From patchwork Sat Jun 5 15:03:58 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: John Wood X-Patchwork-Id: 12301603 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-13.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,FREEMAIL_FORGED_FROMDOMAIN,FREEMAIL_FROM, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2906CC47082 for ; Sat, 5 Jun 2021 15:27:24 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mother.openwall.net (mother.openwall.net [195.42.179.200]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with SMTP id 3A7EF613B4 for ; Sat, 5 Jun 2021 15:27:22 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 3A7EF613B4 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=gmx.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=kernel-hardening-return-21277-kernel-hardening=archiver.kernel.org@lists.openwall.com Received: (qmail 32765 invoked by uid 550); 5 Jun 2021 15:27:16 -0000 Mailing-List: contact kernel-hardening-help@lists.openwall.com; run by ezmlm Precedence: bulk List-Post: List-Help: List-Unsubscribe: List-Subscribe: List-ID: Received: (qmail 32745 invoked from network); 5 Jun 2021 15:27:15 -0000 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=gmx.net; s=badeba3b8450; t=1622906786; bh=V+/W+fEoSiOjB3w8FDJE2wQ1DNe8mLPtzk6quPwutvo=; h=X-UI-Sender-Class:From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=iojLmS3oTN1DZsuRR/9kSaXZCGZfZFJdGoPfE4LYE35NzhqE+PH0i8QWuoSoO3ig4 0JngVPtJQX19ChfEqfqd/uYPbTfQMIgFOXT9yfcsDzgp5iQWkZ6M5rdwdgYtppmBQ+ AgsMyUCQsUzlrWcQ2uUUGoVQflciOPKlRo41cXxA= X-UI-Sender-Class: 01bb95c1-4bf8-414a-932a-4f6e2808ef9c From: John Wood To: Kees Cook , Jann Horn , Jonathan Corbet , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Shuah Khan , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Arnd Bergmann Cc: John Wood , Andi Kleen , valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu, Greg Kroah-Hartman , Randy Dunlap , Andrew Morton , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Subject: [PATCH v8 1/8] security: Add LSM hook at the point where a task gets a fatal signal Date: Sat, 5 Jun 2021 17:03:58 +0200 Message-Id: <20210605150405.6936-2-john.wood@gmx.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20210605150405.6936-1-john.wood@gmx.com> References: <20210605150405.6936-1-john.wood@gmx.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Provags-ID: V03:K1:AXIG8C6g+ihrnMi0Z4HkpARpgiKyCwVIo4zDsrAYAVY7GlNoZU6 7O/98xMjJRXPp5Qat/wXAqITJjdc3Cg9KVDUkv9jMTAC4TmaJiwFSk+4T6TOSiObnjiNVug 5nZhRlb2yHN0s2og2Qe+i3xYhvcGTiItAt6TDApjVwCMOjKleIr60AAiwo95nL9p1fVQ/6I S8e6Adp97nN0pqVcqVFpQ== X-UI-Out-Filterresults: notjunk:1;V03:K0:+rmuCovomkA=:ToTPjaCqTPRANlpKwgY+BI Td9B1Od85sW7rN2BHlZx0S9yGMlNrRoNPYKw30EdwZpFQCw0MJ1R0CK7jNGYsnXyO/JWmtABx BP8IkODttWs14kSIcSCNKNy4q9JWsUjjZTaSYWrXwi64xsSYLhWaaddKFpk8MUuuvSv9uqJAX E/hUUtc0B9GArMYdIA78pHLTWuSIdCh8Q6yZFjSzqfSAR3zBStXRTFgc6GEb7llc9k4u8FD+R XtlGDWysWOLPvtgnghV5DjcNE6AUKsVR7/3NR/PDlkpUufHxi09Ppq7iL9YoFl0WE5upzqFIj q2ZzkVHB18mUQ06x7p6IFopYkvLGrVWFazETXmveEJbPqu/5Xu7Riy03cOUfz3v11HrIzMpMz +aIux0EuCwEfa60cVU4z8Nv7Zm4W7JsHaheyBhL6dxdOf/4gr4Hgajen8Eh3d8F6FbVSPOsxt s6Uybc/P9ER94vsN5/ev4rT+BM0jb2diW8cHTOUaV3rYTpxStwxWfbvo2PowP9gpvZVXNz+hx TSva2yUeepFKks37O8PHbO7IArxS+MAlRplA68Dn18k9iGuaEofOOzhOSpZcTTyMvillCS1iM xqv87MAi6Ut/ohkzwdAmStfNxUwBmvnY7nV9e8iChfcxFcplTo9Rx6RldUnyeSImra4jB7Vzx RpXyAAGqsDguITO8wNAo58W2qV5VbIh+W+g4Bv/8q+pxIopd3BEaf7KRG3D8XZq/xwcthsF6j wqyLd1NJlM3kM3uZl0ZVlHGMTBb4M37rkjQU5DqMJuu5YsZffDQO5e6ZNnBtcnt+pa8zge1yT auceOueO8F+cLAD8VsMsN/Y5wu6H3S0/kPvI24SydTLiJRY6XYuHqkDh2qVoyPCJnfkeGgDa7 l+JKO2UYiadlnCcOEv/DRYUnCcD3MQAWGmIgoIUXbLesQfwXrIwoUVlqfxVLY+/2X5KxnltMR lU21EnKuEaYy41oQ7lvgOfWYYsSQ4i/w/egMQ05Hi30jVL3FoXlaWlI9UMRBTcs13VMp4M3JP cpn10EqaCybbccD3nURqqCVccxWiBfvbdBPp/8NvdtR7Uibubz38DMLWBhCZoPwm+Cn4J4NwY 1+oTCRz76ExaLmdSmDYJMKJUpA2ai+aDo4z Add a security hook that allows a LSM to be notified when a task gets a fatal signal. This patch is a previous step on the way to compute the task crash period by the "brute" LSM (linux security module to detect and mitigate fork brute force attack against vulnerable userspace processes). Signed-off-by: John Wood Reviewed-by: Kees Cook --- include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 1 + include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 4 ++++ include/linux/security.h | 4 ++++ kernel/signal.c | 1 + security/security.c | 5 +++++ 5 files changed, 15 insertions(+) -- 2.25.1 diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h index 04c01794de83..e28468e84300 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h @@ -225,6 +225,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, -ENOSYS, task_prctl, int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5) LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, task_to_inode, struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, task_fatal_signal, const kernel_siginfo_t *siginfo) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, ipc_permission, struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag) LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, ipc_getsecid, struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid) diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h index 5c4c5c0602cb..fc8bef0f15d9 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h @@ -799,6 +799,10 @@ * security attributes, e.g. for /proc/pid inodes. * @p contains the task_struct for the task. * @inode contains the inode structure for the inode. + * @task_fatal_signal: + * This hook allows security modules to be notified when a task gets a + * fatal signal. + * @siginfo contains the signal information. * * Security hooks for Netlink messaging. * diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 06f7c50ce77f..609c76c6c764 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -433,6 +433,7 @@ int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info, int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5); void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode); +void security_task_fatal_signal(const kernel_siginfo_t *siginfo); int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag); void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid); int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg); @@ -1183,6 +1184,9 @@ static inline int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, static inline void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode) { } +static inline void security_task_fatal_signal(const kernel_siginfo_t *siginfo) +{ } + static inline int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag) { diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c index f7c6ffcbd044..4380763b3d8d 100644 --- a/kernel/signal.c +++ b/kernel/signal.c @@ -2804,6 +2804,7 @@ bool get_signal(struct ksignal *ksig) /* * Anything else is fatal, maybe with a core dump. */ + security_task_fatal_signal(&ksig->info); current->flags |= PF_SIGNALED; if (sig_kernel_coredump(signr)) { diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index b38155b2de83..208e3e7d4284 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -1891,6 +1891,11 @@ void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode) call_void_hook(task_to_inode, p, inode); } +void security_task_fatal_signal(const kernel_siginfo_t *siginfo) +{ + call_void_hook(task_fatal_signal, siginfo); +} + int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag) { return call_int_hook(ipc_permission, 0, ipcp, flag);