@@ -232,6 +232,7 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v);
#define IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES 0x08
#define IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE 0x10
#define IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY 0x20
+#define IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC 0x40
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
@@ -442,6 +442,15 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
}
return 0; /* We rely on module signature checking */
}
+
+ if (!file && read_id == READING_KEXEC_IMAGE) {
+ if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC) &&
+ (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) {
+ pr_err("impossible to appraise a kernel image without a file descriptor; try using kexec_file syscall.\n");
+ return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
return 0;
}
@@ -448,6 +448,8 @@ static int ima_appraise_flag(enum ima_hooks func)
return IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE;
else if (func == POLICY_CHECK)
return IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY;
+ else if (func == KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK)
+ return IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC;
return 0;
}
The original kexec_load syscall can not verify file signatures. This patch differentiates between the kexec_load and kexec_file_load syscalls. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@kernel.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> --- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 1 + security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 9 +++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+)