| Message ID | d17655777c21bc09a7af1bbcf74e6f2b69a51152.1561610354.git.luto@kernel.org (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
| Series | [v2,1/8] x86/vsyscall: Remove the vsyscall=native documentation | expand |
On Wed, Jun 26, 2019 at 09:45:03PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > With vsyscall emulation on, we still expose a readable vsyscall page > that contains syscall instructions that validly implement the > vsyscalls. We need this because certain dynamic binary > instrumentation tools attempt to read the call targets of call > instructions in the instrumented code. If the instrumented code > uses vsyscalls, then the vsyscal page needs to contain readable > code. > > Unfortunately, leaving readable memory at a deterministic address > can be used to help various ASLR bypasses, so we gain some hardening > value if we disallow vsyscall reads. > > Given how rarely the vsyscall page needs to be readable, add a > mechanism to make the vsyscall page be execute only. > > Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> > Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> > Cc: Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com> > Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> > Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> > Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> -Kees > --- > .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 7 +++- > arch/x86/Kconfig | 33 ++++++++++++++----- > arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c | 16 +++++++-- > 3 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt > index 0082d1e56999..be8c3a680afa 100644 > --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt > +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt > @@ -5100,7 +5100,12 @@ > targets for exploits that can control RIP. > > emulate [default] Vsyscalls turn into traps and are > - emulated reasonably safely. > + emulated reasonably safely. The vsyscall > + page is readable. > + > + xonly Vsyscalls turn into traps and are > + emulated reasonably safely. The vsyscall > + page is not readable. > > none Vsyscalls don't work at all. This makes > them quite hard to use for exploits but > diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig > index 2bbbd4d1ba31..0182d2c67590 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig > +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig > @@ -2293,23 +2293,38 @@ choice > it can be used to assist security vulnerability exploitation. > > This setting can be changed at boot time via the kernel command > - line parameter vsyscall=[emulate|none]. > + line parameter vsyscall=[emulate|xonly|none]. > > On a system with recent enough glibc (2.14 or newer) and no > static binaries, you can say None without a performance penalty > to improve security. > > - If unsure, select "Emulate". > + If unsure, select "Emulate execution only". > > config LEGACY_VSYSCALL_EMULATE > - bool "Emulate" > + bool "Full emulation" > help > - The kernel traps and emulates calls into the fixed > - vsyscall address mapping. This makes the mapping > - non-executable, but it still contains known contents, > - which could be used in certain rare security vulnerability > - exploits. This configuration is recommended when userspace > - still uses the vsyscall area. > + The kernel traps and emulates calls into the fixed vsyscall > + address mapping. This makes the mapping non-executable, but > + it still contains readable known contents, which could be > + used in certain rare security vulnerability exploits. This > + configuration is recommended when using legacy userspace > + that still uses vsyscalls along with legacy binary > + instrumentation tools that require code to be readable. > + > + An example of this type of legacy userspace is running > + Pin on an old binary that still uses vsyscalls. > + > + config LEGACY_VSYSCALL_XONLY > + bool "Emulate execution only" > + help > + The kernel traps and emulates calls into the fixed vsyscall > + address mapping and does not allow reads. This > + configuration is recommended when userspace might use the > + legacy vsyscall area but support for legacy binary > + instrumentation of legacy code is not needed. It mitigates > + certain uses of the vsyscall area as an ASLR-bypassing > + buffer. > > config LEGACY_VSYSCALL_NONE > bool "None" > diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c > index d9d81ad7a400..fedd7628f3a6 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c > +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c > @@ -42,9 +42,11 @@ > #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS > #include "vsyscall_trace.h" > > -static enum { EMULATE, NONE } vsyscall_mode = > +static enum { EMULATE, XONLY, NONE } vsyscall_mode = > #ifdef CONFIG_LEGACY_VSYSCALL_NONE > NONE; > +#elif defined(CONFIG_LEGACY_VSYSCALL_XONLY) > + XONLY; > #else > EMULATE; > #endif > @@ -54,6 +56,8 @@ static int __init vsyscall_setup(char *str) > if (str) { > if (!strcmp("emulate", str)) > vsyscall_mode = EMULATE; > + else if (!strcmp("xonly", str)) > + vsyscall_mode = XONLY; > else if (!strcmp("none", str)) > vsyscall_mode = NONE; > else > @@ -357,12 +361,20 @@ void __init map_vsyscall(void) > extern char __vsyscall_page; > unsigned long physaddr_vsyscall = __pa_symbol(&__vsyscall_page); > > - if (vsyscall_mode != NONE) { > + /* > + * For full emulation, the page needs to exist for real. In > + * execute-only mode, there is no PTE at all backing the vsyscall > + * page. > + */ > + if (vsyscall_mode == EMULATE) { > __set_fixmap(VSYSCALL_PAGE, physaddr_vsyscall, > PAGE_KERNEL_VVAR); > set_vsyscall_pgtable_user_bits(swapper_pg_dir); > } > > + if (vsyscall_mode == XONLY) > + gate_vma.vm_flags = VM_EXEC; > + > BUILD_BUG_ON((unsigned long)__fix_to_virt(VSYSCALL_PAGE) != > (unsigned long)VSYSCALL_ADDR); > } > -- > 2.21.0 >
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index 0082d1e56999..be8c3a680afa 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -5100,7 +5100,12 @@ targets for exploits that can control RIP. emulate [default] Vsyscalls turn into traps and are - emulated reasonably safely. + emulated reasonably safely. The vsyscall + page is readable. + + xonly Vsyscalls turn into traps and are + emulated reasonably safely. The vsyscall + page is not readable. none Vsyscalls don't work at all. This makes them quite hard to use for exploits but diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index 2bbbd4d1ba31..0182d2c67590 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -2293,23 +2293,38 @@ choice it can be used to assist security vulnerability exploitation. This setting can be changed at boot time via the kernel command - line parameter vsyscall=[emulate|none]. + line parameter vsyscall=[emulate|xonly|none]. On a system with recent enough glibc (2.14 or newer) and no static binaries, you can say None without a performance penalty to improve security. - If unsure, select "Emulate". + If unsure, select "Emulate execution only". config LEGACY_VSYSCALL_EMULATE - bool "Emulate" + bool "Full emulation" help - The kernel traps and emulates calls into the fixed - vsyscall address mapping. This makes the mapping - non-executable, but it still contains known contents, - which could be used in certain rare security vulnerability - exploits. This configuration is recommended when userspace - still uses the vsyscall area. + The kernel traps and emulates calls into the fixed vsyscall + address mapping. This makes the mapping non-executable, but + it still contains readable known contents, which could be + used in certain rare security vulnerability exploits. This + configuration is recommended when using legacy userspace + that still uses vsyscalls along with legacy binary + instrumentation tools that require code to be readable. + + An example of this type of legacy userspace is running + Pin on an old binary that still uses vsyscalls. + + config LEGACY_VSYSCALL_XONLY + bool "Emulate execution only" + help + The kernel traps and emulates calls into the fixed vsyscall + address mapping and does not allow reads. This + configuration is recommended when userspace might use the + legacy vsyscall area but support for legacy binary + instrumentation of legacy code is not needed. It mitigates + certain uses of the vsyscall area as an ASLR-bypassing + buffer. config LEGACY_VSYSCALL_NONE bool "None" diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c index d9d81ad7a400..fedd7628f3a6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c @@ -42,9 +42,11 @@ #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS #include "vsyscall_trace.h" -static enum { EMULATE, NONE } vsyscall_mode = +static enum { EMULATE, XONLY, NONE } vsyscall_mode = #ifdef CONFIG_LEGACY_VSYSCALL_NONE NONE; +#elif defined(CONFIG_LEGACY_VSYSCALL_XONLY) + XONLY; #else EMULATE; #endif @@ -54,6 +56,8 @@ static int __init vsyscall_setup(char *str) if (str) { if (!strcmp("emulate", str)) vsyscall_mode = EMULATE; + else if (!strcmp("xonly", str)) + vsyscall_mode = XONLY; else if (!strcmp("none", str)) vsyscall_mode = NONE; else @@ -357,12 +361,20 @@ void __init map_vsyscall(void) extern char __vsyscall_page; unsigned long physaddr_vsyscall = __pa_symbol(&__vsyscall_page); - if (vsyscall_mode != NONE) { + /* + * For full emulation, the page needs to exist for real. In + * execute-only mode, there is no PTE at all backing the vsyscall + * page. + */ + if (vsyscall_mode == EMULATE) { __set_fixmap(VSYSCALL_PAGE, physaddr_vsyscall, PAGE_KERNEL_VVAR); set_vsyscall_pgtable_user_bits(swapper_pg_dir); } + if (vsyscall_mode == XONLY) + gate_vma.vm_flags = VM_EXEC; + BUILD_BUG_ON((unsigned long)__fix_to_virt(VSYSCALL_PAGE) != (unsigned long)VSYSCALL_ADDR); }
With vsyscall emulation on, we still expose a readable vsyscall page that contains syscall instructions that validly implement the vsyscalls. We need this because certain dynamic binary instrumentation tools attempt to read the call targets of call instructions in the instrumented code. If the instrumented code uses vsyscalls, then the vsyscal page needs to contain readable code. Unfortunately, leaving readable memory at a deterministic address can be used to help various ASLR bypasses, so we gain some hardening value if we disallow vsyscall reads. Given how rarely the vsyscall page needs to be readable, add a mechanism to make the vsyscall page be execute only. Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> --- .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 7 +++- arch/x86/Kconfig | 33 ++++++++++++++----- arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c | 16 +++++++-- 3 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)