returns TRUE will
- * have the READ_IMPLIES_EXEC personality flag set automatically.
+ * have the READ_IMPLIES_EXEC personality flag set automatically. This
+ * is needed either to show the truth about a memory mapping (i.e. CPUs
+ * that lack NX have all memory implicitly executable, so this makes
+ * sure that the visible permissions reflect reality), or to deal with
+ * old toolchains on new CPUs. Old binaries entirely lacking a GNU_STACK
+ * indicate they were likely built with a toolchain that has no idea about
+ * memory permissions, and so we must default to the lowest reasonable
+ * common denominator for the architecture: on ia32 we assume all memory
+ * to be executable by default, and on x86_64 we assume all memory to be
+ * non-executable by default.
+ *
+ * CPU: | lacks NX | has NX, ia32 | has NX, x86_64 |
+ * ELF: | | | |
+ * ------------------------------|------------------|------------------|
+ * missing GNU_STACK | needs RIE | needs RIE | no RIE |
+ * GNU_STACK == RWX | needs RIE | no RIE: stack X | no RIE: stack X |
+ * GNU_STACK == RW | needs RIE | no RIE: stack NX | no RIE: stack NX |
+ *
*/
-#define elf_read_implies_exec(ex, executable_stack) \
- (executable_stack != EXSTACK_DISABLE_X)
+#define elf_read_implies_exec(ex, stk) \
+ (!(__supported_pte_mask & _PAGE_NX) ? 1 : \
+ (mmap_is_ia32() && stk == EXSTACK_DEFAULT))
struct task_struct;
The patch titled Subject: binfmt_elf: Update READ_IMPLIES_EXEC logic for modern CPUs has been added to the -mm tree. Its filename is binfmt_elf-update-read_implies_exec-logic-for-modern-cpus.patch This patch should soon appear at http://ozlabs.org/~akpm/mmots/broken-out/binfmt_elf-update-read_implies_exec-logic-for-modern-cpus.patch and later at http://ozlabs.org/~akpm/mmotm/broken-out/binfmt_elf-update-read_implies_exec-logic-for-modern-cpus.patch Before you just go and hit "reply", please: a) Consider who else should be cc'ed b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's *** Remember to use Documentation/process/submit-checklist.rst when testing your code *** The -mm tree is included into linux-next and is updated there every 3-4 working days ------------------------------------------------------ From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Subject: binfmt_elf: Update READ_IMPLIES_EXEC logic for modern CPUs The READ_IMPLIES_EXEC work-around was designed for old CPUs lacking NX (to have the visible permission flags on memory regions reflect reality: they are all executable), and for old toolchains that lacked the ELF PT_GNU_STACK marking (under the assumption than toolchains that couldn't even specify memory protection flags may have it wrong for all memory regions). This logic is sensible, but was implemented in a way that equated having a PT_GNU_STACK marked executable as being as "broken" as lacking the PT_GNU_STACK marking entirely. This is not a reasonable assumption for CPUs that have had NX support from the start (or very close to the start). This confusion has led to situations where modern 64-bit programs with explicitly marked executable stack are forced into the READ_IMPLIES_EXEC state when no such thing is needed. (And leads to unexpected failures when mmap()ing regions of device driver memory that wish to disallow VM_EXEC[1].) To fix this, elf_read_implies_exec() is adjusted on arm64 (where NX has always existed and all toolchains include PT_GNU_STACK), and x86 is adjusted to handle this combination of possible outcomes: CPU: | lacks NX | has NX, ia32 | has NX, x86_64 | ELF: | | | | ------------------------------|------------------|------------------| missing GNU_STACK | needs RIE | needs RIE | no RIE | GNU_STACK == RWX | needs RIE | no RIE: stack X | no RIE: stack X | GNU_STACK == RW | needs RIE | no RIE: stack NX | no RIE: stack NX | This has the effect of making binfmt_elf's EXSTACK_DEFAULT actually take on the correct architecture default of being non-executable on arm64 and x86_64, and being executable on ia32. [1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190418055759.GA3155@mellanox.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190423181210.GA2443@beast Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Suggested-by: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es> Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> --- arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h | 9 ++++++++- arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)