From patchwork Thu Apr 27 02:07:17 2017 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Rusty Russell X-Patchwork-Id: 9702327 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7EDB2601D3 for ; Thu, 27 Apr 2017 03:17:33 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7BF042858E for ; Thu, 27 Apr 2017 03:17:33 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 702FE285EA; Thu, 27 Apr 2017 03:17:33 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.2 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from mother.openwall.net (mother.openwall.net [195.42.179.200]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with SMTP id E52EE2858E for ; Thu, 27 Apr 2017 03:17:30 +0000 (UTC) Received: (qmail 5529 invoked by uid 550); 27 Apr 2017 03:17:28 -0000 Mailing-List: contact kernel-hardening-help@lists.openwall.com; run by ezmlm Precedence: bulk List-Post: List-Help: List-Unsubscribe: List-Subscribe: List-ID: Delivered-To: mailing list kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Received: (qmail 5505 invoked from network); 27 Apr 2017 03:17:27 -0000 From: Rusty Russell To: Djalal Harouni Cc: Linux Kernel Mailing List , Andy Lutomirski , Kees Cook , Andrew Morton , "Serge E. Hallyn" , kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, LSM List , Linux API , Dongsu Park , Casey Schaufler , James Morris , Paul Moore , Tetsuo Handa , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Jonathan Corbet , Jessica Yu , Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo , Mauro Carvalho Chehab , Ingo Molnar , Zendyani , Peter Zijlstra In-Reply-To: References: <1492640420-27345-1-git-send-email-tixxdz@gmail.com> <1492640420-27345-3-git-send-email-tixxdz@gmail.com> <87r30ifmwz.fsf@rustcorp.com.au> Date: Thu, 27 Apr 2017 11:37:17 +0930 Message-ID: <87k266hacq.fsf@rustcorp.com.au> MIME-Version: 1.0 Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] modules:capabilities: add a per-task modules autoload restriction X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP Djalal Harouni writes: > Hi Rusty, > > On Mon, Apr 24, 2017 at 6:29 AM, Rusty Russell wrote: >> Djalal Harouni writes: >>> When value is (1), task must have CAP_SYS_MODULE to be able to trigger a >>> module auto-load operation, or CAP_NET_ADMIN for modules with a >>> 'netdev-%s' alias. >> >> Sorry, the magic 'netdev-' prefix is a crawling horror. To do this > > Yes I agree, that's the not the best part. I added it for backward > compatibility since I did notice that some network daemon retain > CAP_NET_ADMIN for this case. The aim of the patches is to get modules > autoload covered with CAP_SYS_MODULE and make it more like explicit > modules loading. > >> properly, you need to hand the capability (if any) from the >> request_module() call. Probably by adding a new request_module_cap and >> making request_module() call that, then fixing up the callers. > > Hmm, sorry Rusty I'm a bit confused, when you refer to "callers", you > mean request_module() callers ? Yes. > If so, I'm not sure that the best thing here since it may defeat the > purpose of this feature if we allow to pass capabilities. > > Right now we have modules autoload that can be triggered without > privileges, or with CAP_SYS_ADMIN, CAP_NET_ADMIN, CAP_SYS_MODULE... > and some caps may allow to load other modules to resolve symbols etc. > > The public exploits did target CAP_NET_ADMIN, if we offer a way to > pass in capabilities it will be used it as it is the case now without > it, not to mention that some capabilities are overloaded, exploits > will continue for these ones. > > The goal is to narrow modules autoload only to CAP_SYS_MODULE or > disable it completely for process trees. Later you can give > CAP_SYS_MODULE and you are sure that only /lib/modules/ will be > autoloaded, no arbitrary loads by using seccomp filter on module > syscalls, or separate the process in two one with CAP_SYS_MODULE and > the other with its own capabilities and feature use. > > I also don't like that 'netdev-%s' but it is for compatibility for > specific cases, maybe there are others that we may have to add. But I > would prefer if we narrow it down to only CAP_SYS_MODULE. There's one place where this is called, net/core/dev_ioctl.c: if (no_module && capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) no_module = request_module("netdev-%s", name); *That's the place* you want to add the exception, and the cleanest way is probably to add another arg to __request_module: (incomplete patch, but you get the idea): Hope that helps, Rusty. diff --git a/include/linux/kmod.h b/include/linux/kmod.h index c4e441e00db5..2ea82d5d20af 100644 --- a/include/linux/kmod.h +++ b/include/linux/kmod.h @@ -33,15 +33,16 @@ extern char modprobe_path[]; /* for sysctl */ /* modprobe exit status on success, -ve on error. Return value * usually useless though. */ extern __printf(2, 3) -int __request_module(bool wait, const char *name, ...); -#define request_module(mod...) __request_module(true, mod) -#define request_module_nowait(mod...) __request_module(false, mod) -#define try_then_request_module(x, mod...) \ - ((x) ?: (__request_module(true, mod), (x))) +int __request_module(bool wait, int allow_cap, const char *name, ...); #else -static inline int request_module(const char *name, ...) { return -ENOSYS; } -static inline int request_module_nowait(const char *name, ...) { return -ENOSYS; } -#define try_then_request_module(x, mod...) (x) +static inline __printf(2,3) +int __request_module(bool wait, int allow_cap, const char *name, ...) +{ return -ENOSYS; } +#endif +#define request_module(mod...) __request_module(true, -1, mod) +#define request_module_nowait(mod...) __request_module(false, -1, mod) +#define try_then_request_module(x, mod...) \ + ((x) ?: (__request_module(true, -1, mod), (x))) #endif diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 96899fad7016..9f1217c7cb23 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -889,9 +890,9 @@ static inline int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *cred, return 0; } -static inline int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) +static inline int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name, int allow_cap) { - return 0; + return cap_kernel_module_request(kmod_name, allow_cap); } static inline int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, diff --git a/kernel/kmod.c b/kernel/kmod.c index 563f97e2be36..b2d2f525c80b 100644 --- a/kernel/kmod.c +++ b/kernel/kmod.c @@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ static int call_modprobe(char *module_name, int wait) /** * __request_module - try to load a kernel module * @wait: wait (or not) for the operation to complete + * @allow_cap: if positive, always allow modprobe if this capability set. * @fmt: printf style format string for the name of the module * @...: arguments as specified in the format string * @@ -123,7 +124,8 @@ static int call_modprobe(char *module_name, int wait) * If module auto-loading support is disabled then this function * becomes a no-operation. */ -int __request_module(bool wait, const char *fmt, ...) + +int __request_module(bool wait, int allow_cap, const char *fmt, ...) { va_list args; char module_name[MODULE_NAME_LEN]; @@ -150,7 +152,7 @@ int __request_module(bool wait, const char *fmt, ...) if (ret >= MODULE_NAME_LEN) return -ENAMETOOLONG; - ret = security_kernel_module_request(module_name); + ret = security_kernel_module_request(module_name, allow_cap); if (ret) return ret; diff --git a/net/core/dev_ioctl.c b/net/core/dev_ioctl.c index b94b1d293506..e7a7dc28761d 100644 --- a/net/core/dev_ioctl.c +++ b/net/core/dev_ioctl.c @@ -367,7 +367,8 @@ void dev_load(struct net *net, const char *name) no_module = !dev; if (no_module && capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) - no_module = request_module("netdev-%s", name); + no_module = __request_module(true, CAP_NET_ADMIN, + "netdev-%s", name); if (no_module && capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE)) request_module("%s", name); }