From patchwork Thu Nov 19 23:26:06 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Tushar Sugandhi X-Patchwork-Id: 11919169 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-26.2 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT, USER_IN_DEF_DKIM_WL autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7ECAAC64E69 for ; Thu, 19 Nov 2020 23:26:48 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 20DCE22255 for ; Thu, 19 Nov 2020 23:26:48 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.microsoft.com header.i=@linux.microsoft.com header.b="DEMXViUx" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727082AbgKSX01 (ORCPT ); Thu, 19 Nov 2020 18:26:27 -0500 Received: from linux.microsoft.com ([13.77.154.182]:32934 "EHLO linux.microsoft.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726325AbgKSX0Y (ORCPT ); Thu, 19 Nov 2020 18:26:24 -0500 Received: from tusharsu-Ubuntu.lan (c-71-197-163-6.hsd1.wa.comcast.net [71.197.163.6]) by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 15AC020B71D2; Thu, 19 Nov 2020 15:26:22 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com 15AC020B71D2 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1605828382; bh=brA+6A2QE6Q+exvSYts5b4erozOos8EsHZx2T5mbmxk=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=DEMXViUxw32NXqk9Z2DAXjqH1mhmO4ikAxxWie3kHkBVwj3/QNrLjgf6ECGUyVWEc cY244SBX4h8WSB/9Z+ZQYzprjf7Qvw80MNRJa+uZ6uaK6BmDIs4c+FLlF49R+6Md2s GgtMycxQ3NSFcTKXNnYKdcE6YViYjWmBnXJSUVSc= From: Tushar Sugandhi To: zohar@linux.ibm.com, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@redhat.com, gmazyland@gmail.com, paul@paul-moore.com Cc: tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com, sashal@kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org, nramas@linux.microsoft.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com Subject: [PATCH v6 3/8] IMA: define a hook to measure kernel integrity critical data Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2020 15:26:06 -0800 Message-Id: <20201119232611.30114-4-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.1 In-Reply-To: <20201119232611.30114-1-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> References: <20201119232611.30114-1-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org IMA provides capabilities to measure file data, and in-memory buffer data. However, currently, IMA does not provide a generic function for kernel subsystems to measure the integrity critical data. Kernel integrity critical data can be defined as the in-memory kernel data which if accidentally or maliciously altered, can compromise the integrity of the system. Examples of critical data would be kernel in-memory r/o structures, hash of the memory structures, or data that represents a linux kernel subsystem state change. Define a new IMA hook named ima_measure_critical_data to measure kernel integrity critical data. Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi --- Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 2 +- include/linux/ima.h | 6 +++++ security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 1 + security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 2 ++ 6 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy index e35263f97fc1..6ec7daa87cba 100644 --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Description: func:= [BPRM_CHECK][MMAP_CHECK][CREDS_CHECK][FILE_CHECK]MODULE_CHECK] [FIRMWARE_CHECK] [KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK] [KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK] - [KEXEC_CMDLINE] [KEY_CHECK] + [KEXEC_CMDLINE] [KEY_CHECK] [CRITICAL_DATA] mask:= [[^]MAY_READ] [[^]MAY_WRITE] [[^]MAY_APPEND] [[^]MAY_EXEC] fsmagic:= hex value diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h index 8fa7bcfb2da2..9911a6e496b6 100644 --- a/include/linux/ima.h +++ b/include/linux/ima.h @@ -30,6 +30,9 @@ extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, extern void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry); extern int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size); extern void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size); +extern void ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_name, + const void *buf, int buf_len, + bool measure_buf_hash); #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC extern void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image); @@ -116,6 +119,9 @@ static inline int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size) } static inline void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) {} +static inline void ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_name, + const void *buf, int buf_len, + bool measure_buf_hash) {} #endif /* CONFIG_IMA */ #ifndef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index fa3044a7539f..7d9deda6a8b3 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -201,6 +201,7 @@ static inline unsigned int ima_hash_key(u8 *digest) hook(POLICY_CHECK, policy) \ hook(KEXEC_CMDLINE, kexec_cmdline) \ hook(KEY_CHECK, key) \ + hook(CRITICAL_DATA, critical_data) \ hook(MAX_CHECK, none) #define __ima_hook_enumify(ENUM, str) ENUM, diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c index af218babd198..9917e1730cb6 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c @@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, * subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic= * subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific. * func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | CREDS_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK - * | KEXEC_CMDLINE | KEY_CHECK + * | KEXEC_CMDLINE | KEY_CHECK | CRITICAL_DATA * mask: contains the permission mask * fsmagic: hex value * diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index f3501bdd1035..7661f09569f3 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -922,6 +922,42 @@ void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) fdput(f); } +/** + * ima_measure_critical_data - measure kernel integrity critical data + * @event_name: event name to be used for the buffer entry + * @buf: pointer to buffer containing data to measure + * @buf_len: length of buffer(in bytes) + * @measure_buf_hash: measure buffer hash + * + * Measure the kernel subsystem data, critical to the integrity of the kernel, + * into the IMA log and extend the @pcr. + * + * Use @event_name to describe the state/buffer data change. + * Examples of critical data (buf) could be kernel in-memory r/o structures, + * hash of the memory structures, or data that represents subsystem state + * change. + * + * If @measure_buf_hash is set to true - measure hash of the buffer data, + * else measure the buffer data itself. + * measure_buf_hash can be used to save space, if the data being measured + * is too large. + * + * The data (buf) can only be measured, not appraised. + */ +void ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_name, + const void *buf, int buf_len, + bool measure_buf_hash) +{ + if (!event_name || !buf || !buf_len) { + pr_err("Invalid arguments passed to %s().\n", __func__); + return; + } + + process_buffer_measurement(NULL, buf, buf_len, event_name, + CRITICAL_DATA, 0, NULL, + measure_buf_hash); +} + static int __init init_ima(void) { int error; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 25419c7ff50b..2a0c0603626e 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -1251,6 +1251,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) && strcmp(args[0].from, "KEY_CHECK") == 0) entry->func = KEY_CHECK; + else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "CRITICAL_DATA") == 0) + entry->func = CRITICAL_DATA; else result = -EINVAL; if (!result)