From patchwork Mon Mar 12 03:03:34 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Ben Hutchings X-Patchwork-Id: 10276175 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9379A601A0 for ; Mon, 12 Mar 2018 12:48:26 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8359E286B8 for ; Mon, 12 Mar 2018 12:48:26 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 78055287F9; Mon, 12 Mar 2018 12:48:26 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.2 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from mother.openwall.net (mother.openwall.net [195.42.179.200]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with SMTP id 97CCC286B8 for ; Mon, 12 Mar 2018 12:48:24 +0000 (UTC) Received: (qmail 5553 invoked by uid 550); 12 Mar 2018 12:45:19 -0000 Mailing-List: contact kernel-hardening-help@lists.openwall.com; run by ezmlm Precedence: bulk List-Post: List-Help: List-Unsubscribe: List-Subscribe: List-ID: Delivered-To: mailing list kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Delivered-To: moderator for kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Received: (qmail 31796 invoked from network); 12 Mar 2018 03:08:19 -0000 Content-Disposition: inline MIME-Version: 1.0 From: Ben Hutchings To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org CC: akpm@linux-foundation.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, "Al Viro" , "Ingo Molnar" , "Thomas Gleixner" , gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, "Tom Lendacky" , "Linus Torvalds" , kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, "Andi Kleen" , "Dan Williams" , "Kees Cook" , alan@linux.intel.com Date: Mon, 12 Mar 2018 03:03:34 +0000 Message-ID: X-Mailer: LinuxStableQueue (scripts by bwh) Subject: [PATCH 3.2 085/104] x86: Introduce barrier_nospec In-Reply-To: X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 2a02:8011:400e:2:6f00:88c8:c921:d332 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ben@decadent.org.uk X-SA-Exim-Scanned: No (on shadbolt.decadent.org.uk); SAEximRunCond expanded to false X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP 3.2.101-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Dan Williams commit b3d7ad85b80bbc404635dca80f5b129f6242bc7a upstream. Rename the open coded form of this instruction sequence from rdtsc_ordered() into a generic barrier primitive, barrier_nospec(). One of the mitigations for Spectre variant1 vulnerabilities is to fence speculative execution after successfully validating a bounds check. I.e. force the result of a bounds check to resolve in the instruction pipeline to ensure speculative execution honors that result before potentially operating on out-of-bounds data. No functional changes. Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds Suggested-by: Andi Kleen Suggested-by: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Dan Williams Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: Tom Lendacky Cc: Kees Cook Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: Al Viro Cc: alan@linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727415361.33451.9049453007262764675.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com [bwh: Backported to 3.2: update rdtsc_barrier() instead of rdtsc_ordered()] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/system.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/system.h @@ -478,6 +478,10 @@ static inline unsigned long array_index_ /* Override the default implementation from linux/nospec.h. */ #define array_index_mask_nospec array_index_mask_nospec +/* Prevent speculative execution past this barrier. */ +#define barrier_nospec() alternative_2("", "mfence", X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC, \ + "lfence", X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC) + /** * read_barrier_depends - Flush all pending reads that subsequents reads * depend on. @@ -563,8 +567,7 @@ static inline unsigned long array_index_ */ static __always_inline void rdtsc_barrier(void) { - alternative(ASM_NOP3, "mfence", X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC); - alternative(ASM_NOP3, "lfence", X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC); + barrier_nospec(); } /*