| Message ID | 1527780226.3427.20.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
On Thu, May 31, 2018 at 11:23 AM, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote: > Both the init_module and finit_module syscalls call either directly > or indirectly the security_kernel_read_file LSM hook. This patch > replaces the direct call in init_module with a call to the new > security_kernel_load_data hook and makes the corresponding changes > in SELinux, LoadPin, and IMA. > > Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> > Cc: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> > Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> > Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> > Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> > > --- > Changelog: > - For SELinux, have both the security_kernel_read_file and > security_kernel_load_data LSM hooks call selinux_kernel_read_file(). > - LoadPin: replace existing init_module LSM hook support with > new security_kernel_load_data hook. > > kernel/module.c | 2 +- > security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 24 ++++++++++-------------- > security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ > security/selinux/hooks.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ > 4 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) As mentioned in the previous iteration, I have no strong opinion on the question of the LSM hooks, but the SELinux bits look okay to me. Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> > diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c > index ce8066b88178..b97c642b5b4d 100644 > --- a/kernel/module.c > +++ b/kernel/module.c > @@ -2879,7 +2879,7 @@ static int copy_module_from_user(const void __user *umod, unsigned long len, > if (info->len < sizeof(*(info->hdr))) > return -ENOEXEC; > > - err = security_kernel_read_file(NULL, READING_MODULE); > + err = security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_MODULE); > if (err) > return err; > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > index 5a7696152982..cd33a2eff496 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > @@ -438,17 +438,6 @@ static int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = { > */ > int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id) > { > - bool sig_enforce = is_module_sig_enforced(); > - > - if (!file && read_id == READING_MODULE) { > - if (!sig_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES) && > - (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) { > - pr_err("impossible to appraise a module without a file descriptor. sig_enforce kernel parameter might help\n"); > - return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ > - } > - return 0; /* We rely on module signature checking */ > - } > - > if (read_id == READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER) { > if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) && > (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) { > @@ -487,9 +476,6 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, > return 0; > } > > - if (!file && read_id == READING_MODULE) /* MODULE_SIG_FORCE enabled */ > - return 0; > - > /* permit signed certs */ > if (!file && read_id == READING_X509_CERTIFICATE) > return 0; > @@ -518,6 +504,8 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, > */ > int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id) > { > + bool sig_enforce; > + > if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) != IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) > return 0; > > @@ -533,6 +521,14 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id) > pr_err("Prevent firmware sysfs fallback loading.\n"); > return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ > } > + break; > + case LOADING_MODULE: > + sig_enforce = is_module_sig_enforced(); > + > + if (!sig_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES)) { > + pr_err("impossible to appraise a module without a file descriptor. sig_enforce kernel parameter might help\n"); > + return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ > + } > default: > break; > } > diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c > index 5fa191252c8f..a9c07bfbc338 100644 > --- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c > +++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c > @@ -173,9 +173,24 @@ static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id) > return 0; > } > > +static int loadpin_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id) > +{ > + int rc = 0; > + > + switch (id) { > + case LOADING_MODULE: > + rc = loadpin_read_file(NULL, READING_MODULE); > + default: > + break; > + } > + > + return rc; > +} > + > static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { > LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, loadpin_sb_free_security), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, loadpin_read_file), > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, loadpin_load_data), > }; > > void __init loadpin_add_hooks(void) > diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c > index 02ebd1585eaf..475aed9ee2c7 100644 > --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c > +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c > @@ -4059,6 +4059,20 @@ static int selinux_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, > return rc; > } > > +static int selinux_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id) > +{ > + int rc = 0; > + > + switch (id) { > + case LOADING_MODULE: > + rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(NULL); > + default: > + break; > + } > + > + return rc; > +} > + > static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid) > { > return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, > @@ -6950,6 +6964,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { > LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request), > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, selinux_kernel_load_data), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, selinux_kernel_read_file), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid), > -- > 2.7.5 >
+++ Mimi Zohar [31/05/18 11:23 -0400]: >Both the init_module and finit_module syscalls call either directly >or indirectly the security_kernel_read_file LSM hook. This patch >replaces the direct call in init_module with a call to the new >security_kernel_load_data hook and makes the corresponding changes >in SELinux, LoadPin, and IMA. > >Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> >Cc: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> >Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> >Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> >Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> For the module.c parts: Acked-by: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org> >Changelog: >- For SELinux, have both the security_kernel_read_file and >security_kernel_load_data LSM hooks call selinux_kernel_read_file(). >- LoadPin: replace existing init_module LSM hook support with >new security_kernel_load_data hook. > > kernel/module.c | 2 +- > security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 24 ++++++++++-------------- > security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ > security/selinux/hooks.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ > 4 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) > >diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c >index ce8066b88178..b97c642b5b4d 100644 >--- a/kernel/module.c >+++ b/kernel/module.c >@@ -2879,7 +2879,7 @@ static int copy_module_from_user(const void __user *umod, unsigned long len, > if (info->len < sizeof(*(info->hdr))) > return -ENOEXEC; > >- err = security_kernel_read_file(NULL, READING_MODULE); >+ err = security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_MODULE); > if (err) > return err; > >diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c >index 5a7696152982..cd33a2eff496 100644 >--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c >+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c >@@ -438,17 +438,6 @@ static int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = { > */ > int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id) > { >- bool sig_enforce = is_module_sig_enforced(); >- >- if (!file && read_id == READING_MODULE) { >- if (!sig_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES) && >- (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) { >- pr_err("impossible to appraise a module without a file descriptor. sig_enforce kernel parameter might help\n"); >- return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ >- } >- return 0; /* We rely on module signature checking */ >- } >- > if (read_id == READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER) { > if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) && > (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) { >@@ -487,9 +476,6 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, > return 0; > } > >- if (!file && read_id == READING_MODULE) /* MODULE_SIG_FORCE enabled */ >- return 0; >- > /* permit signed certs */ > if (!file && read_id == READING_X509_CERTIFICATE) > return 0; >@@ -518,6 +504,8 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, > */ > int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id) > { >+ bool sig_enforce; >+ > if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) != IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) > return 0; > >@@ -533,6 +521,14 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id) > pr_err("Prevent firmware sysfs fallback loading.\n"); > return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ > } >+ break; >+ case LOADING_MODULE: >+ sig_enforce = is_module_sig_enforced(); >+ >+ if (!sig_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES)) { >+ pr_err("impossible to appraise a module without a file descriptor. sig_enforce kernel parameter might help\n"); >+ return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ >+ } > default: > break; > } >diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c >index 5fa191252c8f..a9c07bfbc338 100644 >--- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c >+++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c >@@ -173,9 +173,24 @@ static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id) > return 0; > } > >+static int loadpin_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id) >+{ >+ int rc = 0; >+ >+ switch (id) { >+ case LOADING_MODULE: >+ rc = loadpin_read_file(NULL, READING_MODULE); >+ default: >+ break; >+ } >+ >+ return rc; >+} >+ > static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { > LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, loadpin_sb_free_security), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, loadpin_read_file), >+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, loadpin_load_data), > }; > > void __init loadpin_add_hooks(void) >diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c >index 02ebd1585eaf..475aed9ee2c7 100644 >--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c >+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c >@@ -4059,6 +4059,20 @@ static int selinux_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, > return rc; > } > >+static int selinux_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id) >+{ >+ int rc = 0; >+ >+ switch (id) { >+ case LOADING_MODULE: >+ rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(NULL); >+ default: >+ break; >+ } >+ >+ return rc; >+} >+ > static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid) > { > return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, >@@ -6950,6 +6964,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { > LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request), >+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, selinux_kernel_load_data), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, selinux_kernel_read_file), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid), >-- >2.7.5 >
On Thu, May 31, 2018 at 8:23 AM, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote: > diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c > index 5fa191252c8f..a9c07bfbc338 100644 > --- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c > +++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c > @@ -173,9 +173,24 @@ static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id) > return 0; > } > > +static int loadpin_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id) > +{ > + int rc = 0; > + > + switch (id) { > + case LOADING_MODULE: > + rc = loadpin_read_file(NULL, READING_MODULE); > + default: > + break; > + } > + > + return rc; > +} Is it worth keeping the same enum between the two hooks? That would simplify this a bit since it could just pass the id without remapping. And if you must have a separate enum, please change this to fail closed instead of open (and mark the fall-through): int rc = -EPERM; switch (id) { case LOADING_MODULE: rc = loadpin_read_file(NULL, READING_MODULE); /* Fall-through */ default: break; } Thanks! -Kees > + > static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { > LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, loadpin_sb_free_security), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, loadpin_read_file), > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, loadpin_load_data), > }; > > void __init loadpin_add_hooks(void) > diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c > index 02ebd1585eaf..475aed9ee2c7 100644 > --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c > +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c > @@ -4059,6 +4059,20 @@ static int selinux_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, > return rc; > } > > +static int selinux_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id) > +{ > + int rc = 0; > + > + switch (id) { > + case LOADING_MODULE: > + rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(NULL); > + default: > + break; > + } > + > + return rc; > +} > + > static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid) > { > return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, > @@ -6950,6 +6964,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { > LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request), > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, selinux_kernel_load_data), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, selinux_kernel_read_file), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid), > -- > 2.7.5 >
On Tue, 2018-06-05 at 12:45 -0700, Kees Cook wrote: > And if you must have a separate enum, please change this to fail > closed instead of open (and mark the fall-through): > > int rc = -EPERM; > > switch (id) { > case LOADING_MODULE: > rc = loadpin_read_file(NULL, READING_MODULE); > /* Fall-through */ > default: > break; > } This will fail the sysfs firmware fallback loading and the kexec_load syscall without any message, as you have for init_module. Is that what you want? Mimi
On Tue, Jun 5, 2018 at 2:35 PM, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote: > On Tue, 2018-06-05 at 12:45 -0700, Kees Cook wrote: > >> And if you must have a separate enum, please change this to fail >> closed instead of open (and mark the fall-through): >> >> int rc = -EPERM; >> >> switch (id) { >> case LOADING_MODULE: >> rc = loadpin_read_file(NULL, READING_MODULE); >> /* Fall-through */ >> default: >> break; >> } > > This will fail the sysfs firmware fallback loading and the kexec_load > syscall without any message, as you have for init_module. Is that > what you want? I'd prefer there be a full mapping of the enums so that everything gets passed into loadpin_read_file() :) Can the enum be shared or is that nonsensical? -Kees
On Tue, 2018-06-05 at 15:26 -0700, Kees Cook wrote: > On Tue, Jun 5, 2018 at 2:35 PM, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote: > > On Tue, 2018-06-05 at 12:45 -0700, Kees Cook wrote: > > > >> And if you must have a separate enum, please change this to fail > >> closed instead of open (and mark the fall-through): > >> > >> int rc = -EPERM; > >> > >> switch (id) { > >> case LOADING_MODULE: > >> rc = loadpin_read_file(NULL, READING_MODULE); > >> /* Fall-through */ > >> default: > >> break; > >> } > > > > This will fail the sysfs firmware fallback loading and the kexec_load > > syscall without any message, as you have for init_module. Is that > > what you want? > > I'd prefer there be a full mapping of the enums so that everything > gets passed into loadpin_read_file() :) > > Can the enum be shared or is that nonsensical? Considering this is v4 of the patch set, it's pretty obvious I did everything possible not to define a new LSM hook. Even if we can't re-use the existing enum, we could define the new enum in terms of __kernel_read_file_id. enum kernel_load_data_id { __kernel_read_file_id(__data_id_enumify) }; static const char * const kernel_load_data_str[] = { __kernel_read_file_id(__data_id_stringify) }; Eric, Serge, would using either the existing __kernel_read_file_id enum or the above definitions be acceptable? Mimi
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c index ce8066b88178..b97c642b5b4d 100644 --- a/kernel/module.c +++ b/kernel/module.c @@ -2879,7 +2879,7 @@ static int copy_module_from_user(const void __user *umod, unsigned long len, if (info->len < sizeof(*(info->hdr))) return -ENOEXEC; - err = security_kernel_read_file(NULL, READING_MODULE); + err = security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_MODULE); if (err) return err; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 5a7696152982..cd33a2eff496 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -438,17 +438,6 @@ static int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = { */ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id) { - bool sig_enforce = is_module_sig_enforced(); - - if (!file && read_id == READING_MODULE) { - if (!sig_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES) && - (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) { - pr_err("impossible to appraise a module without a file descriptor. sig_enforce kernel parameter might help\n"); - return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ - } - return 0; /* We rely on module signature checking */ - } - if (read_id == READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER) { if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) { @@ -487,9 +476,6 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, return 0; } - if (!file && read_id == READING_MODULE) /* MODULE_SIG_FORCE enabled */ - return 0; - /* permit signed certs */ if (!file && read_id == READING_X509_CERTIFICATE) return 0; @@ -518,6 +504,8 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, */ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id) { + bool sig_enforce; + if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) != IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) return 0; @@ -533,6 +521,14 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id) pr_err("Prevent firmware sysfs fallback loading.\n"); return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ } + break; + case LOADING_MODULE: + sig_enforce = is_module_sig_enforced(); + + if (!sig_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES)) { + pr_err("impossible to appraise a module without a file descriptor. sig_enforce kernel parameter might help\n"); + return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ + } default: break; } diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c index 5fa191252c8f..a9c07bfbc338 100644 --- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c +++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c @@ -173,9 +173,24 @@ static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id) return 0; } +static int loadpin_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id) +{ + int rc = 0; + + switch (id) { + case LOADING_MODULE: + rc = loadpin_read_file(NULL, READING_MODULE); + default: + break; + } + + return rc; +} + static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, loadpin_sb_free_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, loadpin_read_file), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, loadpin_load_data), }; void __init loadpin_add_hooks(void) diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 02ebd1585eaf..475aed9ee2c7 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -4059,6 +4059,20 @@ static int selinux_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, return rc; } +static int selinux_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id) +{ + int rc = 0; + + switch (id) { + case LOADING_MODULE: + rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(NULL); + default: + break; + } + + return rc; +} + static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid) { return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, @@ -6950,6 +6964,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, selinux_kernel_load_data), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, selinux_kernel_read_file), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid),
Both the init_module and finit_module syscalls call either directly or indirectly the security_kernel_read_file LSM hook. This patch replaces the direct call in init_module with a call to the new security_kernel_load_data hook and makes the corresponding changes in SELinux, LoadPin, and IMA. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> --- Changelog: - For SELinux, have both the security_kernel_read_file and security_kernel_load_data LSM hooks call selinux_kernel_read_file(). - LoadPin: replace existing init_module LSM hook support with new security_kernel_load_data hook. kernel/module.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 24 ++++++++++-------------- security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ security/selinux/hooks.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)