From patchwork Mon Oct 22 07:40:42 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: James Bottomley X-Patchwork-Id: 10651819 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0CE8113A4 for ; Mon, 22 Oct 2018 07:40:48 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id EA59A26E79 for ; Mon, 22 Oct 2018 07:40:47 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id DAB5627816; Mon, 22 Oct 2018 07:40:47 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-7.7 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_INVALID, DKIM_SIGNED,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D543A26E79 for ; Mon, 22 Oct 2018 07:40:46 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727734AbeJVP6H (ORCPT ); Mon, 22 Oct 2018 11:58:07 -0400 Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([66.63.167.143]:49744 "EHLO bedivere.hansenpartnership.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727689AbeJVP6H (ORCPT ); Mon, 22 Oct 2018 11:58:07 -0400 Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 43A418EE0FC; Mon, 22 Oct 2018 00:40:46 -0700 (PDT) Received: from bedivere.hansenpartnership.com ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (bedivere.hansenpartnership.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id AjT8Jrp1lYEW; Mon, 22 Oct 2018 00:40:46 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [172.20.48.127] (unknown [62.232.21.219]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by bedivere.hansenpartnership.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 9E4118EE02B; Mon, 22 Oct 2018 00:40:44 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=hansenpartnership.com; s=20151216; t=1540194046; bh=xMkgtJh6DypOQ5djnxNstgJ+pTIGKUCnbPHNIWIms08=; h=Subject:From:To:Cc:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=h57+9tl3nKdqE3TKZyij0S8cUkn5P4b3uuE4k5vSOBz3wzWWMIH/mlat7FIbH8HS4 HjH8sm1pJBW0IEMbWmM5mzNY2qltF+uJwWqWEF8CTBBXMI2mV4dNBIcXEKHTbIT6C/ WaLQ5rXSFtNUiWRq2DuvM6D/OfndGctlOL/4UIJY= Message-ID: <1540194042.3202.16.camel@HansenPartnership.com> Subject: [PATCH v4 7/7] tpm2-sessions: NOT FOR COMMITTING add sessions testing From: James Bottomley To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Jarkko Sakkinen , Ard Biesheuvel Date: Mon, 22 Oct 2018 08:40:42 +0100 In-Reply-To: <1540193596.3202.7.camel@HansenPartnership.com> References: <1540193596.3202.7.camel@HansenPartnership.com> X-Mailer: Evolution 3.26.6 Mime-Version: 1.0 Sender: linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP This runs through a preset sequence using sessions to demonstrate that the session handling code functions. It does both HMAC, encryption and decryption by testing an encrypted sealing operation with authority and proving that the same sealed data comes back again via an HMAC and response encryption. It also does policy unsealing which mimics the more complex of the trusted key scenarios. Signed-off-by: James Bottomley --- v3: add policy unseal testing with two sessions --- drivers/char/tpm/Makefile | 1 + drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c | 1 + drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h | 1 + drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 2 + drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions-test.c | 360 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 365 insertions(+) create mode 100644 drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions-test.c diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile b/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile index 1b5f6ccbb86d..b3f5e95679f9 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_TPM) += tpm.o tpm-y := tpm-interface.o tpm-dev.o tpm-sysfs.o tpm-chip.o tpm2-cmd.o \ tpm-dev-common.o tpmrm-dev.o eventlog/common.o eventlog/tpm1.o \ eventlog/tpm2.o tpm2-space.o tpm-buf.o tpm2-sessions.o +obj-m += tpm2-sessions-test.o tpm-$(CONFIG_ACPI) += tpm_ppi.o eventlog/acpi.o tpm-$(CONFIG_EFI) += eventlog/efi.o tpm-$(CONFIG_OF) += eventlog/of.o diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c index 46caadca916a..ef7ff32bf827 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c @@ -142,6 +142,7 @@ struct tpm_chip *tpm_find_get_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip) return NULL; return chip; } +EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm_find_get_ops); /** * tpm_dev_release() - free chip memory and the device number diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h index d39065d9995d..8cb8b32a8418 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h @@ -163,6 +163,7 @@ enum tpm2_command_codes { TPM2_CC_CONTEXT_LOAD = 0x0161, TPM2_CC_CONTEXT_SAVE = 0x0162, TPM2_CC_FLUSH_CONTEXT = 0x0165, + TPM2_CC_POLICY_COMMAND_CODE = 0x16c, TPM2_CC_READ_PUBLIC = 0x0173, TPM2_CC_START_AUTH_SESS = 0x0176, TPM2_CC_GET_CAPABILITY = 0x017A, diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c index a8655cd535d1..7afe0f50dcce 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c @@ -379,6 +379,7 @@ void tpm2_flush_context_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); } +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm2_flush_context_cmd); /** * tpm_buf_append_auth() - append TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND to the buffer. @@ -409,6 +410,7 @@ void tpm2_buf_append_auth(struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 session_handle, if (hmac && hmac_len) tpm_buf_append(buf, hmac, hmac_len); } +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm2_buf_append_auth); /** * tpm2_seal_trusted() - seal the payload of a trusted key diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions-test.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions-test.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..7b4a01ad3745 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions-test.c @@ -0,0 +1,360 @@ +/* run a set of tests of the sessions code */ +#include "tpm.h" +#include "tpm2-sessions.h" + +#include + +#include + +/* simple policy: command code must be TPM2_CC_UNSEAL */ +static u8 policy[] = { + 0xe6, 0x13, 0x13, 0x70, 0x76, 0x52, 0x4b, 0xde, + 0x48, 0x75, 0x33, 0x86, 0x58, 0x84, 0xe9, 0x73, + 0x2e, 0xbe, 0xe3, 0xaa, 0xcb, 0x09, 0x5d, 0x94, + 0xa6, 0xde, 0x49, 0x2e, 0xc0, 0x6c, 0x46, 0xfa, +}; + +static u32 get_policy(struct tpm_chip *chip) +{ + struct tpm_buf buf; + u8 nonce[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; + u32 h; + int rc; + + rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_START_AUTH_SESS); + if (rc) + return 0; + + /* salt key */ + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, TPM2_RH_NULL); + /* bind key */ + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, TPM2_RH_NULL); + /* zero nonce */ + memset(nonce, 0, sizeof(nonce)); + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, sizeof(nonce)); + tpm_buf_append(&buf, nonce, sizeof(nonce)); + /* encrypted salt (empty) */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0); + /* session type (HMAC, audit or policy) */ + tpm_buf_append_u8(&buf, TPM2_SE_POLICY); + /* symmetric encryption parameters */ + /* symmetric algorithm */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM2_ALG_NULL); + + /* hash algorithm for session */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM2_ALG_SHA256); + + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &chip->kernel_space, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, + 0, 0, "start policy session"); + + h = get_unaligned_be32(&buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]); + + tpm_buf_reset(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, + TPM2_CC_POLICY_COMMAND_CODE); + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, h); + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, TPM2_CC_UNSEAL); + + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &chip->kernel_space, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, + 0, 0, "start policy session"); + + return h; +} + +int tpm2_sessions_test(void) +{ + struct tpm2_auth *auth; + struct tpm_buf buf, b1; + struct tpm_buf t2b; + struct tpm_chip *chip; + int rc; + char payload[29]; + char *password = "Passw0Rd"; + const u8 *p; + u32 h, ps; + u8 name[34]; + u16 len; + int ret = -EINVAL; + + chip = tpm_find_get_ops(NULL); + if (!chip) + return -ENODEV; + + if (!(chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2)) + return -ENODEV; + + get_random_bytes(payload, sizeof(payload)); + + /* precursor: get a session */ + rc = tpm2_start_auth_session(chip, &auth); + dev_info(&chip->dev, "TPM: start auth session returned %d\n", rc); + if (rc) + goto out; + + /* first test: get random bytes from TPM */ + tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_GET_RANDOM); + tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(&buf, auth, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT + | TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION, NULL, 0); + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 29); + tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(&buf, auth); + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &chip->kernel_space, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, + 0, 0, "get random"); + rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(&buf, auth, rc); + dev_info(&chip->dev, "TPM: check hmac response returned %d\n", rc); + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + + /* + * second test, seal random data protecting sensitive by + * encryption and also doing response encryption (not + * necessary) The encrypted payload has two components: an + * authorization password which must be presented on useal and + * the actual data (the random payload) + */ + tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_CREATE); + tpm_buf_append_name(&buf, auth, chip->tpmkey, chip->tpmkeyname); + tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(&buf, auth, TPM2_SA_DECRYPT + | TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT + | TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION, NULL, 0); + /* sensitive */ + tpm_buf_init_2b(&t2b); + /* the authorization */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&t2b, strlen(password)); + tpm_buf_append(&t2b, password, strlen(password)); + /* the payload */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&t2b, sizeof(payload)); + tpm_buf_append(&t2b, payload, sizeof(payload)); + tpm_buf_append_2b(&buf, &t2b); + /* the public */ + /* type */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&t2b, TPM2_ALG_KEYEDHASH); + /* name hash */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&t2b, TPM2_ALG_SHA256); + /* object properties */ + tpm_buf_append_u32(&t2b, TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH | TPM2_OA_NO_DA); + /* auth policy (empty) */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&t2b, 0); + /* keyed hash parameters (we're null for a non-HMAC data blob) */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&t2b, TPM2_ALG_NULL); + /* unique */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&t2b, 0); + tpm_buf_append_2b(&buf, &t2b); + /* outside info (also empty) */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0); + /* creation PCR (empty) */ + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 0); + tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(&buf, auth); + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &chip->kernel_space, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, + 4, 0, "sealing data"); + rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(&buf, auth, rc); + dev_info(&chip->dev, "TPM: sealing response returned %d\n", rc); + if (rc) + goto out; + + /* + * now load the sealed object (we need the pub and priv parts + * returned from prior command + */ + tpm_buf_init(&b1, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_LOAD); + /* parent */ + tpm_buf_append_name(&b1, auth, chip->tpmkey, chip->tpmkeyname); + tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(&b1, auth, TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION, + NULL, 0); + p = &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE+4]; + /* private */ + len = tpm_get_inc_u16(&p); + tpm_buf_append_u16(&b1, len); + tpm_buf_append(&b1, p, len); + p += len; + /* public */ + len = tpm_get_inc_u16(&p); + tpm_buf_append_u16(&b1, len); + tpm_buf_append(&b1, p, len); + tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(&b1, auth); + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &chip->kernel_space, b1.data, PAGE_SIZE, + 4, 0, "loading seal"); + rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(&b1, auth, rc); + dev_info(&chip->dev, "TPM: load response returned %d\n", rc); + if (rc) + goto out; + p = &b1.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]; + h = tpm_get_inc_u32(&p); + dev_info(&chip->dev, "sealed data loaded at %08x\n", h); + /* skip over parameter size */ + p += 4; + len = tpm_get_inc_u16(&p); + if (len != sizeof(name)) { + dev_err(&chip->dev, "Wrong name size %d\n", len); + goto out; + } + memcpy(name, p, len); + tpm_buf_destroy(&b1); + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + + /* + * now unseal the data using the authority in a HMAC and + * protecting the returned unseal by encryption + */ + tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_UNSEAL); + tpm_buf_append_name(&buf, auth, h, name); + tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(&buf, auth, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, + password, strlen(password)); + tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(&buf, auth); + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &chip->kernel_space, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, + 4, 0, "unseal"); + rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(&buf, auth, rc); + tpm2_flush_context_cmd(chip, h, 0); + dev_info(&chip->dev, "unseal returns %d\n", rc); + if (rc) + goto out; + p = &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4]; + len = tpm_get_inc_u16(&p); + if (len != sizeof(payload)) { + dev_err(&chip->dev, "wrong unseal payload size %d != %ld", + len, sizeof(payload)); + goto out; + } + if (memcmp(payload, p, len) != 0) { + dev_err(&chip->dev, "Payload DID NOT compare correctly\n"); + goto out; + } + + /* + * third test, seal random data protecting sensitive by + * encryption and also doing response encryption (not + * necessary) The encrypted payload has two components: an + * authorization password which must be presented on useal and + * the actual data (the random payload) + * + * For this test use a policy to release the data testing that + * we can have two sessions + */ + get_random_bytes(payload, sizeof(payload)); + /* auth session should be closed, so get a new one */ + rc = tpm2_start_auth_session(chip, &auth); + if (rc) { + dev_err(&chip->dev, "new auth session failed: %d\n", rc); + goto out; + } + + tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_CREATE); + tpm_buf_append_name(&buf, auth, chip->tpmkey, chip->tpmkeyname); + tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(&buf, auth, TPM2_SA_DECRYPT + | TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT + | TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION, NULL, 0); + /* sensitive */ + tpm_buf_init_2b(&t2b); + /* the authorization */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&t2b, 0); + /* the payload */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&t2b, sizeof(payload)); + tpm_buf_append(&t2b, payload, sizeof(payload)); + tpm_buf_append_2b(&buf, &t2b); + /* the public */ + /* type */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&t2b, TPM2_ALG_KEYEDHASH); + /* name hash */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&t2b, TPM2_ALG_SHA256); + /* object properties */ + tpm_buf_append_u32(&t2b, TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH | TPM2_OA_NO_DA); + /* auth policy (specific to command code) */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&t2b, sizeof(policy)); + tpm_buf_append(&t2b, policy, sizeof(policy)); + /* keyed hash parameters (we're null for a non-HMAC data blob) */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&t2b, TPM2_ALG_NULL); + /* unique */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&t2b, 0); + tpm_buf_append_2b(&buf, &t2b); + /* outside info (also empty) */ + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0); + /* creation PCR (empty) */ + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 0); + tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(&buf, auth); + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &chip->kernel_space, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, + 4, 0, "sealing data"); + rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(&buf, auth, rc); + dev_info(&chip->dev, "policy sealing response returned %d\n", rc); + if (rc) + goto out; + + /* + * now load the sealed object (we need the pub and priv parts + * returned from prior command + */ + tpm_buf_init(&b1, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_LOAD); + /* parent */ + tpm_buf_append_name(&b1, auth, chip->tpmkey, chip->tpmkeyname); + tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(&b1, auth, TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION, + NULL, 0); + p = &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE+4]; + /* private */ + len = tpm_get_inc_u16(&p); + tpm_buf_append_u16(&b1, len); + tpm_buf_append(&b1, p, len); + p += len; + /* public */ + len = tpm_get_inc_u16(&p); + tpm_buf_append_u16(&b1, len); + tpm_buf_append(&b1, p, len); + tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(&b1, auth); + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &chip->kernel_space, b1.data, PAGE_SIZE, + 4, 0, "loading seal"); + rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(&b1, auth, rc); + dev_info(&chip->dev, "TPM: load response returned %d\n", rc); + if (rc) + goto out; + p = &b1.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]; + h = tpm_get_inc_u32(&p); + dev_info(&chip->dev, "sealed data loaded at %08x\n", h); + /* skip over parameter size */ + p += 4; + len = tpm_get_inc_u16(&p); + if (len != sizeof(name)) { + dev_err(&chip->dev, "Wrong name size %d\n", len); + goto out; + } + memcpy(name, p, len); + tpm_buf_destroy(&b1); + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + + /* now get a policy session */ + ps = get_policy(chip); + /* + * now unseal the data using the authority in a HMAC and + * protecting the returned unseal by encryption + */ + tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_UNSEAL); + tpm_buf_append_name(&buf, auth, h, name); + tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, ps, NULL, 0, 0, NULL, 0); + tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(&buf, auth, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, + NULL, 0); + tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(&buf, auth); + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &chip->kernel_space, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, + 4, 0, "unseal"); + rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(&buf, auth, rc); + tpm2_flush_context_cmd(chip, h, 0); + dev_info(&chip->dev, "unseal returns %d\n", rc); + if (rc) + goto out; + p = &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4]; + len = tpm_get_inc_u16(&p); + if (len != sizeof(payload)) { + dev_err(&chip->dev, "wrong unseal payload size %d != %ld", + len, sizeof(payload)); + goto out; + } + if (memcmp(payload, p, len) != 0) { + dev_err(&chip->dev, "Payload DID NOT compare correctly\n"); + goto out; + } + + dev_info(&chip->dev, "All tests passed\n"); + ret = 0; + + out: + tpm_put_ops(chip); + + return ret; +} + +module_init(tpm2_sessions_test); + +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");