From patchwork Tue Mar 30 20:57:48 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Kees Cook X-Patchwork-Id: 12173723 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-18.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 50DB5C433DB for ; Tue, 30 Mar 2021 20:58:43 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mother.openwall.net (mother.openwall.net [195.42.179.200]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with SMTP id 4694E619C5 for ; Tue, 30 Mar 2021 20:58:42 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 4694E619C5 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=chromium.org Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=kernel-hardening-return-21087-kernel-hardening=archiver.kernel.org@lists.openwall.com Received: (qmail 5299 invoked by uid 550); 30 Mar 2021 20:58:09 -0000 Mailing-List: contact kernel-hardening-help@lists.openwall.com; run by ezmlm Precedence: bulk List-Post: List-Help: List-Unsubscribe: List-Subscribe: List-ID: Received: (qmail 5187 invoked from network); 30 Mar 2021 20:58:07 -0000 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=chromium.org; s=google; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=s7qD72PIIaKegCCfwDbGOQmh3vj9ZS1vEx5gz0J99Lg=; b=lGXEvcGvGErmybYZADN9M9vTPSUkuTyHObRGJdImdyjpniegEiRCqNXNuKcfv+NZFO N+oV9d2k2SnKMxRgXkmxzo8dDebK3nVnnQ5Q8P5TFtSSMDWaJcYW5IXBc8Cv2KnGqNUt 83luJIQTk8q/BV7nZGYGpNRlKsYobxW9FikB8= X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=s7qD72PIIaKegCCfwDbGOQmh3vj9ZS1vEx5gz0J99Lg=; b=qD+9bzwV3FxKDBR35gD1dBl38SCUR4YrCed39z1Yi24Jr+wGa11bdJeQo9TmgG0JKF lWQTmycsITJZNrRSp0YbP+dNqwebazJbT6+n93ExUdgHKEeSBQbrsXhxlOmKdVmrXrqU aDSk91sCE7Tc0D9eKXW6oFksfuwvvqgtNo9cHXn+gi2X6Q3M7+ZcbLfPPEoy2gipDXtr Ko3A8esDW28UT9kr1LMRgEcC2j8LRae4u65vNWazLTv9aLW4wgWG+cSrOsLbsDDNtv0U Z0vnsPbgP0ogWaThld5zlUI5xM0ePu8VU/B8SqVPyAK+BIn4KCzuVamkvZe2fwAy55m6 DFJg== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM531Pgv+2HtXIX5uOgeoYVRsHHS7cw6GxKltdJ92yGIRMXIRVfqVA rHnSq8aAOpRWuqLHonT2fJrSJg== X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJxIlv/t8e+htb3eFAk1lSzIuiuO94bDCDl9IP1whq6yq56Qms3/b5dJBu6a1Z6nXeAy/BZ/nA== X-Received: by 2002:a63:338b:: with SMTP id z133mr38473pgz.442.1617137875416; Tue, 30 Mar 2021 13:57:55 -0700 (PDT) From: Kees Cook To: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Kees Cook , Elena Reshetova , x86@kernel.org, Andy Lutomirski , Peter Zijlstra , Catalin Marinas , Will Deacon , Mark Rutland , Alexander Potapenko , Alexander Popov , Ard Biesheuvel , Jann Horn , Vlastimil Babka , David Hildenbrand , Mike Rapoport , Andrew Morton , Jonathan Corbet , Randy Dunlap , kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v8 4/6] x86/entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support Date: Tue, 30 Mar 2021 13:57:48 -0700 Message-Id: <20210330205750.428816-5-keescook@chromium.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20210330205750.428816-1-keescook@chromium.org> References: <20210330205750.428816-1-keescook@chromium.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Patch-Hashes: v=1; h=sha256; g=5ebd0a02df09ef237ee07421c9f73e94deeaf170; i=np7yed3mY+gWIWkexmB7CyDLgwsIh0xV2RGaksJc7tI=; m=cc9SLz8pm+mdXOKZLHtRjH7FITDzwHCOKmwFrX1p7io=; p=EuIQlileJ2PUD6W0Q1r2arSRAFiVT/zqDgDnM3BVsdE= X-Patch-Sig: m=pgp; i=keescook@chromium.org; s=0x0x8972F4DFDC6DC026; b=iQIzBAABCgAdFiEEpcP2jyKd1g9yPm4TiXL039xtwCYFAmBjkMwACgkQiXL039xtwCam+BAAgyJ fgr3/nTqZn/eYQhhvKuViaCBZLo6l/+H4rxQlTvedji1wqc8cEH1sbGhPpbetwvdv1E5URzjuzmHj KdNMLLG9GNPC46Kj+wXSF6TYDAjM5cN5/gDYo4VtCaToL0CpKQ7ckFQaxaTmeU0fNlFfPSnuB7lkI CiMSuRjNVKM0shhpfIRhpcbrf4pKGtVEI6S2q/Gbf8E9b9CqMBuY6Emsp+RP+E5pIV3MWV+/lWBzW nvw3ooLNtPE4eIIi144Y2qrQIg6kLUEm6bQcJNJ3P5Sl8tPGjpGmC6Na5y+jkQhGtJa8xw8iigpd8 0U/JPVq7sNUY3cC2zuUxjCQndMGeEMC5pqmPYVD5r5EfzWdLjVpna6rY1uIHVjapxIqa47C0SRTR4 5IVkd5ixH0ZqAvdCg7Kmse+MVEFltJ84/dvtt1jVcWTSD810k5uamerLnqHhOTMjxBl870hd23zNW hbNqvHuR9jfFcRe//CAXRojf+E0OfMXwE59pfcMCu+Bd2yJHWaVTzfom6Evz+EH+l/IKLU5TF+fEJ urdE7yT5Eyh8VgMnbExQG1evQIv9UuJeZaNZyqYOT3vycXyscwFxWh3hWDSlYRY7tyBdNfAqe+3U7 o/s2Y+ekI0WlMnWK52ZRX2sTdctKAo9wnnsvddL51SJw6DgLEPu9zjHET5nmRGG4= Allow for a randomized stack offset on a per-syscall basis, with roughly 5-6 bits of entropy, depending on compiler and word size. Since the method of offsetting uses macros, this cannot live in the common entry code (the stack offset needs to be retained for the life of the syscall, which means it needs to happen at the actual entry point). Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner --- arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + arch/x86/entry/common.c | 3 +++ arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index 2792879d398e..4b4ad8ec10d2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -165,6 +165,7 @@ config X86 select HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE_PUD if X86_64 select HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_WP if X86_64 && USERFAULTFD select HAVE_ARCH_VMAP_STACK if X86_64 + select HAVE_ARCH_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET select HAVE_ARCH_WITHIN_STACK_FRAMES select HAVE_ASM_MODVERSIONS select HAVE_CMPXCHG_DOUBLE diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/common.c b/arch/x86/entry/common.c index a2433ae8a65e..810983d7c26f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/entry/common.c @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 __visible noinstr void do_syscall_64(unsigned long nr, struct pt_regs *regs) { + add_random_kstack_offset(); nr = syscall_enter_from_user_mode(regs, nr); instrumentation_begin(); @@ -83,6 +84,7 @@ __visible noinstr void do_int80_syscall_32(struct pt_regs *regs) { unsigned int nr = syscall_32_enter(regs); + add_random_kstack_offset(); /* * Subtlety here: if ptrace pokes something larger than 2^32-1 into * orig_ax, the unsigned int return value truncates it. This may @@ -102,6 +104,7 @@ static noinstr bool __do_fast_syscall_32(struct pt_regs *regs) unsigned int nr = syscall_32_enter(regs); int res; + add_random_kstack_offset(); /* * This cannot use syscall_enter_from_user_mode() as it has to * fetch EBP before invoking any of the syscall entry work diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h index 2b87b191b3b8..14ebd2196569 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ #ifndef _ASM_X86_ENTRY_COMMON_H #define _ASM_X86_ENTRY_COMMON_H +#include #include #include @@ -70,6 +71,21 @@ static inline void arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare(struct pt_regs *regs, */ current_thread_info()->status &= ~(TS_COMPAT | TS_I386_REGS_POKED); #endif + + /* + * Ultimately, this value will get limited by KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX(), + * but not enough for x86 stack utilization comfort. To keep + * reasonable stack head room, reduce the maximum offset to 8 bits. + * + * The actual entropy will be further reduced by the compiler when + * applying stack alignment constraints (see cc_stack_align4/8 in + * arch/x86/Makefile), which will remove the 3 (x86_64) or 2 (ia32) + * low bits from any entropy chosen here. + * + * Therefore, final stack offset entropy will be 5 (x86_64) or + * 6 (ia32) bits. + */ + choose_random_kstack_offset(rdtsc() & 0xFF); } #define arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare