From patchwork Mon Dec 6 17:25:44 2021 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Stefan Berger X-Patchwork-Id: 12659183 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 56D13C4167E for ; Mon, 6 Dec 2021 17:27:29 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S241909AbhLFRa5 (ORCPT ); Mon, 6 Dec 2021 12:30:57 -0500 Received: from mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.156.1]:30654 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S240329AbhLFR34 (ORCPT ); Mon, 6 Dec 2021 12:29:56 -0500 Received: from pps.filterd (m0098399.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.1.2/8.16.1.2) with SMTP id 1B6FjRtr005534; Mon, 6 Dec 2021 17:26:11 GMT DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=ibm.com; h=from : to : cc : subject : date : message-id : content-transfer-encoding : mime-version; s=pp1; bh=5dAPaPlMd5CJ+2PVoXw4RIyM0HE+Jr/GDRtytyJkbac=; b=SBIIMeiWKna2Sgm1VQboWNvF+76TqtbWUIk5al49zZ/pq0gPCYygUpM6FzNrmWR5Q78w ClMW+dCjfm1MxUSX5++Pfp4ugWXzwDpSHwMroFg7kfmflR9n3GtLyfGNR1VGXYKymBIA fbg5KZbbTRllvUMkX3mlqRUEXGW0VoawfM/y8yHSzttgIzLQL0TXa6Wiev30oRtJHiau ys3+QBbgw5JLeWZgWriXmeqp/9yegiVKt1qW5AdwIEUje+uBK7XmKXDKTjnq/Q5oNZ4O ORl0OHdqEgKxxj2cbnA1yQdKiuaIDZ3yl+UbU8xnDqvHz3vQ9PSDbKb3fkLYNcft7SqY 7g== Received: from pps.reinject (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 3csmnekdah-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Mon, 06 Dec 2021 17:26:11 +0000 Received: from m0098399.ppops.net (m0098399.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by pps.reinject (8.16.0.43/8.16.0.43) with SMTP id 1B6H91PE031387; Mon, 6 Dec 2021 17:26:10 GMT Received: from ppma03dal.us.ibm.com (b.bd.3ea9.ip4.static.sl-reverse.com [169.62.189.11]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 3csmnekda7-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Mon, 06 Dec 2021 17:26:10 +0000 Received: from pps.filterd (ppma03dal.us.ibm.com [127.0.0.1]) by ppma03dal.us.ibm.com (8.16.1.2/8.16.1.2) with SMTP id 1B6HDicY029393; Mon, 6 Dec 2021 17:26:09 GMT Received: from b01cxnp23034.gho.pok.ibm.com (b01cxnp23034.gho.pok.ibm.com [9.57.198.29]) by ppma03dal.us.ibm.com with ESMTP id 3cqyya2my3-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Mon, 06 Dec 2021 17:26:08 +0000 Received: from b01ledav001.gho.pok.ibm.com (b01ledav001.gho.pok.ibm.com [9.57.199.106]) by b01cxnp23034.gho.pok.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id 1B6HQ7VS50594172 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Mon, 6 Dec 2021 17:26:07 GMT Received: from b01ledav001.gho.pok.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3ACDF2805C; Mon, 6 Dec 2021 17:26:07 +0000 (GMT) Received: from b01ledav001.gho.pok.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 18C9C28059; Mon, 6 Dec 2021 17:26:07 +0000 (GMT) Received: from sbct-3.pok.ibm.com (unknown [9.47.158.153]) by b01ledav001.gho.pok.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Mon, 6 Dec 2021 17:26:07 +0000 (GMT) From: Stefan Berger To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: zohar@linux.ibm.com, serge@hallyn.com, christian.brauner@ubuntu.com, containers@lists.linux.dev, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, ebiederm@xmission.com, krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com, roberto.sassu@huawei.com, mpeters@redhat.com, lhinds@redhat.com, lsturman@redhat.com, puiterwi@redhat.com, jejb@linux.ibm.com, jamjoom@us.ibm.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, paul@paul-moore.com, rgb@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org, Stefan Berger Subject: [PATCH v3 00/16] ima: Namespace IMA with audit support in IMA-ns Date: Mon, 6 Dec 2021 12:25:44 -0500 Message-Id: <20211206172600.1495968-1-stefanb@linux.ibm.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.31.1 X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 X-Proofpoint-ORIG-GUID: 5hh1xSrf9rJIa-dDyinvb_GP3VkB77ia X-Proofpoint-GUID: oVt0Fj-k5zrg5eMXdwQko2VVQ83tIug_ X-Proofpoint-UnRewURL: 0 URL was un-rewritten MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=baseguard engine=ICAP:2.0.205,Aquarius:18.0.790,Hydra:6.0.425,FMLib:17.11.62.513 definitions=2021-12-06_06,2021-12-06_02,2021-12-02_01 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 adultscore=0 spamscore=0 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 priorityscore=1501 phishscore=0 suspectscore=0 impostorscore=0 malwarescore=0 bulkscore=0 clxscore=1015 mlxlogscore=999 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.12.0-2110150000 definitions=main-2112060104 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org The goal of this series of patches is to start with the namespacing of IMA and support auditing within an IMA namespace (IMA-ns) as the first step. In this series the IMA namespace is piggy backing on the user namespace and therefore an IMA namespace gets created when a user namespace is created. The advantage of this is that the user namespace can provide the keys infrastructure that IMA appraisal support will need later on. We chose the goal of supporting auditing within an IMA namespace since it requires the least changes to IMA. Following this series, auditing within an IMA namespace can be activated by a user running the following lines that rely on a statically linked busybox to be installed on the host for execution within the minimal container environment: mkdir -p rootfs/{bin,mnt,proc} cp /sbin/busybox rootfs/bin PATH=/bin unshare --user --map-root-user --mount-proc --pid --fork \ --root rootfs busybox sh -c \ "busybox mount -t securityfs /mnt /mnt; \ busybox echo 'audit func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC' > /mnt/ima/policy; \ busybox cat /mnt/ima/policy" Following the audit log on the host the last line cat'ing the IMA policy inside the namespace would have been audited. Unfortunately the auditing line is not distinguishable from one stemming from actions on the host. The hope here is that Richard Brigg's container id support for auditing would help resolve the problem. The following lines added to a suitable IMA policy on the host would cause the execution of the commands inside the container (by uid 1000) to be measured and audited as well on the host, thus leading to two auditing messages for the 'busybox cat' above and log entries in IMA's system log. echo -e "measure func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC uid=1000\n" \ "audit func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC uid=1000\n" \ > /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy The goal of supporting measurement and auditing by the host, of actions occurring within IMA namespaces, is that users, particularly root, should not be able to evade the host's IMA policy just by spawning new IMA namespaces, running programs there, and discarding the namespaces again. This is achieved through 'hierarchical processing' of file accesses that are evaluated against the policy of the namespace where the action occurred and against all namespaces' and their policies leading back to the root IMA namespace (init_ima_ns). The patch series adds support for a virtualized SecurityFS with a few new API calls that are used by IMA namespacing. Only the data relevant to the IMA namespace are shown. The files and directories of other security subsystems (TPM, evm, Tomoyo, safesetid) are not showing up when secruityfs is mounted inside a user namespace. Much of the code leading up to the virtualization of SecurityFS deals with moving IMA's variables from various files into the IMA namespace structure called 'ima_namespace'. When it comes to determining the current IMA namespace I took the approach to get the current IMA namespace (get_current_ns()) on the top level and pass the pointer all the way down to those functions that now need access to the ima_namespace to get to their variables. This later on comes in handy once hierarchical processing is implemented in this series where we walk the list of namespaces backwards and again need to pass the pointer into functions. This patch also introduces usage of CAP_MAC_ADMIN to allow access to the IMA policy via reduced capabilities. We would again later on use this capability to allow users to set file extended attributes for IMA appraisal support. The basis for this series of patches is Linux v5.15. My tree with these patches is here: https://github.com/stefanberger/linux-ima-namespaces/tree/v5.15%2Bimans.v3.public Regards, Stefan v3: - Further modifications to virtualized SecurityFS following James's posted patch - Dropping of early teardown for user_namespaces since not needed anymore v2: - Folllwed Christian's suggestion to virtualize securitytfs; no more securityfs_ns - Followed James's advice for late 'population' of securityfs for IMA namespaces - Squashed 2 patches dealing with capabilities - Added missing 'depends on USER_NS' to Kconfig - Added missing 'static' to several functions *** BLURB HERE *** Mehmet Kayaalp (2): ima: Define ns_status for storing namespaced iint data ima: Namespace audit status flags Stefan Berger (14): ima: Add IMA namespace support ima: Move delayed work queue and variables into ima_namespace ima: Move IMA's keys queue related variables into ima_namespace ima: Move policy related variables into ima_namespace ima: Move ima_htable into ima_namespace ima: Move measurement list related variables into ima_namespace ima: Only accept AUDIT rules for IMA non-init_ima_ns namespaces for now ima: Implement hierarchical processing of file accesses securityfs: Move vfsmount into user_namespace securityfs: Extend securityfs with namespacing support ima: Move some IMA policy and filesystem related variables into ima_namespace ima: Use mac_admin_ns_capable() to check corresponding capability ima: Move dentries into ima_namespace ima: Setup securityfs for IMA namespace include/linux/capability.h | 6 + include/linux/ima.h | 126 ++++++++++++++ include/linux/security.h | 8 + include/linux/user_namespace.h | 8 + init/Kconfig | 13 ++ kernel/user.c | 9 +- kernel/user_namespace.c | 16 ++ security/inode.c | 83 +++++++-- security/integrity/ima/Makefile | 4 +- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 145 ++++++++++------ security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 33 ++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 26 +-- security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c | 8 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 170 ++++++++++++------- security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 22 +-- security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c | 73 ++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 128 +++++++++----- security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c | 111 ++++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_ns_status.c | 132 ++++++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 142 +++++++++------- security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c | 75 ++++---- security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c | 73 +++----- security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c | 4 +- 23 files changed, 1075 insertions(+), 340 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_ns_status.c