| Message ID | 20231109133751.212079-1-songshuaishuai@tinylab.org (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | Mainlined |
| Commit | 05d450aabd7386246c5aafc341fe9febe5855967 |
| Headers | show |
| Series | [V2] riscv: Support RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET | expand |
Hi, palmer: 在 2023/11/9 21:37, Song Shuai 写道: > Inspired from arm64's implement -- commit 70918779aec9 > ("arm64: entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support") > > Add support of kernel stack offset randomization while handling syscall, > the offset is defaultly limited by KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX() (i.e. 10 bits). > > In order to avoid trigger stack canaries (due to __builtin_alloca) and > slowing down the entry path, use __no_stack_protector attribute to > disable stack protector for do_trap_ecall_u() at the function level. > > Acked-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com> > Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> > Signed-off-by: Song Shuai <songshuaishuai@tinylab.org> Just a Reminder in case you miss this one. > --- > Changes since V1: > https://lore.kernel.org/linux-riscv/20231101064423.1906122-1-songshuaishuai@tinylab.org/ > - fix whitespace errors Damien pointed out > - add Acked-by and Reviewed-by tags > > --- > arch/riscv/Kconfig | 1 + > arch/riscv/kernel/traps.c | 17 ++++++++++++++++- > 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/arch/riscv/Kconfig b/arch/riscv/Kconfig > index d607ab0f7c6d..0e843de33f0c 100644 > --- a/arch/riscv/Kconfig > +++ b/arch/riscv/Kconfig > @@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ config RISCV > select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB_QXFER_PKT > select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS if MMU > select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS if COMPAT > + select HAVE_ARCH_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET > select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER > select HAVE_ARCH_THREAD_STRUCT_WHITELIST > select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK > diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/traps.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/traps.c > index 19807c4d3805..a1a75163fb81 100644 > --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/traps.c > +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/traps.c > @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ > #include <linux/cpu.h> > #include <linux/kernel.h> > #include <linux/init.h> > +#include <linux/randomize_kstack.h> > #include <linux/sched.h> > #include <linux/sched/debug.h> > #include <linux/sched/signal.h> > @@ -296,7 +297,8 @@ asmlinkage __visible __trap_section void do_trap_break(struct pt_regs *regs) > } > } > > -asmlinkage __visible __trap_section void do_trap_ecall_u(struct pt_regs *regs) > +asmlinkage __visible __trap_section __no_stack_protector > +void do_trap_ecall_u(struct pt_regs *regs) > { > if (user_mode(regs)) { > long syscall = regs->a7; > @@ -308,10 +310,23 @@ asmlinkage __visible __trap_section void do_trap_ecall_u(struct pt_regs *regs) > > syscall = syscall_enter_from_user_mode(regs, syscall); > > + add_random_kstack_offset(); > + > if (syscall >= 0 && syscall < NR_syscalls) > syscall_handler(regs, syscall); > else if (syscall != -1) > regs->a0 = -ENOSYS; > + /* > + * Ultimately, this value will get limited by KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX(), > + * so the maximum stack offset is 1k bytes (10 bits). > + * > + * The actual entropy will be further reduced by the compiler when > + * applying stack alignment constraints: 16-byte (i.e. 4-bit) aligned > + * for RV32I or RV64I. > + * > + * The resulting 6 bits of entropy is seen in SP[9:4]. > + */ > + choose_random_kstack_offset(get_random_u16()); > > syscall_exit_to_user_mode(regs); > } else {
Hello: This patch was applied to riscv/linux.git (for-next) by Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>: On Thu, 9 Nov 2023 21:37:51 +0800 you wrote: > Inspired from arm64's implement -- commit 70918779aec9 > ("arm64: entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support") > > Add support of kernel stack offset randomization while handling syscall, > the offset is defaultly limited by KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX() (i.e. 10 bits). > > In order to avoid trigger stack canaries (due to __builtin_alloca) and > slowing down the entry path, use __no_stack_protector attribute to > disable stack protector for do_trap_ecall_u() at the function level. > > [...] Here is the summary with links: - [V2] riscv: Support RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET https://git.kernel.org/riscv/c/05d450aabd73 You are awesome, thank you!
diff --git a/arch/riscv/Kconfig b/arch/riscv/Kconfig index d607ab0f7c6d..0e843de33f0c 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/Kconfig +++ b/arch/riscv/Kconfig @@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ config RISCV select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB_QXFER_PKT select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS if MMU select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS if COMPAT + select HAVE_ARCH_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER select HAVE_ARCH_THREAD_STRUCT_WHITELIST select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/traps.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/traps.c index 19807c4d3805..a1a75163fb81 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/traps.c +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/traps.c @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ #include <linux/cpu.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/init.h> +#include <linux/randomize_kstack.h> #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/sched/debug.h> #include <linux/sched/signal.h> @@ -296,7 +297,8 @@ asmlinkage __visible __trap_section void do_trap_break(struct pt_regs *regs) } } -asmlinkage __visible __trap_section void do_trap_ecall_u(struct pt_regs *regs) +asmlinkage __visible __trap_section __no_stack_protector +void do_trap_ecall_u(struct pt_regs *regs) { if (user_mode(regs)) { long syscall = regs->a7; @@ -308,10 +310,23 @@ asmlinkage __visible __trap_section void do_trap_ecall_u(struct pt_regs *regs) syscall = syscall_enter_from_user_mode(regs, syscall); + add_random_kstack_offset(); + if (syscall >= 0 && syscall < NR_syscalls) syscall_handler(regs, syscall); else if (syscall != -1) regs->a0 = -ENOSYS; + /* + * Ultimately, this value will get limited by KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX(), + * so the maximum stack offset is 1k bytes (10 bits). + * + * The actual entropy will be further reduced by the compiler when + * applying stack alignment constraints: 16-byte (i.e. 4-bit) aligned + * for RV32I or RV64I. + * + * The resulting 6 bits of entropy is seen in SP[9:4]. + */ + choose_random_kstack_offset(get_random_u16()); syscall_exit_to_user_mode(regs); } else {
Inspired from arm64's implement -- commit 70918779aec9 ("arm64: entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support") Add support of kernel stack offset randomization while handling syscall, the offset is defaultly limited by KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX() (i.e. 10 bits). In order to avoid trigger stack canaries (due to __builtin_alloca) and slowing down the entry path, use __no_stack_protector attribute to disable stack protector for do_trap_ecall_u() at the function level. Acked-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Song Shuai <songshuaishuai@tinylab.org> --- Changes since V1: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-riscv/20231101064423.1906122-1-songshuaishuai@tinylab.org/ - fix whitespace errors Damien pointed out - add Acked-by and Reviewed-by tags --- arch/riscv/Kconfig | 1 + arch/riscv/kernel/traps.c | 17 ++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)