From patchwork Mon Dec 30 17:37:53 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: James Bottomley X-Patchwork-Id: 11313549 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E2366930 for ; Mon, 30 Dec 2019 17:38:20 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C133E2071E for ; Mon, 30 Dec 2019 17:38:20 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (1024-bit key) header.d=hansenpartnership.com header.i=@hansenpartnership.com header.b="lra8nvXm" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727332AbfL3RiU (ORCPT ); Mon, 30 Dec 2019 12:38:20 -0500 Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([66.63.167.143]:39178 "EHLO bedivere.hansenpartnership.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727236AbfL3RiU (ORCPT ); Mon, 30 Dec 2019 12:38:20 -0500 Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 210CD8EE15F; Mon, 30 Dec 2019 09:38:19 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=hansenpartnership.com; s=20151216; t=1577727499; bh=tgmsNP/mt1L5gXrWlnWYxsUhURaOTtBAwX4ahuy9rRE=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:From; b=lra8nvXmaabdi/COCw6tIdDxJAjgky60OkYm7tY9hDnU6gqZLhzQoS6oLVEuDMoFo YI1+tZvuLzKAl85B2fiyQeI7It9hQ1E1NZEUc1UaPS31g75cbnbroe2KeyYjEoSOm/ ZGfX8o6sMJZUsWACrSc5a42p2a612dTkufeMYFAA= Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (bedivere.hansenpartnership.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id PcpzEdoHbhAE; Mon, 30 Dec 2019 09:38:18 -0800 (PST) Received: from jarvis.int.hansenpartnership.com (jarvis.ext.hansenpartnership.com [153.66.160.226]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 076BD8EE07B; Mon, 30 Dec 2019 09:38:17 -0800 (PST) From: James Bottomley To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mimi Zohar , Jarkko Sakkinen , David Woodhouse , keyrings@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v4 0/9] TPM 2.0 trusted keys with attached policy Date: Mon, 30 Dec 2019 09:37:53 -0800 Message-Id: <20191230173802.8731-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.16.4 Sender: linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org This is basically a respin to update the ASN.1 interface to pass pointers in and out instead of updating in place. The remainder of the patches haven't changed in substance, but have changed to support the new ASN.1 encoder API. General Cover letter description: I've changed the output format to use the standardised ASN.1 coding for TPM2 keys, meaning they should interoperate with userspace TPM2 key implementations. Apart from interoperability, another advantage of the existing key format is that it carries all parameters like parent and hash with it and it is capable of carrying policy directives in a way that mean they're tied permanently to the key (no having to try to remember what the policy was and reconstruct it from userspace). This actually allows us to support the TPM 1.2 commands like pcrinfo easily in 2.0. Using the TPM2_PolicyPassword trick, this series now combines authorization with policy in a flexible way that would allow us to move to HMAC based authorizations later for TPM security. In getting passwords to work, I fixed the tpm2 password format in a separate patch. TPM 1.2 only allows fixed length authorizations, but TPM 2.0 allows for variable length passphrases, so we should support that in the keys. James --- James Bottomley (9): lib: add asn.1 encoder oid_registry: Add TCG defined OIDS for TPM keys security: keys: trusted fix tpm2 authorizations security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 tpm2 key format for the blobs security: keys: trusted: Make sealed key properly interoperable security: keys: trusted: add PCR policy to TPM2 keys security: keys: trusted: add ability to specify arbitrary policy security: keys: trusted: implement counter/timer policy security: keys: trusted: add password based authorizations to policy keys Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst | 64 +++- include/keys/trusted-type.h | 7 +- include/linux/asn1_encoder.h | 32 ++ include/linux/oid_registry.h | 5 + include/linux/tpm.h | 8 + lib/Makefile | 2 +- lib/asn1_encoder.c | 391 +++++++++++++++++++ security/keys/Kconfig | 2 + security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 2 +- security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.c | 433 ++++++++++++++++++++++ security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.h | 31 ++ security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1 | 23 ++ security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 46 ++- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 360 ++++++++++++++++-- 14 files changed, 1370 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-) create mode 100644 include/linux/asn1_encoder.h create mode 100644 lib/asn1_encoder.c create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.c create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2-policy.h create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/tpm2key.asn1