From patchwork Mon Feb 15 12:41:10 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Alexey Gladkov X-Patchwork-Id: 12088123 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-13.7 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00, DKIM_ADSP_CUSTOM_MED,FREEMAIL_FORGED_FROMDOMAIN,FREEMAIL_FROM, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9070BC433DB for ; Mon, 15 Feb 2021 12:43:35 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mother.openwall.net (mother.openwall.net [195.42.179.200]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with SMTP id 801B964DA8 for ; Mon, 15 Feb 2021 12:43:34 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 801B964DA8 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=gmail.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=kernel-hardening-return-20756-kernel-hardening=archiver.kernel.org@lists.openwall.com Received: (qmail 30574 invoked by uid 550); 15 Feb 2021 12:42:56 -0000 Mailing-List: contact kernel-hardening-help@lists.openwall.com; run by ezmlm Precedence: bulk List-Post: List-Help: List-Unsubscribe: List-Subscribe: List-ID: Received: (qmail 30493 invoked from network); 15 Feb 2021 12:42:54 -0000 From: Alexey Gladkov To: LKML , io-uring@vger.kernel.org, Kernel Hardening , Linux Containers , linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: Alexey Gladkov , Andrew Morton , Christian Brauner , "Eric W . Biederman" , Jann Horn , Jens Axboe , Kees Cook , Linus Torvalds , Oleg Nesterov Subject: [PATCH v6 3/7] Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts Date: Mon, 15 Feb 2021 13:41:10 +0100 Message-Id: <72fdcd154bec7e0dfad090f1af65ddac1e767451.1613392826.git.gladkov.alexey@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.29.2 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Greylist: Sender succeeded SMTP AUTH, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.6.1 (raptor.unsafe.ru [5.9.43.93]); Mon, 15 Feb 2021 12:42:42 +0000 (UTC) The rlimit counter is tied to uid in the user_namespace. This allows rlimit values to be specified in userns even if they are already globally exceeded by the user. However, the value of the previous user_namespaces cannot be exceeded. To illustrate the impact of rlimits, let's say there is a program that does not fork. Some service-A wants to run this program as user X in multiple containers. Since the program never fork the service wants to set RLIMIT_NPROC=1. service-A \- program (uid=1000, container1, rlimit_nproc=1) \- program (uid=1000, container2, rlimit_nproc=1) The service-A sets RLIMIT_NPROC=1 and runs the program in container1. When the service-A tries to run a program with RLIMIT_NPROC=1 in container2 it fails since user X already has one running process. We cannot use existing inc_ucounts / dec_ucounts because they do not allow us to exceed the maximum for the counter. Some rlimits can be overlimited by root or if the user has the appropriate capability. Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov --- fs/exec.c | 2 +- fs/io-wq.c | 22 ++++++------ fs/io-wq.h | 2 +- fs/io_uring.c | 2 +- include/linux/cred.h | 2 ++ include/linux/sched/user.h | 1 - include/linux/user_namespace.h | 13 ++++++++ kernel/cred.c | 10 +++--- kernel/exit.c | 2 +- kernel/fork.c | 9 ++--- kernel/sys.c | 2 +- kernel/ucount.c | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/user.c | 1 - kernel/user_namespace.c | 3 +- 14 files changed, 103 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c index 0371a3400be5..e6d7f186f33c 100644 --- a/fs/exec.c +++ b/fs/exec.c @@ -1874,7 +1874,7 @@ static int do_execveat_common(int fd, struct filename *filename, * whether NPROC limit is still exceeded. */ if ((current->flags & PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED) && - atomic_read(¤t_user()->processes) > rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC)) { + is_ucounts_overlimit(current_ucounts(), UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC))) { retval = -EAGAIN; goto out_ret; } diff --git a/fs/io-wq.c b/fs/io-wq.c index a564f36e260c..5b6940c90c61 100644 --- a/fs/io-wq.c +++ b/fs/io-wq.c @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include "../kernel/sched/sched.h" #include "io-wq.h" @@ -120,7 +121,7 @@ struct io_wq { io_wq_work_fn *do_work; struct task_struct *manager; - struct user_struct *user; + const struct cred *cred; refcount_t refs; struct completion done; @@ -234,7 +235,7 @@ static void io_worker_exit(struct io_worker *worker) if (worker->flags & IO_WORKER_F_RUNNING) atomic_dec(&acct->nr_running); if (!(worker->flags & IO_WORKER_F_BOUND)) - atomic_dec(&wqe->wq->user->processes); + dec_rlimit_ucounts(wqe->wq->cred->ucounts, UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, 1); worker->flags = 0; preempt_enable(); @@ -364,15 +365,15 @@ static void __io_worker_busy(struct io_wqe *wqe, struct io_worker *worker, worker->flags |= IO_WORKER_F_BOUND; wqe->acct[IO_WQ_ACCT_UNBOUND].nr_workers--; wqe->acct[IO_WQ_ACCT_BOUND].nr_workers++; - atomic_dec(&wqe->wq->user->processes); + dec_rlimit_ucounts(wqe->wq->cred->ucounts, UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, 1); } else { worker->flags &= ~IO_WORKER_F_BOUND; wqe->acct[IO_WQ_ACCT_UNBOUND].nr_workers++; wqe->acct[IO_WQ_ACCT_BOUND].nr_workers--; - atomic_inc(&wqe->wq->user->processes); + inc_rlimit_ucounts(wqe->wq->cred->ucounts, UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, 1); } io_wqe_inc_running(wqe, worker); - } + } } /* @@ -707,7 +708,7 @@ static bool create_io_worker(struct io_wq *wq, struct io_wqe *wqe, int index) raw_spin_unlock_irq(&wqe->lock); if (index == IO_WQ_ACCT_UNBOUND) - atomic_inc(&wq->user->processes); + inc_rlimit_ucounts(wq->cred->ucounts, UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, 1); refcount_inc(&wq->refs); wake_up_process(worker->task); @@ -838,7 +839,7 @@ static bool io_wq_can_queue(struct io_wqe *wqe, struct io_wqe_acct *acct, if (free_worker) return true; - if (atomic_read(&wqe->wq->user->processes) >= acct->max_workers && + if (is_ucounts_overlimit(wqe->wq->cred->ucounts, UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, acct->max_workers) && !(capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))) return false; @@ -1074,7 +1075,7 @@ struct io_wq *io_wq_create(unsigned bounded, struct io_wq_data *data) wq->do_work = data->do_work; /* caller must already hold a reference to this */ - wq->user = data->user; + wq->cred = data->cred; ret = -ENOMEM; for_each_node(node) { @@ -1090,10 +1091,7 @@ struct io_wq *io_wq_create(unsigned bounded, struct io_wq_data *data) wqe->node = alloc_node; wqe->acct[IO_WQ_ACCT_BOUND].max_workers = bounded; atomic_set(&wqe->acct[IO_WQ_ACCT_BOUND].nr_running, 0); - if (wq->user) { - wqe->acct[IO_WQ_ACCT_UNBOUND].max_workers = - task_rlimit(current, RLIMIT_NPROC); - } + wqe->acct[IO_WQ_ACCT_UNBOUND].max_workers = task_rlimit(current, RLIMIT_NPROC); atomic_set(&wqe->acct[IO_WQ_ACCT_UNBOUND].nr_running, 0); wqe->wq = wq; raw_spin_lock_init(&wqe->lock); diff --git a/fs/io-wq.h b/fs/io-wq.h index b158f8addcf3..4130e247c556 100644 --- a/fs/io-wq.h +++ b/fs/io-wq.h @@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ typedef void (free_work_fn)(struct io_wq_work *); typedef struct io_wq_work *(io_wq_work_fn)(struct io_wq_work *); struct io_wq_data { - struct user_struct *user; + const struct cred *cred; io_wq_work_fn *do_work; free_work_fn *free_work; diff --git a/fs/io_uring.c b/fs/io_uring.c index 931671082e61..389998f39843 100644 --- a/fs/io_uring.c +++ b/fs/io_uring.c @@ -8084,7 +8084,7 @@ static int io_init_wq_offload(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, unsigned int concurrency; int ret = 0; - data.user = ctx->user; + data.cred = ctx->creds; data.free_work = io_free_work; data.do_work = io_wq_submit_work; diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h index ad160e5fe5c6..8025fe48198f 100644 --- a/include/linux/cred.h +++ b/include/linux/cred.h @@ -372,6 +372,7 @@ static inline void put_cred(const struct cred *_cred) #define task_uid(task) (task_cred_xxx((task), uid)) #define task_euid(task) (task_cred_xxx((task), euid)) +#define task_ucounts(task) (task_cred_xxx((task), ucounts)) #define current_cred_xxx(xxx) \ ({ \ @@ -388,6 +389,7 @@ static inline void put_cred(const struct cred *_cred) #define current_fsgid() (current_cred_xxx(fsgid)) #define current_cap() (current_cred_xxx(cap_effective)) #define current_user() (current_cred_xxx(user)) +#define current_ucounts() (current_cred_xxx(ucounts)) extern struct user_namespace init_user_ns; #ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS diff --git a/include/linux/sched/user.h b/include/linux/sched/user.h index a8ec3b6093fc..d33d867ad6c1 100644 --- a/include/linux/sched/user.h +++ b/include/linux/sched/user.h @@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ */ struct user_struct { refcount_t __count; /* reference count */ - atomic_t processes; /* How many processes does this user have? */ atomic_t sigpending; /* How many pending signals does this user have? */ #ifdef CONFIG_FANOTIFY atomic_t fanotify_listeners; diff --git a/include/linux/user_namespace.h b/include/linux/user_namespace.h index f71b5a4a3e74..0a27cd049404 100644 --- a/include/linux/user_namespace.h +++ b/include/linux/user_namespace.h @@ -50,9 +50,12 @@ enum ucount_type { UCOUNT_INOTIFY_INSTANCES, UCOUNT_INOTIFY_WATCHES, #endif + UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, UCOUNT_COUNTS, }; +#define MAX_PER_NAMESPACE_UCOUNTS UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC + struct user_namespace { struct uid_gid_map uid_map; struct uid_gid_map gid_map; @@ -107,6 +110,16 @@ struct ucounts *alloc_ucounts(struct user_namespace *ns, kuid_t uid); struct ucounts *get_ucounts(struct ucounts *ucounts); void put_ucounts(struct ucounts *ucounts); +static inline long get_ucounts_value(struct ucounts *ucounts, enum ucount_type type) +{ + return atomic_long_read(&ucounts->ucount[type]); +} + +bool inc_rlimit_ucounts(struct ucounts *ucounts, enum ucount_type type, long v); +bool inc_rlimit_ucounts_and_test(struct ucounts *ucounts, enum ucount_type type, long v, long max); +void dec_rlimit_ucounts(struct ucounts *ucounts, enum ucount_type type, long v); +bool is_ucounts_overlimit(struct ucounts *ucounts, enum ucount_type type, long max); + #ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS static inline struct user_namespace *get_user_ns(struct user_namespace *ns) diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c index 58a8a9e24347..dcfa30b337c5 100644 --- a/kernel/cred.c +++ b/kernel/cred.c @@ -360,7 +360,7 @@ int copy_creds(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags) kdebug("share_creds(%p{%d,%d})", p->cred, atomic_read(&p->cred->usage), read_cred_subscribers(p->cred)); - atomic_inc(&p->cred->user->processes); + inc_rlimit_ucounts(task_ucounts(p), UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, 1); return 0; } @@ -395,8 +395,8 @@ int copy_creds(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags) } #endif - atomic_inc(&new->user->processes); p->cred = p->real_cred = get_cred(new); + inc_rlimit_ucounts(task_ucounts(p), UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, 1); alter_cred_subscribers(new, 2); validate_creds(new); return 0; @@ -496,12 +496,12 @@ int commit_creds(struct cred *new) * in set_user(). */ alter_cred_subscribers(new, 2); - if (new->user != old->user) - atomic_inc(&new->user->processes); + if (new->user != old->user || new->user_ns != old->user_ns) + inc_rlimit_ucounts(new->ucounts, UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, 1); rcu_assign_pointer(task->real_cred, new); rcu_assign_pointer(task->cred, new); if (new->user != old->user) - atomic_dec(&old->user->processes); + dec_rlimit_ucounts(old->ucounts, UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, 1); alter_cred_subscribers(old, -2); /* send notifications */ diff --git a/kernel/exit.c b/kernel/exit.c index 04029e35e69a..61c0fe902b50 100644 --- a/kernel/exit.c +++ b/kernel/exit.c @@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ void release_task(struct task_struct *p) /* don't need to get the RCU readlock here - the process is dead and * can't be modifying its own credentials. But shut RCU-lockdep up */ rcu_read_lock(); - atomic_dec(&__task_cred(p)->user->processes); + dec_rlimit_ucounts(task_ucounts(p), UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, 1); rcu_read_unlock(); cgroup_release(p); diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c index 40a5da7d3d70..812b023ecdce 100644 --- a/kernel/fork.c +++ b/kernel/fork.c @@ -819,9 +819,11 @@ void __init fork_init(void) init_task.signal->rlim[RLIMIT_SIGPENDING] = init_task.signal->rlim[RLIMIT_NPROC]; - for (i = 0; i < UCOUNT_COUNTS; i++) + for (i = 0; i < MAX_PER_NAMESPACE_UCOUNTS; i++) init_user_ns.ucount_max[i] = max_threads/2; + init_user_ns.ucount_max[UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC] = task_rlimit(&init_task, RLIMIT_NPROC); + #ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK cpuhp_setup_state(CPUHP_BP_PREPARE_DYN, "fork:vm_stack_cache", NULL, free_vm_stack_cache); @@ -1962,8 +1964,7 @@ static __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process( DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(!p->softirqs_enabled); #endif retval = -EAGAIN; - if (atomic_read(&p->real_cred->user->processes) >= - task_rlimit(p, RLIMIT_NPROC)) { + if (is_ucounts_overlimit(task_ucounts(p), UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC))) { if (p->real_cred->user != INIT_USER && !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) goto bad_fork_free; @@ -2366,7 +2367,7 @@ static __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process( #endif delayacct_tsk_free(p); bad_fork_cleanup_count: - atomic_dec(&p->cred->user->processes); + dec_rlimit_ucounts(task_ucounts(p), UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, 1); exit_creds(p); bad_fork_free: p->state = TASK_DEAD; diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c index 373def7debe8..304b6b5e5942 100644 --- a/kernel/sys.c +++ b/kernel/sys.c @@ -474,7 +474,7 @@ static int set_user(struct cred *new) * for programs doing set*uid()+execve() by harmlessly deferring the * failure to the execve() stage. */ - if (atomic_read(&new_user->processes) >= rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC) && + if (is_ucounts_overlimit(new->ucounts, UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC)) && new_user != INIT_USER) current->flags |= PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED; else diff --git a/kernel/ucount.c b/kernel/ucount.c index 50cc1dfb7d28..2f42d2ee6e27 100644 --- a/kernel/ucount.c +++ b/kernel/ucount.c @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include struct ucounts init_ucounts = { .ns = &init_user_ns, @@ -80,6 +81,7 @@ static struct ctl_table user_table[] = { UCOUNT_ENTRY("max_inotify_instances"), UCOUNT_ENTRY("max_inotify_watches"), #endif + { }, { } }; #endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */ @@ -222,6 +224,19 @@ static inline bool atomic_long_inc_below(atomic_long_t *v, int u) } } +static inline long atomic_long_dec_value(atomic_long_t *v, long n) +{ + long c, old; + c = atomic_long_read(v); + for (;;) { + old = atomic_long_cmpxchg(v, c, c - n); + if (likely(old == c)) + return c; + c = old; + } + return c; +} + struct ucounts *inc_ucount(struct user_namespace *ns, kuid_t uid, enum ucount_type type) { @@ -255,6 +270,51 @@ void dec_ucount(struct ucounts *ucounts, enum ucount_type type) put_ucounts(ucounts); } +bool inc_rlimit_ucounts(struct ucounts *ucounts, enum ucount_type type, long v) +{ + struct ucounts *iter; + bool overlimit = false; + + for (iter = ucounts; iter; iter = iter->ns->ucounts) { + long max = READ_ONCE(iter->ns->ucount_max[type]); + if (atomic_long_add_return(v, &iter->ucount[type]) > max) + overlimit = true; + } + + return overlimit; +} + +bool inc_rlimit_ucounts_and_test(struct ucounts *ucounts, enum ucount_type type, + long v, long max) +{ + bool overlimit = inc_rlimit_ucounts(ucounts, type, v); + if (!overlimit && get_ucounts_value(ucounts, type) > max) + overlimit = true; + return overlimit; +} + +void dec_rlimit_ucounts(struct ucounts *ucounts, enum ucount_type type, long v) +{ + struct ucounts *iter; + for (iter = ucounts; iter; iter = iter->ns->ucounts) { + long dec = atomic_long_dec_value(&iter->ucount[type], v); + WARN_ON_ONCE(dec < 0); + } +} + +bool is_ucounts_overlimit(struct ucounts *ucounts, enum ucount_type type, long max) +{ + struct ucounts *iter; + if (get_ucounts_value(ucounts, type) > max) + return true; + for (iter = ucounts; iter; iter = iter->ns->ucounts) { + max = READ_ONCE(iter->ns->ucount_max[type]); + if (get_ucounts_value(iter, type) > max) + return true; + } + return false; +} + static __init int user_namespace_sysctl_init(void) { #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL @@ -271,6 +331,7 @@ static __init int user_namespace_sysctl_init(void) BUG_ON(!setup_userns_sysctls(&init_user_ns)); #endif hlist_add_ucounts(&init_ucounts); + inc_rlimit_ucounts(&init_ucounts, UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC, 1); return 0; } subsys_initcall(user_namespace_sysctl_init); diff --git a/kernel/user.c b/kernel/user.c index a2478cddf536..7f5ff498207a 100644 --- a/kernel/user.c +++ b/kernel/user.c @@ -98,7 +98,6 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(uidhash_lock); /* root_user.__count is 1, for init task cred */ struct user_struct root_user = { .__count = REFCOUNT_INIT(1), - .processes = ATOMIC_INIT(1), .sigpending = ATOMIC_INIT(0), .locked_shm = 0, .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c index 516db53166ab..2434b13b02e5 100644 --- a/kernel/user_namespace.c +++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c @@ -118,9 +118,10 @@ int create_user_ns(struct cred *new) ns->owner = owner; ns->group = group; INIT_WORK(&ns->work, free_user_ns); - for (i = 0; i < UCOUNT_COUNTS; i++) { + for (i = 0; i < MAX_PER_NAMESPACE_UCOUNTS; i++) { ns->ucount_max[i] = INT_MAX; } + ns->ucount_max[UCOUNT_RLIMIT_NPROC] = rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC); ns->ucounts = ucounts; /* Inherit USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED from our parent */