From patchwork Mon Oct 22 07:39:50 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: James Bottomley X-Patchwork-Id: 10651817 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A94F11815 for ; Mon, 22 Oct 2018 07:39:56 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9D029288A0 for ; Mon, 22 Oct 2018 07:39:56 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 876CF2888A; Mon, 22 Oct 2018 07:39:56 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-7.7 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_INVALID, DKIM_SIGNED,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=unavailable version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 315D62888D for ; Mon, 22 Oct 2018 07:39:56 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727559AbeJVP5Q (ORCPT ); Mon, 22 Oct 2018 11:57:16 -0400 Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([66.63.167.143]:49718 "EHLO bedivere.hansenpartnership.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727135AbeJVP5Q (ORCPT ); Mon, 22 Oct 2018 11:57:16 -0400 Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id BB1C68EE0FC; Mon, 22 Oct 2018 00:39:54 -0700 (PDT) Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (bedivere.hansenpartnership.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id tiZEVSCX4YlF; Mon, 22 Oct 2018 00:39:54 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [172.20.48.127] (unknown [62.232.21.219]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 548CC8EE02B; Mon, 22 Oct 2018 00:39:53 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=hansenpartnership.com; s=20151216; t=1540193994; bh=tH9nL1PHeJPUUsYyaRgxhyUs82JiWIIbsXwj/BZusjo=; h=Subject:From:To:Cc:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=S6YK+fcN1z/p0FL3z4IxOCd0+SqjNBDUv8GFqsdSD7dMBFLZ4TGg5UkBfjoYoOcJQ gOOKaYdCFtbwHhd2xw1vuXN6PEBP4jiTxoCqoQxirgnK+RXr+UY1/T5MO3k3BTEb4C girKevzi+tiJYToHeCpxToEaDJFMSC9ASDXlY1Oc= Message-ID: <1540193990.3202.15.camel@HansenPartnership.com> Subject: [PATCH v4 6/7] tpm: add the null key name as a tpm2 sysfs variable From: James Bottomley To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Jarkko Sakkinen , Ard Biesheuvel Date: Mon, 22 Oct 2018 08:39:50 +0100 In-Reply-To: <1540193596.3202.7.camel@HansenPartnership.com> References: <1540193596.3202.7.camel@HansenPartnership.com> X-Mailer: Evolution 3.26.6 Mime-Version: 1.0 Sender: linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP This is the last component of encrypted tpm2 session handling that allows us to verify from userspace that the key derived from the NULL seed genuinely belongs to the TPM and has not been spoofed. The procedure for doing this involves creating an attestation identity key (which requires verification of the TPM EK certificate) and then using that AIK to sign a certification of the Elliptic Curve key over the NULL seed. Userspace must create this EC Key using the parameters prescribed in TCG TPM v2.0 Provisioning Guidance for the SRK ECC; if this is done correctly the names will match and the TPM can then run a TPM2_Certify operation on this derived primary key using the newly created AIK. Signed-off-by: James Bottomley --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c index 83a77a445538..7e901d9e893e 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c @@ -284,6 +284,19 @@ static ssize_t timeouts_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, } static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(timeouts); +static ssize_t null_name_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, + char *buf) +{ + struct tpm_chip *chip = to_tpm_chip(dev); + int size = TPM2_NAME_SIZE; + + bin2hex(buf, chip->tpmkeyname, size); + size *= 2; + buf[size++] = '\n'; + return size; +} +static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(null_name); + static struct attribute *tpm_dev_attrs[] = { &dev_attr_pubek.attr, &dev_attr_pcrs.attr, @@ -298,17 +311,29 @@ static struct attribute *tpm_dev_attrs[] = { NULL, }; +static struct attribute *tpm2_dev_attrs[] = { + &dev_attr_null_name.attr, + NULL, +}; + static const struct attribute_group tpm_dev_group = { .attrs = tpm_dev_attrs, }; +static const struct attribute_group tpm2_dev_group = { + .attrs = tpm2_dev_attrs, +}; + void tpm_sysfs_add_device(struct tpm_chip *chip) { /* XXX: If you wish to remove this restriction, you must first update * tpm_sysfs to explicitly lock chip->ops. */ - if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) + if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) { + WARN_ON(chip->groups_cnt != 0); + chip->groups[chip->groups_cnt++] = &tpm2_dev_group; return; + } /* The sysfs routines rely on an implicit tpm_try_get_ops, device_del * is called before ops is null'd and the sysfs core synchronizes this