From patchwork Mon Mar 25 22:09:54 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Matthew Garrett X-Patchwork-Id: 10870195 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6D48014DE for ; Mon, 25 Mar 2019 22:11:21 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5BD2D2905C for ; Mon, 25 Mar 2019 22:11:21 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 4F7A229053; Mon, 25 Mar 2019 22:11:21 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-15.5 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI, USER_IN_DEF_DKIM_WL autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id BB1F029053 for ; Mon, 25 Mar 2019 22:11:20 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1731257AbfCYWLO (ORCPT ); Mon, 25 Mar 2019 18:11:14 -0400 Received: from mail-ua1-f73.google.com ([209.85.222.73]:44255 "EHLO mail-ua1-f73.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1731253AbfCYWLK (ORCPT ); Mon, 25 Mar 2019 18:11:10 -0400 Received: by mail-ua1-f73.google.com with SMTP id v11so1334152uap.11 for ; Mon, 25 Mar 2019 15:11:09 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20161025; h=date:in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version:references:subject:from:to :cc; bh=oX6b6UXnLFndsb7tObotwtVDLDo+/sc4TNosNTsNVcE=; b=n3zobW7nksY3qoybt2xy2r7QRwNaPKsNzK7ZjnA/boc9nKSz+Su7uPl/+JupnTybMv /XeeRkIi2xuCtJQmbLrLR+10kfx/wGc61VHvQ7gztx1YC91CrYqyUiUmiGnrNBUfycfD jMSyri79P8gFp4TYefUuEvRv2SFiz6IJWZdAQ2fjDOtR35QpGRxpBq25z7Pa2bT1fCJ0 /lR0QvzHUHFoOvwvj6cJNKhWotq8K+rxaTXRFY6GMl0ENOC8cepO3wUG+cUB419Oeh3M iHCvLAYu3WnUBgc0WcHilrF2fTeHWOoOJ+Gz7SCvGHguvir76jDiyLuOY5aFukASBQL6 G2DQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:date:in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version :references:subject:from:to:cc; bh=oX6b6UXnLFndsb7tObotwtVDLDo+/sc4TNosNTsNVcE=; b=HsHTbccZttZLgVnLtKw9VGJABazOcgHcQKXpzOQ2e1egVrN2T8WiIJDVS3jaZYQoAU 26owhZWmCdBKoM2wveoh3oz8N8PnrtDLeXyFEUkG4Lj23kb152PJZKQ57BOOYAQezk5y 4u+wb08L/Crmu1DfpiBQdnoa+XwZjQb+PAy7KB2Des2ihWOJmqqGBIJpHG/EbCp1+IMJ 33q+m5wXTZa4LJ0wee0BATihoQflgea41hpGS/7RGKydd0UMfIchiGY12+soaVO56/qO 3pdpb5NXdhJAKPfQvgycwkNhVcjRo/5slOM1acikADcKlD5w/k/e3/S721czqNY70ZR/ 8QQQ== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAUKlTwqaCiE1KM21VXYo8NX2Kev3khNCCfVX97MNrZuyydDtomh rJ6/GOXU9PmpqPlC5AqmJKl+A9FF/Aqom4LH+KyXrw== X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqzCpwMqlIY8s3ZXJhy4/xktxbcuRE1AUoDFA2gIf7tGU5DXdtz2c+CCt1ERYYG6SQktfyBy5XA5qh59xr5enW0ujA== X-Received: by 2002:a67:fbc2:: with SMTP id o2mr2467492vsr.78.1553551868925; Mon, 25 Mar 2019 15:11:08 -0700 (PDT) Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2019 15:09:54 -0700 In-Reply-To: <20190325220954.29054-1-matthewgarrett@google.com> Message-Id: <20190325220954.29054-28-matthewgarrett@google.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 References: <20190325220954.29054-1-matthewgarrett@google.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.21.0.392.gf8f6787159e-goog Subject: [PATCH 27/27] kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down From: Matthew Garrett To: jmorris@namei.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com, Matthew Garrett , Matthew Garrett , Mimi Zohar , Dmitry Kasatkin , linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Sender: linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP Systems in lockdown mode should block the kexec of untrusted kernels. For x86 and ARM we can ensure that a kernel is trustworthy by validating a PE signature, but this isn't possible on other architectures. On those platforms we can use IMA digital signatures instead. Add a function to determine whether IMA has or will verify signatures for a given event type, and if so permit kexec_file() even if the kernel is otherwise locked down. This is restricted to cases where CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING is set in order to prevent an attacker from loading additional keys at runtime. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett Cc: Mimi Zohar Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Mimi Zohar --- include/linux/ima.h | 9 ++++++ kernel/kexec_file.c | 7 +++- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 2 ++ security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h index b5e16b8c50b7..05921227d700 100644 --- a/include/linux/ima.h +++ b/include/linux/ima.h @@ -127,4 +127,13 @@ static inline int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, return 0; } #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */ + +#if defined(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) && defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING) +extern bool ima_appraise_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id func); +#else +static inline bool ima_appraise_kexec_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id func) +{ + return false; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE && CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING */ #endif /* _LINUX_IMA_H */ diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c index 0cfe4f6f7f85..8ffa4b75c620 100644 --- a/kernel/kexec_file.c +++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c @@ -240,7 +240,12 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd, ret = 0; - if (kernel_is_locked_down(reason)) { + /* If IMA is guaranteed to appraise a signature on the kexec + * image, permit it even if the kernel is otherwise locked + * down. + */ + if (!ima_appraise_signature(READING_KEXEC_IMAGE) && + kernel_is_locked_down(reason)) { ret = -EPERM; goto out; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index cc12f3449a72..fe03cc6f1ca4 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -115,6 +115,8 @@ struct ima_kexec_hdr { u64 count; }; +extern const int read_idmap[]; + #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC void ima_load_kexec_buffer(void); #else diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 4ffac4f5c647..106f06dee9d1 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -442,7 +442,7 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id) return 0; } -static const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = { +const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = { [READING_FIRMWARE] = FIRMWARE_CHECK, [READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER] = FIRMWARE_CHECK, [READING_MODULE] = MODULE_CHECK, diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 122797023bdb..f8f1cdb74a4f 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -1341,3 +1341,53 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) return 0; } #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY */ + +#if defined(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) && defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING) +/* + * ima_appraise_signature: whether IMA will appraise a given function using + * an IMA digital signature. This is restricted to cases where the kernel + * has a set of built-in trusted keys in order to avoid an attacker simply + * loading additional keys. + */ +bool ima_appraise_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id id) +{ + struct ima_rule_entry *entry; + bool found = false; + enum ima_hooks func; + + if (id >= READING_MAX_ID) + return false; + + func = read_idmap[id] ?: FILE_CHECK; + + rcu_read_lock(); + list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules, list) { + if (entry->action != APPRAISE) + continue; + + /* + * A generic entry will match, but otherwise require that it + * match the func we're looking for + */ + if (entry->func && entry->func != func) + continue; + + /* + * We require this to be a digital signature, not a raw IMA + * hash. + */ + if (entry->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) + found = true; + + /* + * We've found a rule that matches, so break now even if it + * didn't require a digital signature - a later rule that does + * won't override it, so would be a false positive. + */ + break; + } + + rcu_read_unlock(); + return found; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE && CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING */