From patchwork Tue Oct 9 17:30:33 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Nayna X-Patchwork-Id: 10633035 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 76B6B112B for ; Tue, 9 Oct 2018 17:34:13 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 61EC1294D5 for ; Tue, 9 Oct 2018 17:34:13 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 56093294B8; Tue, 9 Oct 2018 17:34:13 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-7.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=unavailable version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id F2AB928B3C for ; Tue, 9 Oct 2018 17:34:12 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727195AbeJJAwO (ORCPT ); Tue, 9 Oct 2018 20:52:14 -0400 Received: from mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.158.5]:41302 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726468AbeJJAwK (ORCPT ); Tue, 9 Oct 2018 20:52:10 -0400 Received: from pps.filterd (m0098416.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.22/8.16.0.22) with SMTP id w99HU8lP080562 for ; Tue, 9 Oct 2018 13:34:06 -0400 Received: from e06smtp01.uk.ibm.com (e06smtp01.uk.ibm.com [195.75.94.97]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2n0xcvf0yt-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Tue, 09 Oct 2018 13:34:06 -0400 Received: from localhost by e06smtp01.uk.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! 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Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Tue, 9 Oct 2018 18:34:01 +0100 Received: from d06av21.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (d06av21.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com [9.149.105.232]) by b06cxnps4076.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id w99HXxrG4719028 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=FAIL); Tue, 9 Oct 2018 17:33:59 GMT Received: from d06av21.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 39AAE52052; Tue, 9 Oct 2018 20:33:33 +0100 (BST) Received: from swastik.in.ibm.com (unknown [9.195.38.245]) by d06av21.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B6FC25204E; Tue, 9 Oct 2018 20:33:27 +0100 (BST) From: Nayna Jain To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: zohar@linux.ibm.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com, jforbes@redhat.com, seth.forshee@canonical.com, pjones@redhat.com, vgoyal@redhat.com, dyoung@redhat.com, ebiederm@xmission.com, kexec@lists.infradead.org, Nayna Jain Subject: [PATCH v6 1/5] x86/ima: define arch_ima_get_secureboot Date: Tue, 9 Oct 2018 23:00:33 +0530 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.13.6 In-Reply-To: <20181009173037.32630-1-nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com> References: <20181009173037.32630-1-nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 18100917-4275-0000-0000-000002C73152 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 18100917-4276-0000-0000-000037D25DAF Message-Id: <20181009173037.32630-2-nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2018-10-09_12:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=1 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1807170000 definitions=main-1810090169 Sender: linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP From: Nayna Jain Distros are concerned about totally disabling the kexec_load syscall. As a compromise, the kexec_load syscall will only be disabled when CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG is configured and the system is booted with secureboot enabled. This patch defines the new arch specific function called arch_ima_get_secureboot() to retrieve the secureboot state of the system. Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain Suggested-by: Seth Forshee Cc: David Howells Cc: Eric Biederman Cc: Peter Jones Cc: Vivek Goyal Cc: Dave Young --- arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 2 ++ arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ include/linux/ima.h | 9 +++++++++ 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+) create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile index 02d6f5cf4e70..f32406e51424 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile @@ -149,3 +149,5 @@ ifeq ($(CONFIG_X86_64),y) obj-$(CONFIG_MMCONF_FAM10H) += mmconf-fam10h_64.o obj-y += vsmp_64.o endif + +obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima_arch.o diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..bb5a88d2b271 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ */ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2018 IBM Corporation + */ +#include +#include + +extern struct boot_params boot_params; + +bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void) +{ + if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT) && + (boot_params.secure_boot == efi_secureboot_mode_enabled)) + return true; + else + return false; +} diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h index 84806b54b50a..4852255aa4f4 100644 --- a/include/linux/ima.h +++ b/include/linux/ima.h @@ -30,6 +30,15 @@ extern void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry); extern void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image); #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_X86 +extern bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void); +#else +static inline bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void) +{ + return false; +} +#endif + #else static inline int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) {