From patchwork Thu May 23 14:08:42 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Alexander Potapenko X-Patchwork-Id: 10958189 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6E28A14B6 for ; Thu, 23 May 2019 15:55:33 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E2D46283EE for ; Thu, 23 May 2019 15:55:32 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id D6E81285D9; Thu, 23 May 2019 15:55:32 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-12.8 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED, USER_IN_DEF_DKIM_WL autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from mother.openwall.net (mother.openwall.net [195.42.179.200]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with SMTP id B1B53283EE for ; Thu, 23 May 2019 15:55:28 +0000 (UTC) Received: (qmail 23645 invoked by uid 550); 23 May 2019 15:55:27 -0000 Mailing-List: contact kernel-hardening-help@lists.openwall.com; run by ezmlm Precedence: bulk List-Post: List-Help: List-Unsubscribe: List-Subscribe: List-ID: Delivered-To: mailing list kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Delivered-To: moderator for kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Received: (qmail 7796 invoked from network); 23 May 2019 14:09:17 -0000 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20161025; h=date:in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version:references:subject:from:to :cc; bh=gdPkgObKlWOcdk8e46Oik49xVTWYBX7bQXMpu7mlMGs=; b=rXDxY0v/lcLDjFplx5Y7/QPVkoA04qniNWemRKZT0Zdqy5OBEhJjVJuUUaV29pBTB3 VS8jo8tOdan672tQQIhQnAGT3cmdY6wBeUeLQSj4sADPKAINNSV/21V8SWKqq1X5LzuV GYRwl821kh4NHSLftKaqcyzjagUgP5K4JXc3zu/LmfvjZjJOgxiAa/kawy+JXOpskcTt 20e6VYa67N/9/K9VQ6bw6sMXSFZnnstfWtGU6+zroCYSfBqwg1mbIDPo0NLzcEOQrpKS gZpnlYbcCfC/qKaxkL86vIe2Vp4whKOnpmGejWpxfWdlhsGdJm3j+LJy1WEmBUUulK5D Plkw== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:date:in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version :references:subject:from:to:cc; bh=gdPkgObKlWOcdk8e46Oik49xVTWYBX7bQXMpu7mlMGs=; b=Vc2hu8gmoonF/uO0cVAGKBhQvxIj7TJUpcyzrXpqtROC5XI7HGnL2l++03iDCnOuQH XWXN81nX+2pHxW2lBSq1JcFQoNkF1dRpc0QP8KKExRWLFAdoIy9Mx7WsDL7HPgvu6h/Z jjGwJHcb1nL83GDHkoDMk2zgXpPy/PLXWK/x+GCCbTPveOi0XarysdHOs1xA/WoTOKEh 8yM3/bBS8jPYvyFFwW1Qp64ENoQ7ITBIERAoASZPfF1xnvqv4I1dUOp7q4GqIoCfl5u/ Nmc4Z1fesRI61hi77Om3nsl6HM3BjJbUgOLDP/Kv++UepqlCbDK7umjoeXPovXNyzoJW wpag== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAXZWi2bi7Ig9YvTd/h330kzvFxhQBCGXyTwapcQBx8oiz/pAz6q GyuflD5G/uqtKn/NHizBv/NuZ7J7Jvg= X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqwf2z6zZcNlfdnPdndyRBGBPUUEGL4p18pe71ljCZ4mCuadqwo7nQ1dTlYgVSfyU+Ol0TYu5b6w9rM= X-Received: by 2002:ac8:1b33:: with SMTP id y48mr80781800qtj.176.1558620545363; Thu, 23 May 2019 07:09:05 -0700 (PDT) Date: Thu, 23 May 2019 16:08:42 +0200 In-Reply-To: <20190523140844.132150-1-glider@google.com> Message-Id: <20190523140844.132150-2-glider@google.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 References: <20190523140844.132150-1-glider@google.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.21.0.1020.gf2820cf01a-goog Subject: [PATCH v4 1/3] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options From: Alexander Potapenko To: akpm@linux-foundation.org, cl@linux.com, keescook@chromium.org Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Masahiro Yamada , Michal Hocko , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Nick Desaulniers , Kostya Serebryany , Dmitry Vyukov , Sandeep Patil , Laura Abbott , Randy Dunlap , Jann Horn , Mark Rutland X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP The new options are needed to prevent possible information leaks and make control-flow bugs that depend on uninitialized values more deterministic. init_on_alloc=1 makes the kernel initialize newly allocated pages and heap objects with zeroes. Initialization is done at allocation time at the places where checks for __GFP_ZERO are performed. init_on_free=1 makes the kernel initialize freed pages and heap objects with zeroes upon their deletion. This helps to ensure sensitive data doesn't leak via use-after-free accesses. Both init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 guarantee that the allocator returns zeroed memory. The only exception is slab caches with constructors. Those are never zero-initialized to preserve their semantics. For SLOB allocator init_on_free=1 also implies init_on_alloc=1 behavior, i.e. objects are zeroed at both allocation and deallocation time. This is done because SLOB may otherwise return multiple freelist pointers in the allocated object. For SLAB and SLUB enabling either init_on_alloc or init_on_free leads to one-time initialization of the object. Both init_on_alloc and init_on_free default to zero, but those defaults can be overridden with CONFIG_INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON and CONFIG_INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON. Slowdown for the new features compared to init_on_free=0, init_on_alloc=0: hackbench, init_on_free=1: +7.62% sys time (st.err 0.74%) hackbench, init_on_alloc=1: +7.75% sys time (st.err 2.14%) Linux build with -j12, init_on_free=1: +8.38% wall time (st.err 0.39%) Linux build with -j12, init_on_free=1: +24.42% sys time (st.err 0.52%) Linux build with -j12, init_on_alloc=1: -0.13% wall time (st.err 0.42%) Linux build with -j12, init_on_alloc=1: +0.57% sys time (st.err 0.40%) The slowdown for init_on_free=0, init_on_alloc=0 compared to the baseline is within the standard error. The new features are also going to pave the way for hardware memory tagging (e.g. arm64's MTE), which will require both on_alloc and on_free hooks to set the tags for heap objects. With MTE, tagging will have the same cost as memory initialization. Although init_on_free is rather costly, there are paranoid use-cases where in-memory data lifetime is desired to be minimized. There are various arguments for/against the realism of the associated threat models, but given that we'll need the infrastructre for MTE anyway, and there are people who want wipe-on-free behavior no matter what the performance cost, it seems reasonable to include it in this series. Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko To: Andrew Morton To: Christoph Lameter To: Kees Cook Cc: Masahiro Yamada Cc: Michal Hocko Cc: James Morris Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" Cc: Nick Desaulniers Cc: Kostya Serebryany Cc: Dmitry Vyukov Cc: Sandeep Patil Cc: Laura Abbott Cc: Randy Dunlap Cc: Jann Horn Cc: Mark Rutland Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com --- v2: - unconditionally initialize pages in kernel_init_free_pages() - comment from Randy Dunlap: drop 'default false' lines from Kconfig.hardening v3: - don't call kernel_init_free_pages() from memblock_free_pages() - adopted some Kees' comments for the patch description v4: - use NULL instead of 0 in slab_alloc_node() (found by kbuild test robot) - don't write to NULL object in slab_alloc_node() (found by Android testing) --- .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 8 +++ drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_ioctl.c | 2 +- include/linux/mm.h | 22 +++++++ kernel/kexec_core.c | 2 +- mm/dmapool.c | 2 +- mm/page_alloc.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++--- mm/slab.c | 16 ++++- mm/slab.h | 16 +++++ mm/slob.c | 22 ++++++- mm/slub.c | 27 ++++++-- net/core/sock.c | 2 +- security/Kconfig.hardening | 14 +++++ 12 files changed, 175 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index 52e6fbb042cc..68fb6fa41cc1 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -1673,6 +1673,14 @@ initrd= [BOOT] Specify the location of the initial ramdisk + init_on_alloc= [MM] Fill newly allocated pages and heap objects with + zeroes. + Format: 0 | 1 + Default set by CONFIG_INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON. + init_on_free= [MM] Fill freed pages and heap objects with zeroes. + Format: 0 | 1 + Default set by CONFIG_INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON. + init_pkru= [x86] Specify the default memory protection keys rights register contents for all processes. 0x55555554 by default (disallow access to all but pkey 0). Can diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_ioctl.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_ioctl.c index 829b0c6944d8..61758201d9b2 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_ioctl.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_ioctl.c @@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ __malloc void *_uverbs_alloc(struct uverbs_attr_bundle *bundle, size_t size, res = (void *)pbundle->internal_buffer + pbundle->internal_used; pbundle->internal_used = ALIGN(new_used, sizeof(*pbundle->internal_buffer)); - if (flags & __GFP_ZERO) + if (want_init_on_alloc(flags)) memset(res, 0, size); return res; } diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h index 0e8834ac32b7..7733a341c0c4 100644 --- a/include/linux/mm.h +++ b/include/linux/mm.h @@ -2685,6 +2685,28 @@ static inline void kernel_poison_pages(struct page *page, int numpages, int enable) { } #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON +DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(init_on_alloc); +#else +DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(init_on_alloc); +#endif +static inline bool want_init_on_alloc(gfp_t flags) +{ + if (static_branch_unlikely(&init_on_alloc)) + return true; + return flags & __GFP_ZERO; +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON +DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(init_on_free); +#else +DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(init_on_free); +#endif +static inline bool want_init_on_free(void) +{ + return static_branch_unlikely(&init_on_free); +} + extern bool _debug_pagealloc_enabled; static inline bool debug_pagealloc_enabled(void) diff --git a/kernel/kexec_core.c b/kernel/kexec_core.c index fd5c95ff9251..2f75dd0d0d81 100644 --- a/kernel/kexec_core.c +++ b/kernel/kexec_core.c @@ -315,7 +315,7 @@ static struct page *kimage_alloc_pages(gfp_t gfp_mask, unsigned int order) arch_kexec_post_alloc_pages(page_address(pages), count, gfp_mask); - if (gfp_mask & __GFP_ZERO) + if (want_init_on_alloc(gfp_mask)) for (i = 0; i < count; i++) clear_highpage(pages + i); } diff --git a/mm/dmapool.c b/mm/dmapool.c index 76a160083506..493d151067cb 100644 --- a/mm/dmapool.c +++ b/mm/dmapool.c @@ -381,7 +381,7 @@ void *dma_pool_alloc(struct dma_pool *pool, gfp_t mem_flags, #endif spin_unlock_irqrestore(&pool->lock, flags); - if (mem_flags & __GFP_ZERO) + if (want_init_on_alloc(mem_flags)) memset(retval, 0, pool->size); return retval; diff --git a/mm/page_alloc.c b/mm/page_alloc.c index 3b13d3914176..14ded6620aa0 100644 --- a/mm/page_alloc.c +++ b/mm/page_alloc.c @@ -135,6 +135,48 @@ unsigned long totalcma_pages __read_mostly; int percpu_pagelist_fraction; gfp_t gfp_allowed_mask __read_mostly = GFP_BOOT_MASK; +#ifdef CONFIG_INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(init_on_alloc); +#else +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(init_on_alloc); +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(init_on_free); +#else +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(init_on_free); +#endif + +static int __init early_init_on_alloc(char *buf) +{ + int ret; + bool bool_result; + + if (!buf) + return -EINVAL; + ret = kstrtobool(buf, &bool_result); + if (bool_result) + static_branch_enable(&init_on_alloc); + else + static_branch_disable(&init_on_alloc); + return ret; +} +early_param("init_on_alloc", early_init_on_alloc); + +static int __init early_init_on_free(char *buf) +{ + int ret; + bool bool_result; + + if (!buf) + return -EINVAL; + ret = kstrtobool(buf, &bool_result); + if (bool_result) + static_branch_enable(&init_on_free); + else + static_branch_disable(&init_on_free); + return ret; +} +early_param("init_on_free", early_init_on_free); /* * A cached value of the page's pageblock's migratetype, used when the page is @@ -1089,6 +1131,14 @@ static int free_tail_pages_check(struct page *head_page, struct page *page) return ret; } +static void kernel_init_free_pages(struct page *page, int numpages) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < numpages; i++) + clear_highpage(page + i); +} + static __always_inline bool free_pages_prepare(struct page *page, unsigned int order, bool check_free) { @@ -1141,6 +1191,8 @@ static __always_inline bool free_pages_prepare(struct page *page, } arch_free_page(page, order); kernel_poison_pages(page, 1 << order, 0); + if (want_init_on_free()) + kernel_init_free_pages(page, 1 << order); if (debug_pagealloc_enabled()) kernel_map_pages(page, 1 << order, 0); @@ -2019,8 +2071,8 @@ static inline int check_new_page(struct page *page) static inline bool free_pages_prezeroed(void) { - return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_ZERO) && - page_poisoning_enabled(); + return (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_ZERO) && + page_poisoning_enabled()) || want_init_on_free(); } #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_VM @@ -2074,13 +2126,10 @@ inline void post_alloc_hook(struct page *page, unsigned int order, static void prep_new_page(struct page *page, unsigned int order, gfp_t gfp_flags, unsigned int alloc_flags) { - int i; - post_alloc_hook(page, order, gfp_flags); - if (!free_pages_prezeroed() && (gfp_flags & __GFP_ZERO)) - for (i = 0; i < (1 << order); i++) - clear_highpage(page + i); + if (!free_pages_prezeroed() && want_init_on_alloc(gfp_flags)) + kernel_init_free_pages(page, 1 << order); if (order && (gfp_flags & __GFP_COMP)) prep_compound_page(page, order); diff --git a/mm/slab.c b/mm/slab.c index 2915d912e89a..d42eb11f8f50 100644 --- a/mm/slab.c +++ b/mm/slab.c @@ -1853,6 +1853,14 @@ static bool set_objfreelist_slab_cache(struct kmem_cache *cachep, cachep->num = 0; + /* + * If slab auto-initialization on free is enabled, store the freelist + * off-slab, so that its contents don't end up in one of the allocated + * objects. + */ + if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_free(cachep))) + return false; + if (cachep->ctor || flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU) return false; @@ -3293,7 +3301,7 @@ slab_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *cachep, gfp_t flags, int nodeid, local_irq_restore(save_flags); ptr = cache_alloc_debugcheck_after(cachep, flags, ptr, caller); - if (unlikely(flags & __GFP_ZERO) && ptr) + if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_alloc(flags, cachep)) && ptr) memset(ptr, 0, cachep->object_size); slab_post_alloc_hook(cachep, flags, 1, &ptr); @@ -3350,7 +3358,7 @@ slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cachep, gfp_t flags, unsigned long caller) objp = cache_alloc_debugcheck_after(cachep, flags, objp, caller); prefetchw(objp); - if (unlikely(flags & __GFP_ZERO) && objp) + if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_alloc(flags, cachep)) && objp) memset(objp, 0, cachep->object_size); slab_post_alloc_hook(cachep, flags, 1, &objp); @@ -3471,6 +3479,8 @@ void ___cache_free(struct kmem_cache *cachep, void *objp, struct array_cache *ac = cpu_cache_get(cachep); check_irq_off(); + if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_free(cachep))) + memset(objp, 0, cachep->object_size); kmemleak_free_recursive(objp, cachep->flags); objp = cache_free_debugcheck(cachep, objp, caller); @@ -3558,7 +3568,7 @@ int kmem_cache_alloc_bulk(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t flags, size_t size, cache_alloc_debugcheck_after_bulk(s, flags, size, p, _RET_IP_); /* Clear memory outside IRQ disabled section */ - if (unlikely(flags & __GFP_ZERO)) + if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_alloc(flags, s))) for (i = 0; i < size; i++) memset(p[i], 0, s->object_size); diff --git a/mm/slab.h b/mm/slab.h index 43ac818b8592..24ae887359b8 100644 --- a/mm/slab.h +++ b/mm/slab.h @@ -524,4 +524,20 @@ static inline int cache_random_seq_create(struct kmem_cache *cachep, static inline void cache_random_seq_destroy(struct kmem_cache *cachep) { } #endif /* CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM */ +static inline bool slab_want_init_on_alloc(gfp_t flags, struct kmem_cache *c) +{ + if (static_branch_unlikely(&init_on_alloc)) + return !(c->ctor); + else + return flags & __GFP_ZERO; +} + +static inline bool slab_want_init_on_free(struct kmem_cache *c) +{ + if (static_branch_unlikely(&init_on_free)) + return !(c->ctor); + else + return false; +} + #endif /* MM_SLAB_H */ diff --git a/mm/slob.c b/mm/slob.c index 84aefd9b91ee..1b565ee7f479 100644 --- a/mm/slob.c +++ b/mm/slob.c @@ -212,6 +212,19 @@ static void slob_free_pages(void *b, int order) free_pages((unsigned long)b, order); } +/* + * init_on_free=1 also implies initialization at allocation time. + * This is because newly allocated objects may contain freelist pointers + * somewhere in the middle. + */ +static inline bool slob_want_init_on_alloc(gfp_t flags, struct kmem_cache *c) +{ + if (static_branch_unlikely(&init_on_alloc) || + static_branch_unlikely(&init_on_free)) + return c ? (!c->ctor) : true; + return flags & __GFP_ZERO; +} + /* * slob_page_alloc() - Allocate a slob block within a given slob_page sp. * @sp: Page to look in. @@ -353,8 +366,6 @@ static void *slob_alloc(size_t size, gfp_t gfp, int align, int node) BUG_ON(!b); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&slob_lock, flags); } - if (unlikely(gfp & __GFP_ZERO)) - memset(b, 0, size); return b; } @@ -389,6 +400,9 @@ static void slob_free(void *block, int size) return; } + if (unlikely(want_init_on_free())) + memset(block, 0, size); + if (!slob_page_free(sp)) { /* This slob page is about to become partially free. Easy! */ sp->units = units; @@ -484,6 +498,8 @@ __do_kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t gfp, int node, unsigned long caller) } kmemleak_alloc(ret, size, 1, gfp); + if (unlikely(slob_want_init_on_alloc(gfp, 0))) + memset(ret, 0, size); return ret; } @@ -582,6 +598,8 @@ static void *slob_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *c, gfp_t flags, int node) WARN_ON_ONCE(flags & __GFP_ZERO); c->ctor(b); } + if (unlikely(slob_want_init_on_alloc(flags, c))) + memset(b, 0, c->size); kmemleak_alloc_recursive(b, c->size, 1, c->flags, flags); return b; diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c index cd04dbd2b5d0..db8ed569a5cf 100644 --- a/mm/slub.c +++ b/mm/slub.c @@ -1424,6 +1424,19 @@ static __always_inline bool slab_free_hook(struct kmem_cache *s, void *x) static inline bool slab_free_freelist_hook(struct kmem_cache *s, void **head, void **tail) { + + void *object; + void *next = *head; + void *old_tail = *tail ? *tail : *head; + + if (slab_want_init_on_free(s)) + do { + object = next; + next = get_freepointer(s, object); + memset(object, 0, s->size); + set_freepointer(s, object, next); + } while (object != old_tail); + /* * Compiler cannot detect this function can be removed if slab_free_hook() * evaluates to nothing. Thus, catch all relevant config debug options here. @@ -1433,9 +1446,7 @@ static inline bool slab_free_freelist_hook(struct kmem_cache *s, defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS_FREE) || \ defined(CONFIG_KASAN) - void *object; - void *next = *head; - void *old_tail = *tail ? *tail : *head; + next = *head; /* Head and tail of the reconstructed freelist */ *head = NULL; @@ -2741,8 +2752,14 @@ static __always_inline void *slab_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *s, prefetch_freepointer(s, next_object); stat(s, ALLOC_FASTPATH); } + /* + * If the object has been wiped upon free, make sure it's fully + * initialized by zeroing out freelist pointer. + */ + if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_free(s)) && object) + *(void **)object = NULL; - if (unlikely(gfpflags & __GFP_ZERO) && object) + if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_alloc(gfpflags, s)) && object) memset(object, 0, s->object_size); slab_post_alloc_hook(s, gfpflags, 1, &object); @@ -3163,7 +3180,7 @@ int kmem_cache_alloc_bulk(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t flags, size_t size, local_irq_enable(); /* Clear memory outside IRQ disabled fastpath loop */ - if (unlikely(flags & __GFP_ZERO)) { + if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_alloc(flags, s))) { int j; for (j = 0; j < i; j++) diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c index 75b1c950b49f..9ceb90c875bc 100644 --- a/net/core/sock.c +++ b/net/core/sock.c @@ -1602,7 +1602,7 @@ static struct sock *sk_prot_alloc(struct proto *prot, gfp_t priority, sk = kmem_cache_alloc(slab, priority & ~__GFP_ZERO); if (!sk) return sk; - if (priority & __GFP_ZERO) + if (want_init_on_alloc(priority)) sk_prot_clear_nulls(sk, prot->obj_size); } else sk = kmalloc(prot->obj_size, priority); diff --git a/security/Kconfig.hardening b/security/Kconfig.hardening index 0a1d4ca314f4..87883e3e3c2a 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig.hardening +++ b/security/Kconfig.hardening @@ -159,6 +159,20 @@ config STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE runtime to control kernel stack erasing for kernels built with CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK. +config INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON + bool "Set init_on_alloc=1 by default" + help + Enable init_on_alloc=1 by default, making the kernel initialize every + page and heap allocation with zeroes. + init_on_alloc can be overridden via command line. + +config INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON + bool "Set init_on_free=1 by default" + help + Enable init_on_free=1 by default, making the kernel initialize freed + pages and slab memory with zeroes. + init_on_free can be overridden via command line. + endmenu endmenu