From patchwork Sat Jun 22 00:03:54 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Matthew Garrett X-Patchwork-Id: 11011033 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B504B76 for ; Sat, 22 Jun 2019 00:06:02 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A783528B7B for ; Sat, 22 Jun 2019 00:06:02 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 9B66328BB1; Sat, 22 Jun 2019 00:06:02 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-15.5 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI, USER_IN_DEF_DKIM_WL autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1E3A228B7B for ; Sat, 22 Jun 2019 00:06:02 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726937AbfFVAFH (ORCPT ); Fri, 21 Jun 2019 20:05:07 -0400 Received: from mail-pg1-f202.google.com ([209.85.215.202]:45959 "EHLO mail-pg1-f202.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726953AbfFVAFF (ORCPT ); Fri, 21 Jun 2019 20:05:05 -0400 Received: by mail-pg1-f202.google.com with SMTP id k2so4989978pga.12 for ; Fri, 21 Jun 2019 17:05:05 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20161025; h=date:in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version:references:subject:from:to :cc; bh=TMklhc9+XfiI8L3K2AutSbeZaJ7HLQ2HsXG+mlV/TZs=; b=p7vfmYbicP0O5OJzjFHdr94n1dC4CJO8yX/92U2d2BTbbGPpuy00yXNd9NLehfmCFV 5XqqdDRq+j7IDKg4ECOxaLzyDNdD8IRWnSj4RlJg+fnqujjgDyfVtsIJ9EOZPvHQpXUF rFQ6bRCqsV8oHm1TLKJCR1V5tdwwsJJaH3HL1oCf+hG2ILKmD0gxGnsJmF9ggXD1qJsP dyX+p6/3+RHtCJNz5ZK7L9Ir/FRDlefa1IqIXWmOpCGGurVyGN5/+sfdEvh3UMqC2Utp 4zkAY8boj/uZNoZnDEBzHHNWlw88TuW2EXhkMlcVLRtlhNAVlAt/WOZPPBD7NHwAMiy5 zcpg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:date:in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version :references:subject:from:to:cc; bh=TMklhc9+XfiI8L3K2AutSbeZaJ7HLQ2HsXG+mlV/TZs=; b=JVLZclUU8pxgMRgNoDJWhE/PNE+tD7/Ynmt0VPQgpQY1g68RVtDv2476gYQIqvEV7Q mE8Kpbl5C4MRNUncyEfO6YIC6jwY00l2MF/tlHIfL+PhN7X8TPSFZqt3FPc3xCOf/tBO JC3OylwsaUOakM0eTIWdA6qXcxV/r7GtroczDEzHP1pH1uAlzXAWL8gnobagdfIbgWfD Hm/wZdGdxrfEh4harESrgBgUDfS5Tx373mHrnLRTEAdHCZD/ijILEV3r5zVXnyqP3mE8 u32E4UXDYfy2NIAaJzl2NHLjHwBL3MVNJEDZT1+6Ob1OFRip8o95xQxYS7VMaeQiKipR x7pw== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAXrjiax+DybliGfliJ5mhgV1/GHpCL/nMCDQxqOx211wBvns7nZ v8wqcrmCIk5ARz22mFL51HgNJtOT3w20gtlOLWNaaw== X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqyiFQ+2Cd5OSyAvJhYhgYOd8VHPKVlHOgHk3dAwEgc6MxZt9cRi1sgqABuTYgGBeTygjlYiJdOudBsv5yQQd+2tYg== X-Received: by 2002:a63:2258:: with SMTP id t24mr12689918pgm.236.1561161904729; Fri, 21 Jun 2019 17:05:04 -0700 (PDT) Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2019 17:03:54 -0700 In-Reply-To: <20190622000358.19895-1-matthewgarrett@google.com> Message-Id: <20190622000358.19895-26-matthewgarrett@google.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 References: <20190622000358.19895-1-matthewgarrett@google.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.22.0.410.gd8fdbe21b5-goog Subject: [PATCH V34 25/29] kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down From: Matthew Garrett To: jmorris@namei.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Matthew Garrett , Matthew Garrett , Mimi Zohar , Dmitry Kasatkin , linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Sender: linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP Systems in lockdown mode should block the kexec of untrusted kernels. For x86 and ARM we can ensure that a kernel is trustworthy by validating a PE signature, but this isn't possible on other architectures. On those platforms we can use IMA digital signatures instead. Add a function to determine whether IMA has or will verify signatures for a given event type, and if so permit kexec_file() even if the kernel is otherwise locked down. This is restricted to cases where CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING is set in order to prevent an attacker from loading additional keys at runtime. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett Acked-by: Mimi Zohar Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org --- include/linux/ima.h | 9 ++++++ kernel/kexec_file.c | 11 +++++-- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 2 ++ security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h index dc12fbcf484c..c30954acc660 100644 --- a/include/linux/ima.h +++ b/include/linux/ima.h @@ -132,4 +132,13 @@ static inline int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, return 0; } #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */ + +#if defined(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) && defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING) +extern bool ima_appraise_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id func); +#else +static inline bool ima_appraise_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id func) +{ + return false; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE && CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING */ #endif /* _LINUX_IMA_H */ diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c index 27adb4312b03..539d0ca855bc 100644 --- a/kernel/kexec_file.c +++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c @@ -237,8 +237,15 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd, goto out; } - ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_KEXEC); - if (ret) + ret = 0; + + /* If IMA is guaranteed to appraise a signature on the kexec + * image, permit it even if the kernel is otherwise locked + * down. + */ + if (!ima_appraise_signature(READING_KEXEC_IMAGE) && + security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_KEXEC)) { + ret = -EPERM; goto out; break; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index d213e835c498..3bc62062cfe8 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -115,6 +115,8 @@ struct ima_kexec_hdr { u64 count; }; +extern const int read_idmap[]; + #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC void ima_load_kexec_buffer(void); #else diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 357edd140c09..927fe889201a 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -473,7 +473,7 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id) return 0; } -static const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = { +const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = { [READING_FIRMWARE] = FIRMWARE_CHECK, [READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER] = FIRMWARE_CHECK, [READING_MODULE] = MODULE_CHECK, diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index e0cc323f948f..8784449918e2 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -1339,3 +1339,53 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) return 0; } #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY */ + +#if defined(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) && defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING) +/* + * ima_appraise_signature: whether IMA will appraise a given function using + * an IMA digital signature. This is restricted to cases where the kernel + * has a set of built-in trusted keys in order to avoid an attacker simply + * loading additional keys. + */ +bool ima_appraise_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id id) +{ + struct ima_rule_entry *entry; + bool found = false; + enum ima_hooks func; + + if (id >= READING_MAX_ID) + return false; + + func = read_idmap[id] ?: FILE_CHECK; + + rcu_read_lock(); + list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules, list) { + if (entry->action != APPRAISE) + continue; + + /* + * A generic entry will match, but otherwise require that it + * match the func we're looking for + */ + if (entry->func && entry->func != func) + continue; + + /* + * We require this to be a digital signature, not a raw IMA + * hash. + */ + if (entry->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) + found = true; + + /* + * We've found a rule that matches, so break now even if it + * didn't require a digital signature - a later rule that does + * won't override it, so would be a false positive. + */ + break; + } + + rcu_read_unlock(); + return found; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE && CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING */