From patchwork Fri Jan 17 13:03:35 2025 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Mel Gorman X-Patchwork-Id: 13943328 Received: from mail12.out.titan.email (mail12.out.titan.email [18.198.158.5]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6DA951FFC4A for ; Fri, 17 Jan 2025 13:39:23 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=18.198.158.5 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1737121167; cv=none; b=il9taXxQmY89q5DXiPZ7MpqD/sTDFcLYVvEol5o7w8fmhM8YBJ4UskCxd9fqRR8EOzloPwc3g+DUpCYwMt1HS9NPhYK0lXr9oddwpYGya6rfG+EhPpZGgnSiIq3iKjIaJUBBKgVpyaBAzIKdxbVOeRd2ICvw1nXZ3SrFD/pGkpE= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1737121167; c=relaxed/simple; bh=GoL8elr1g+v9QVwcLmr7gtwKfIKEgObjpBU6EDehYeE=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=YM41NmSzZpcuLYPom6xm3f1OEBWg6u3IZ7HCCVDhY7RPJy33sPLOVzd4Zp6q8aELpSg0g8xXi6BHrzbErhi9iKOjs3EigHQwuZfWk2hT9xkpRVrUjc0ApY8vKF4kz4Hy/yeVTGwZcXCZK4elegAslUSOwoHUnQUL5uRG9U/PQxc= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=techsingularity.net; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=techsingularity.net; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=techsingularity.net header.i=@techsingularity.net header.b=Y6vlzjVM; arc=none smtp.client-ip=18.198.158.5 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=techsingularity.net Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=techsingularity.net Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=techsingularity.net header.i=@techsingularity.net header.b="Y6vlzjVM" Received: from smtp-out0101.titan.email (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by smtp-out0101.titan.email (Postfix) with ESMTP id 80932A009B; Fri, 17 Jan 2025 13:03:59 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: a=rsa-sha256; bh=2rFrjKhCOLgXm9a/3DoxLHhn5CHHMWAoj6SakG580bw=; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=techsingularity.net; h=to:cc:subject:from:message-id:date:in-reply-to:references:mime-version:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references:reply-to; q=dns/txt; s=titan1; t=1737119039; v=1; b=Y6vlzjVMCJ3cZmPLJA88USrvWVVrM7jdpCl11/6uLbjj9qSHS6WUji2cl4FNKOyyMwZNzoEi zZf5HTTHVkHFGw6tg48WzdRCv0+S5dWi8U+Dj+llcrQqWc/jPg6PkMPu1BbliPUhs64+aq6J/RC NhaVEcqa5Lybqn7J1UlwZ748= Received: from mail.blacknight.com (ip-84-203-196-66.broadband.digiweb.ie [84.203.196.66]) by smtp-out0101.titan.email (Postfix) with ESMTPA id 20583A0049; Fri, 17 Jan 2025 13:03:59 +0000 (UTC) Feedback-ID: :mgorman@techsingularity.net:techsingularity.net:flockmailId From: Mel Gorman To: Kees Cook Cc: Daniel Micay , linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Mel Gorman Subject: [PATCH 1/3] mm: security: Move hardened usercopy under 'Kernel hardening options' Date: Fri, 17 Jan 2025 13:03:35 +0000 Message-ID: <20250117130337.4716-2-mgorman@techsingularity.net> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.43.0 In-Reply-To: <20250117130337.4716-1-mgorman@techsingularity.net> References: <20250117130337.4716-1-mgorman@techsingularity.net> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-F-Verdict: SPFVALID X-Titan-Src-Out: 1737119039409530807.9138.3900322166364608842@prod-euc1-smtp-out1002. X-CMAE-Score: 0 X-CMAE-Analysis: v=2.4 cv=UdNXSrSN c=1 sm=1 tr=0 ts=678a553f a=jU4EnjUUC1PH4wSjvv7Pww==:117 a=jU4EnjUUC1PH4wSjvv7Pww==:17 a=CEWIc4RMnpUA:10 a=R_Myd5XaAAAA:8 a=KkbEisfxgXDdCi-76G0A:9 a=L2g4Dz8VuBQ37YGmWQah:22 X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP There is a submenu for 'Kernel hardening options' under "Security". Move HARDENED_USERCOPY under the hardening options as it is clearly related. Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman Acked-by: Paul Moore --- security/Kconfig | 12 ------------ security/Kconfig.hardening | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index 28e685f53bd1..fe7346dc4bc3 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -159,18 +159,6 @@ config LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR this low address space will need the permission specific to the systems running LSM. -config HARDENED_USERCOPY - bool "Harden memory copies between kernel and userspace" - imply STRICT_DEVMEM - help - This option checks for obviously wrong memory regions when - copying memory to/from the kernel (via copy_to_user() and - copy_from_user() functions) by rejecting memory ranges that - are larger than the specified heap object, span multiple - separately allocated pages, are not on the process stack, - or are part of the kernel text. This prevents entire classes - of heap overflow exploits and similar kernel memory exposures. - config FORTIFY_SOURCE bool "Harden common str/mem functions against buffer overflows" depends on ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE diff --git a/security/Kconfig.hardening b/security/Kconfig.hardening index c9d5ca3d8d08..00e6e2ed0c43 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig.hardening +++ b/security/Kconfig.hardening @@ -279,6 +279,22 @@ config ZERO_CALL_USED_REGS endmenu +menu "String manipulation" + +config HARDENED_USERCOPY + bool "Harden memory copies between kernel and userspace" + imply STRICT_DEVMEM + help + This option checks for obviously wrong memory regions when + copying memory to/from the kernel (via copy_to_user() and + copy_from_user() functions) by rejecting memory ranges that + are larger than the specified heap object, span multiple + separately allocated pages, are not on the process stack, + or are part of the kernel text. This prevents entire classes + of heap overflow exploits and similar kernel memory exposures. + +endmenu + menu "Hardening of kernel data structures" config LIST_HARDENED