From patchwork Tue Apr 2 18:15:04 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Claudio Carvalho X-Patchwork-Id: 10882153 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 05EEC922 for ; Tue, 2 Apr 2019 18:15:28 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E4125288D8 for ; Tue, 2 Apr 2019 18:15:27 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id D7CF8288F4; Tue, 2 Apr 2019 18:15:27 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-7.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6FA6A288D8 for ; Tue, 2 Apr 2019 18:15:27 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1730814AbfDBSPZ (ORCPT ); Tue, 2 Apr 2019 14:15:25 -0400 Received: from mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.158.5]:44320 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1730756AbfDBSPZ (ORCPT ); Tue, 2 Apr 2019 14:15:25 -0400 Received: from pps.filterd (m0098421.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.27/8.16.0.27) with SMTP id x32I9gec116523 for ; Tue, 2 Apr 2019 14:15:23 -0400 Received: from e11.ny.us.ibm.com (e11.ny.us.ibm.com [129.33.205.201]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2rmbtpu6hp-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Tue, 02 Apr 2019 14:15:23 -0400 Received: from localhost by e11.ny.us.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! 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Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Tue, 2 Apr 2019 19:15:18 +0100 Received: from b01ledav004.gho.pok.ibm.com (b01ledav004.gho.pok.ibm.com [9.57.199.109]) by b01cxnp23034.gho.pok.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id x32IFHPd24641628 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Tue, 2 Apr 2019 18:15:17 GMT Received: from b01ledav004.gho.pok.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 51015112063; Tue, 2 Apr 2019 18:15:17 +0000 (GMT) Received: from b01ledav004.gho.pok.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8D52A112062; Tue, 2 Apr 2019 18:15:15 +0000 (GMT) Received: from rino.br.ibm.com (unknown [9.18.235.111]) by b01ledav004.gho.pok.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Tue, 2 Apr 2019 18:15:15 +0000 (GMT) From: Claudio Carvalho To: linuxppc-dev@ozlabs.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Michael Ellerman , Paul Mackerras , Benjamin Herrenschmidt , Ard Biesheuvel , Jeremy Kerr , Matthew Garret , Claudio Carvalho , Nayna Jain Subject: [PATCH 3/4] powerpc/powernv: Detect the secure boot mode of the system Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2019 15:15:04 -0300 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20190402181505.25037-1-cclaudio@linux.ibm.com> References: <20190402181505.25037-1-cclaudio@linux.ibm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 19040218-2213-0000-0000-0000036F855F X-IBM-SpamModules-Scores: X-IBM-SpamModules-Versions: BY=3.00010862; HX=3.00000242; KW=3.00000007; PH=3.00000004; SC=3.00000284; SDB=6.01183359; UDB=6.00619523; IPR=6.00964108; MB=3.00026264; MTD=3.00000008; XFM=3.00000015; UTC=2019-04-02 18:15:21 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 19040218-2214-0000-0000-00005DE10038 Message-Id: <20190402181505.25037-4-cclaudio@linux.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2019-04-02_07:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1810050000 definitions=main-1904020121 Sender: linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP From: Nayna Jain PowerNV secure boot defines different IMA policies based on the secure boot state of the system. This patch defines a function to detect the secure boot state of the system. Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain --- arch/powerpc/include/asm/secboot.h | 21 +++++++++ arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Makefile | 2 +- arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/secboot.c | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/include/asm/secboot.h create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/secboot.c diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/secboot.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/secboot.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..1904fb4a3352 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/secboot.h @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * PowerPC secure boot definitions + * + * Copyright (C) 2019 IBM Corporation + * Author: Nayna Jain + * + */ +#ifndef POWERPC_SECBOOT_H +#define POWERPC_SECBOOT_H + +#if defined(CONFIG_OPAL_SECVAR) +extern bool get_powerpc_sb_mode(void); +#else +static inline bool get_powerpc_sb_mode(void) +{ + return false; +} +#endif + +#endif diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Makefile b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Makefile index 1511d836fd19..a36e22f8ecf8 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Makefile +++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/Makefile @@ -16,4 +16,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS) += opal-imc.o obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_MEMTRACE) += memtrace.o obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_VAS) += vas.o vas-window.o vas-debug.o obj-$(CONFIG_OCXL_BASE) += ocxl.o -obj-$(CONFIG_OPAL_SECVAR) += opal-secvar.o +obj-$(CONFIG_OPAL_SECVAR) += opal-secvar.o secboot.o diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/secboot.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/secboot.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..afb1552636c5 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/secboot.c @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) 2019 IBM Corporation + * Author: Nayna Jain + * + * secboot.c + * - util functions to get powerpc secboot state + * + */ +#include +#include + +bool get_powerpc_sb_mode(void) +{ + efi_char16_t efi_SecureBoot_name[] = L"SecureBoot"; + efi_char16_t efi_SetupMode_name[] = L"SetupMode"; + efi_guid_t efi_variable_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID; + efi_status_t status; + u8 secboot, setupmode; + unsigned long size = sizeof(secboot); + + status = efi.get_variable(efi_SecureBoot_name, &efi_variable_guid, + NULL, &size, &secboot); + + /* + * For now assume all failures reading the SecureBoot variable implies + * secure boot is not enabled. Later differentiate failure types. + */ + if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) { + secboot = 0; + setupmode = 0; + goto out; + } + + size = sizeof(setupmode); + status = efi.get_variable(efi_SetupMode_name, &efi_variable_guid, + NULL, &size, &setupmode); + + /* + * Failure to read the SetupMode variable does not prevent + * secure boot mode + */ + if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) + setupmode = 0; + +out: + if ((secboot == 0) || (setupmode == 1)) { + pr_info("ima: secureboot mode disabled\n"); + return false; + } + + pr_info("ima: secureboot mode enabled\n"); + return true; +}