From patchwork Tue Jan 15 09:45:42 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Kairui Song X-Patchwork-Id: 10764147 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9175F13B5 for ; Tue, 15 Jan 2019 09:47:01 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 813202B513 for ; Tue, 15 Jan 2019 09:47:01 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 72CB52B527; Tue, 15 Jan 2019 09:47:01 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-7.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0FDB42B513 for ; Tue, 15 Jan 2019 09:47:01 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728790AbfAOJq7 (ORCPT ); Tue, 15 Jan 2019 04:46:59 -0500 Received: from mx1.redhat.com ([209.132.183.28]:53540 "EHLO mx1.redhat.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727746AbfAOJq7 (ORCPT ); Tue, 15 Jan 2019 04:46:59 -0500 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx08.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.23]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mx1.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 12846811D8; Tue, 15 Jan 2019 09:46:59 +0000 (UTC) Received: from kasong-desktop-nay-redhat-com.nay.redhat.com (unknown [10.66.128.41]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id BF11819744; Tue, 15 Jan 2019 09:46:52 +0000 (UTC) From: Kairui Song To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, dwmw2@infradead.org, jwboyer@fedoraproject.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com, bauerman@linux.ibm.com, ebiggers@google.com, nayna@linux.ibm.com, dyoung@redhat.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org, Kairui Song Subject: [RFC PATCH v2 2/2] kexec, KEYS: Make use of platform keyring for signature verify Date: Tue, 15 Jan 2019 17:45:42 +0800 Message-Id: <20190115094542.17129-3-kasong@redhat.com> In-Reply-To: <20190115094542.17129-1-kasong@redhat.com> References: <20190115094542.17129-1-kasong@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.84 on 10.5.11.23 X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.5.16 (mx1.redhat.com [10.5.110.27]); Tue, 15 Jan 2019 09:46:59 +0000 (UTC) Sender: linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP With KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG enabled, kexec_file_load will need to verify the kernel image. The image might be signed with third part keys, and the keys could be stored in firmware, then got loaded into the .platform keyring. Now we have a symbol .platform_trusted_keyring as the reference to .platform keyring, this patch makes use if it and allow kexec_file_load to verify the image against keys in .platform keyring. This commit adds a VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING similar to previous VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING indicating that verify_pkcs7_signature should verify the signature using platform keyring. Also, decrease the error message log level when verification failed with -ENOKEY, so that if called tried multiple time with different keyring it won't generate extra noises. Signed-off-by: Kairui Song --- arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 15 ++++++++++++--- certs/system_keyring.c | 11 ++++++++++- include/linux/verification.h | 3 +++ 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c index 7d97e432cbbc..a06b04065bb1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c @@ -534,9 +534,18 @@ static int bzImage64_cleanup(void *loader_data) #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG static int bzImage64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len) { - return verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len, - VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING, - VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE); + int ret; + ret = verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len, + VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING, + VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE); +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING + if (ret == -ENOKEY) { + ret = verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len, + VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING, + VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE); + } +#endif + return ret; } #endif diff --git a/certs/system_keyring.c b/certs/system_keyring.c index 4690ef9cda8a..df2a09599bd8 100644 --- a/certs/system_keyring.c +++ b/certs/system_keyring.c @@ -239,12 +239,21 @@ int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len, trusted_keys = secondary_trusted_keys; #else trusted_keys = builtin_trusted_keys; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING + } else if (trusted_keys == VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING) { + trusted_keys = platform_trusted_keys; + if (!trusted_keys) { + ret = -ENOKEY; + pr_devel("PKCS#7 platform keyring is not available\n"); + goto error; + } #endif } ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, trusted_keys); if (ret < 0) { if (ret == -ENOKEY) - pr_err("PKCS#7 signature not signed with a trusted key\n"); + pr_devel("PKCS#7 signature not signed with a trusted key\n"); goto error; } diff --git a/include/linux/verification.h b/include/linux/verification.h index cfa4730d607a..dbd1686e9bc4 100644 --- a/include/linux/verification.h +++ b/include/linux/verification.h @@ -17,6 +17,9 @@ * should be used. */ #define VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING ((struct key *)1UL) +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING +#define VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING ((struct key *)2UL) +#endif /* * The use to which an asymmetric key is being put.