diff mbox series

[v3] security/keys: rewrite big_key crypto to use library interface

Message ID 20200511215101.302530-1-Jason@zx2c4.com (mailing list archive)
State New, archived
Headers show
Series [v3] security/keys: rewrite big_key crypto to use library interface | expand

Commit Message

Jason A. Donenfeld May 11, 2020, 9:51 p.m. UTC
A while back, I noticed that the crypto and crypto API usage in big_keys
were entirely broken in multiple ways, so I rewrote it. Now, I'm
rewriting it again, but this time using the simpler ChaCha20Poly1305
library function. This makes the file considerably more simple; the
diffstat alone should justify this commit. It also should be faster,
since it no longer requires a mutex around the "aead api object" (nor
allocations), allowing us to encrypt multiple items in parallel. We also
benefit from being able to pass any type of pointer, so we can get rid
of the ridiculously complex custom page allocator that big_key really
doesn't need.

Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
---
Changes v2->v3:
 - [Eric] Unify kernel_read/write handling in big_key_preparse and
   big_key_read.
 - [Eric] Update commit message.

Changes v1->v2:
 - [Eric] Return -EBADMSG instead of -EINVAL if the authtag fails.
 - [Eric] Select CONFIG_CRYPTO, since it's required by the LIB selection.
 - [Eric] Zero out buffers that formerly contained either plaintext or
   ciphertext keys.
 - [Jason] If kernel_read() fails, return that error value, instead of
   relying on the subsequent decryption to fail.

Note v1:
 I finally got around to updating this patch from the mailing list posts
 back in 2017-2018, using the library interface that we eventually
 merged in 2019. I haven't retested this for functionality, but nothing
 much has changed, so I suspect things should still be good to go.

 security/keys/Kconfig   |   3 +-
 security/keys/big_key.c | 240 ++++++----------------------------------
 2 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 208 deletions(-)

Comments

David Howells May 12, 2020, 1:17 p.m. UTC | #1
Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> wrote:

> -	/* no ->update(); don't add it without changing big_key_crypt() nonce */
> +	/* no ->update(); don't add it without changing chacha20poly1305's nonce

Note that ->update() doesn't have to modify the contents of the key, but can
just rather replace them entirely.  See attached.  The actual work is done in
big_key_preparse(); all big_key_update() has to do is apply it and dispose of
the old payload.

David
---
commit 724e76c185d517f35ead4f72f9958850c9218f4d
Author: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date:   Tue May 12 14:03:53 2020 +0100

    keys: Implement update for the big_key type
    
    Implement the ->update op for the big_key type.
    
    Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>

diff --git a/include/keys/big_key-type.h b/include/keys/big_key-type.h
index 3fee04f81439..988d90d77f53 100644
--- a/include/keys/big_key-type.h
+++ b/include/keys/big_key-type.h
@@ -18,5 +18,6 @@ extern void big_key_revoke(struct key *key);
 extern void big_key_destroy(struct key *key);
 extern void big_key_describe(const struct key *big_key, struct seq_file *m);
 extern long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer, size_t buflen);
+extern int big_key_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
 
 #endif /* _KEYS_BIG_KEY_TYPE_H */
diff --git a/security/keys/big_key.c b/security/keys/big_key.c
index d43f3daab2b8..dd708e8f13c0 100644
--- a/security/keys/big_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/big_key.c
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ struct key_type key_type_big_key = {
 	.destroy		= big_key_destroy,
 	.describe		= big_key_describe,
 	.read			= big_key_read,
-	/* no ->update(); don't add it without changing chacha20poly1305's nonce */
+	.update			= big_key_update,
 };
 
 /*
@@ -191,6 +191,23 @@ void big_key_destroy(struct key *key)
 	key->payload.data[big_key_data] = NULL;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Update a big key
+ */
+int big_key_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = key_payload_reserve(key, prep->datalen);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	if (key_is_positive(key))
+		big_key_destroy(key);
+
+	return generic_key_instantiate(key, prep);
+}
+
 /*
  * describe the big_key key
  */
Jason A. Donenfeld May 12, 2020, 9:38 p.m. UTC | #2
Hi David,

So long as that ->update function:
1. Deletes the old on-disk data.
2. Deletes the old key from the inode.
3. Generates a new key using get_random_bytes.
4. Stores that new key in the inode.
5. Encrypts the updated data afresh with the new key.
6. Puts the updated data onto disk,

then this is fine with me, and feel free to have my Acked-by if you
want. But if it doesn't do that -- i.e. if it tries to reuse the old
key or similar -- then this isn't fine. But it sounds like from what
you've described that things are actually fine, in which case, I guess
it makes sense to apply your patch ontop of mine and commit these.

Jason
David Howells May 12, 2020, 10:03 p.m. UTC | #3
Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> wrote:

> So long as that ->update function:
> 1. Deletes the old on-disk data.
> 2. Deletes the old key from the inode.
> 3. Generates a new key using get_random_bytes.
> 4. Stores that new key in the inode.
> 5. Encrypts the updated data afresh with the new key.
> 6. Puts the updated data onto disk,
> 
> then this is fine with me, and feel free to have my Acked-by if you
> want. But if it doesn't do that -- i.e. if it tries to reuse the old
> key or similar -- then this isn't fine. But it sounds like from what
> you've described that things are actually fine, in which case, I guess
> it makes sense to apply your patch ontop of mine and commit these.

Yep.  It calls big_key_destroy(), which clears away the old stuff just as when
a key is being destroyed, then generic_key_instantiate() just as when a key is
being set up.

The key ID and the key metadata (ownership, perms, expiry) are maintained, but
the payload is just completely replaced.

David
Jason A. Donenfeld May 13, 2020, 2:33 a.m. UTC | #4
On Tue, May 12, 2020 at 4:03 PM David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> wrote:
>
> Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> wrote:
>
> > So long as that ->update function:
> > 1. Deletes the old on-disk data.
> > 2. Deletes the old key from the inode.
> > 3. Generates a new key using get_random_bytes.
> > 4. Stores that new key in the inode.
> > 5. Encrypts the updated data afresh with the new key.
> > 6. Puts the updated data onto disk,
> >
> > then this is fine with me, and feel free to have my Acked-by if you
> > want. But if it doesn't do that -- i.e. if it tries to reuse the old
> > key or similar -- then this isn't fine. But it sounds like from what
> > you've described that things are actually fine, in which case, I guess
> > it makes sense to apply your patch ontop of mine and commit these.
>
> Yep.  It calls big_key_destroy(), which clears away the old stuff just as when
> a key is being destroyed, then generic_key_instantiate() just as when a key is
> being set up.
>
> The key ID and the key metadata (ownership, perms, expiry) are maintained, but
> the payload is just completely replaced.

Okay, in that case, take my:

    Acked-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>

And then perhaps you can take both my patch and your addendum into keys-next.

Jason
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/security/keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/Kconfig
index 47c041563d41..7da6c1b496f9 100644
--- a/security/keys/Kconfig
+++ b/security/keys/Kconfig
@@ -61,8 +61,7 @@  config BIG_KEYS
 	depends on KEYS
 	depends on TMPFS
 	select CRYPTO
-	select CRYPTO_AES
-	select CRYPTO_GCM
+	select CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA20POLY1305
 	help
 	  This option provides support for holding large keys within the kernel
 	  (for example Kerberos ticket caches).  The data may be stored out to
diff --git a/security/keys/big_key.c b/security/keys/big_key.c
index 82008f900930..d43f3daab2b8 100644
--- a/security/keys/big_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/big_key.c
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ 
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
 /* Large capacity key type
  *
- * Copyright (C) 2017 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2017-2020 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All Rights Reserved.
  * Copyright (C) 2013 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
  * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
  */
@@ -12,20 +12,10 @@ 
 #include <linux/file.h>
 #include <linux/shmem_fs.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
-#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
 #include <linux/random.h>
-#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
 #include <keys/user-type.h>
 #include <keys/big_key-type.h>
-#include <crypto/aead.h>
-#include <crypto/gcm.h>
-
-struct big_key_buf {
-	unsigned int		nr_pages;
-	void			*virt;
-	struct scatterlist	*sg;
-	struct page		*pages[];
-};
+#include <crypto/chacha20poly1305.h>
 
 /*
  * Layout of key payload words.
@@ -37,14 +27,6 @@  enum {
 	big_key_len,
 };
 
-/*
- * Crypto operation with big_key data
- */
-enum big_key_op {
-	BIG_KEY_ENC,
-	BIG_KEY_DEC,
-};
-
 /*
  * If the data is under this limit, there's no point creating a shm file to
  * hold it as the permanently resident metadata for the shmem fs will be at
@@ -52,16 +34,6 @@  enum big_key_op {
  */
 #define BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD (sizeof(struct inode) + sizeof(struct dentry))
 
-/*
- * Key size for big_key data encryption
- */
-#define ENC_KEY_SIZE 32
-
-/*
- * Authentication tag length
- */
-#define ENC_AUTHTAG_SIZE 16
-
 /*
  * big_key defined keys take an arbitrary string as the description and an
  * arbitrary blob of data as the payload
@@ -75,136 +47,20 @@  struct key_type key_type_big_key = {
 	.destroy		= big_key_destroy,
 	.describe		= big_key_describe,
 	.read			= big_key_read,
-	/* no ->update(); don't add it without changing big_key_crypt() nonce */
+	/* no ->update(); don't add it without changing chacha20poly1305's nonce */
 };
 
-/*
- * Crypto names for big_key data authenticated encryption
- */
-static const char big_key_alg_name[] = "gcm(aes)";
-#define BIG_KEY_IV_SIZE		GCM_AES_IV_SIZE
-
-/*
- * Crypto algorithms for big_key data authenticated encryption
- */
-static struct crypto_aead *big_key_aead;
-
-/*
- * Since changing the key affects the entire object, we need a mutex.
- */
-static DEFINE_MUTEX(big_key_aead_lock);
-
-/*
- * Encrypt/decrypt big_key data
- */
-static int big_key_crypt(enum big_key_op op, struct big_key_buf *buf, size_t datalen, u8 *key)
-{
-	int ret;
-	struct aead_request *aead_req;
-	/* We always use a zero nonce. The reason we can get away with this is
-	 * because we're using a different randomly generated key for every
-	 * different encryption. Notably, too, key_type_big_key doesn't define
-	 * an .update function, so there's no chance we'll wind up reusing the
-	 * key to encrypt updated data. Simply put: one key, one encryption.
-	 */
-	u8 zero_nonce[BIG_KEY_IV_SIZE];
-
-	aead_req = aead_request_alloc(big_key_aead, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!aead_req)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
-	memset(zero_nonce, 0, sizeof(zero_nonce));
-	aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, buf->sg, buf->sg, datalen, zero_nonce);
-	aead_request_set_callback(aead_req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, NULL, NULL);
-	aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, 0);
-
-	mutex_lock(&big_key_aead_lock);
-	if (crypto_aead_setkey(big_key_aead, key, ENC_KEY_SIZE)) {
-		ret = -EAGAIN;
-		goto error;
-	}
-	if (op == BIG_KEY_ENC)
-		ret = crypto_aead_encrypt(aead_req);
-	else
-		ret = crypto_aead_decrypt(aead_req);
-error:
-	mutex_unlock(&big_key_aead_lock);
-	aead_request_free(aead_req);
-	return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Free up the buffer.
- */
-static void big_key_free_buffer(struct big_key_buf *buf)
-{
-	unsigned int i;
-
-	if (buf->virt) {
-		memset(buf->virt, 0, buf->nr_pages * PAGE_SIZE);
-		vunmap(buf->virt);
-	}
-
-	for (i = 0; i < buf->nr_pages; i++)
-		if (buf->pages[i])
-			__free_page(buf->pages[i]);
-
-	kfree(buf);
-}
-
-/*
- * Allocate a buffer consisting of a set of pages with a virtual mapping
- * applied over them.
- */
-static void *big_key_alloc_buffer(size_t len)
-{
-	struct big_key_buf *buf;
-	unsigned int npg = (len + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
-	unsigned int i, l;
-
-	buf = kzalloc(sizeof(struct big_key_buf) +
-		      sizeof(struct page) * npg +
-		      sizeof(struct scatterlist) * npg,
-		      GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!buf)
-		return NULL;
-
-	buf->nr_pages = npg;
-	buf->sg = (void *)(buf->pages + npg);
-	sg_init_table(buf->sg, npg);
-
-	for (i = 0; i < buf->nr_pages; i++) {
-		buf->pages[i] = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
-		if (!buf->pages[i])
-			goto nomem;
-
-		l = min_t(size_t, len, PAGE_SIZE);
-		sg_set_page(&buf->sg[i], buf->pages[i], l, 0);
-		len -= l;
-	}
-
-	buf->virt = vmap(buf->pages, buf->nr_pages, VM_MAP, PAGE_KERNEL);
-	if (!buf->virt)
-		goto nomem;
-
-	return buf;
-
-nomem:
-	big_key_free_buffer(buf);
-	return NULL;
-}
-
 /*
  * Preparse a big key
  */
 int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 {
-	struct big_key_buf *buf;
 	struct path *path = (struct path *)&prep->payload.data[big_key_path];
 	struct file *file;
-	u8 *enckey;
+	u8 *buf, *enckey;
 	ssize_t written;
-	size_t datalen = prep->datalen, enclen = datalen + ENC_AUTHTAG_SIZE;
+	size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
+	size_t enclen = datalen + CHACHA20POLY1305_AUTHTAG_SIZE;
 	int ret;
 
 	if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 1024 * 1024 || !prep->data)
@@ -220,28 +76,28 @@  int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 		 * to be swapped out if needed.
 		 *
 		 * File content is stored encrypted with randomly generated key.
+		 * Since the key is random for each file, we can set the nonce
+		 * to zero, provided we never define a ->update() call.
 		 */
 		loff_t pos = 0;
 
-		buf = big_key_alloc_buffer(enclen);
+		buf = kvmalloc(enclen, GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!buf)
 			return -ENOMEM;
-		memcpy(buf->virt, prep->data, datalen);
 
 		/* generate random key */
-		enckey = kmalloc(ENC_KEY_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+		enckey = kmalloc(CHACHA20POLY1305_KEY_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!enckey) {
 			ret = -ENOMEM;
 			goto error;
 		}
-		ret = get_random_bytes_wait(enckey, ENC_KEY_SIZE);
+		ret = get_random_bytes_wait(enckey, CHACHA20POLY1305_KEY_SIZE);
 		if (unlikely(ret))
 			goto err_enckey;
 
-		/* encrypt aligned data */
-		ret = big_key_crypt(BIG_KEY_ENC, buf, datalen, enckey);
-		if (ret)
-			goto err_enckey;
+		/* encrypt data */
+		chacha20poly1305_encrypt(buf, prep->data, datalen, NULL, 0,
+					 0, enckey);
 
 		/* save aligned data to file */
 		file = shmem_kernel_file_setup("", enclen, 0);
@@ -250,11 +106,11 @@  int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 			goto err_enckey;
 		}
 
-		written = kernel_write(file, buf->virt, enclen, &pos);
+		written = kernel_write(file, buf, enclen, &pos);
 		if (written != enclen) {
 			ret = written;
 			if (written >= 0)
-				ret = -ENOMEM;
+				ret = -EIO;
 			goto err_fput;
 		}
 
@@ -265,7 +121,8 @@  int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 		*path = file->f_path;
 		path_get(path);
 		fput(file);
-		big_key_free_buffer(buf);
+		memzero_explicit(buf, enclen);
+		kvfree(buf);
 	} else {
 		/* Just store the data in a buffer */
 		void *data = kmalloc(datalen, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -283,7 +140,8 @@  int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 err_enckey:
 	kzfree(enckey);
 error:
-	big_key_free_buffer(buf);
+	memzero_explicit(buf, enclen);
+	kvfree(buf);
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -361,14 +219,13 @@  long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer, size_t buflen)
 		return datalen;
 
 	if (datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) {
-		struct big_key_buf *buf;
 		struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data[big_key_path];
 		struct file *file;
-		u8 *enckey = (u8 *)key->payload.data[big_key_data];
-		size_t enclen = datalen + ENC_AUTHTAG_SIZE;
+		u8 *buf, *enckey = (u8 *)key->payload.data[big_key_data];
+		size_t enclen = datalen + CHACHA20POLY1305_AUTHTAG_SIZE;
 		loff_t pos = 0;
 
-		buf = big_key_alloc_buffer(enclen);
+		buf = kvmalloc(enclen, GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!buf)
 			return -ENOMEM;
 
@@ -379,25 +236,28 @@  long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer, size_t buflen)
 		}
 
 		/* read file to kernel and decrypt */
-		ret = kernel_read(file, buf->virt, enclen, &pos);
-		if (ret >= 0 && ret != enclen) {
-			ret = -EIO;
+		ret = kernel_read(file, buf, enclen, &pos);
+		if (ret != enclen) {
+			if (ret >= 0)
+				ret = -EIO;
 			goto err_fput;
 		}
 
-		ret = big_key_crypt(BIG_KEY_DEC, buf, enclen, enckey);
-		if (ret)
+		ret = chacha20poly1305_decrypt(buf, buf, enclen, NULL, 0, 0,
+					       enckey) ? 0 : -EBADMSG;
+		if (unlikely(ret))
 			goto err_fput;
 
 		ret = datalen;
 
 		/* copy out decrypted data */
-		memcpy(buffer, buf->virt, datalen);
+		memcpy(buffer, buf, datalen);
 
 err_fput:
 		fput(file);
 error:
-		big_key_free_buffer(buf);
+		memzero_explicit(buf, enclen);
+		kvfree(buf);
 	} else {
 		ret = datalen;
 		memcpy(buffer, key->payload.data[big_key_data], datalen);
@@ -411,39 +271,7 @@  long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer, size_t buflen)
  */
 static int __init big_key_init(void)
 {
-	int ret;
-
-	/* init block cipher */
-	big_key_aead = crypto_alloc_aead(big_key_alg_name, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
-	if (IS_ERR(big_key_aead)) {
-		ret = PTR_ERR(big_key_aead);
-		pr_err("Can't alloc crypto: %d\n", ret);
-		return ret;
-	}
-
-	if (unlikely(crypto_aead_ivsize(big_key_aead) != BIG_KEY_IV_SIZE)) {
-		WARN(1, "big key algorithm changed?");
-		ret = -EINVAL;
-		goto free_aead;
-	}
-
-	ret = crypto_aead_setauthsize(big_key_aead, ENC_AUTHTAG_SIZE);
-	if (ret < 0) {
-		pr_err("Can't set crypto auth tag len: %d\n", ret);
-		goto free_aead;
-	}
-
-	ret = register_key_type(&key_type_big_key);
-	if (ret < 0) {
-		pr_err("Can't register type: %d\n", ret);
-		goto free_aead;
-	}
-
-	return 0;
-
-free_aead:
-	crypto_free_aead(big_key_aead);
-	return ret;
+	return register_key_type(&key_type_big_key);
 }
 
 late_initcall(big_key_init);