| Message ID | 20200817215233.95319-3-bmeneg@redhat.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
| Series | integrity: improve user feedback for invalid bootparams | expand |
On Mon, 2020-08-17 at 18:52 -0300, Bruno Meneguele wrote: > Prompt a message to kmsg in case the user entered any invalid option to some > of the ima_{policy,appraise,hash} and evm kernel parameters. It's already > done for ima_template. I think what you are trying to say is don't silently ignore unknown or invalid ima_{policy,appraise,hash} and evm kernel boot command line options. Mimi
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index 0d36259b690d..6ae00fee1d34 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -59,6 +59,9 @@ static int __init evm_set_fixmode(char *str) { if (strncmp(str, "fix", 3) == 0) evm_fixmode = 1; + else + pr_err("invalid \"%s\" mode", str); + return 0; } __setup("evm=", evm_set_fixmode); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 580b771e3458..2193b51c2743 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -33,6 +33,8 @@ static int __init default_appraise_setup(char *str) ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_FIX; else if (strncmp(str, "enforce", 7) == 0) ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE; + else + pr_err("invalid \"%s\" appraise option", str); #endif return 1; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 8a91711ca79b..2b22932b140d 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -50,18 +50,23 @@ static int __init hash_setup(char *str) return 1; if (strcmp(template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) == 0) { - if (strncmp(str, "sha1", 4) == 0) + if (strncmp(str, "sha1", 4) == 0) { ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1; - else if (strncmp(str, "md5", 3) == 0) + } else if (strncmp(str, "md5", 3) == 0) { ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_MD5; - else + } else { + pr_err("invalid hash algorithm \"%s\" for template \"%s\"", + str, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME); return 1; + } goto out; } i = match_string(hash_algo_name, HASH_ALGO__LAST, str); - if (i < 0) + if (i < 0) { + pr_err("invalid hash algorithm \"%s\"", str); return 1; + } ima_hash_algo = i; out: diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 07f033634b27..880d10887de8 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -240,6 +240,8 @@ static int __init policy_setup(char *str) ima_use_secure_boot = true; else if (strcmp(p, "fail_securely") == 0) ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs = true; + else + pr_err("policy \"%s\" not found", p); } return 1;
Prompt a message to kmsg in case the user entered any invalid option to some of the ima_{policy,appraise,hash} and evm kernel parameters. It's already done for ima_template. Signed-off-by: Bruno Meneguele <bmeneg@redhat.com> --- security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 3 +++ security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 2 ++ security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 13 +++++++++---- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 2 ++ 4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)