@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ enum tpm_pcrs { TPM_PCR0 = 0, TPM_PCR8 = 8, TPM_PCR10 = 10 };
extern int ima_policy_flag;
/* set during initialization */
-extern int ima_hash_algo;
+extern int ima_hash_algo __ro_after_init;
extern int ima_sha1_idx __ro_after_init;
extern int ima_hash_algo_idx __ro_after_init;
extern int ima_extra_slots __ro_after_init;
@@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ int ima_get_action(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, int mask,
enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr,
struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
- const char *func_data);
+ const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_hashes);
int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, enum ima_hooks func,
int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
- const char *func_data);
+ const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_hashes);
void ima_init_policy(void);
void ima_update_policy(void);
void ima_update_policy_flag(void);
@@ -172,6 +172,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
* @pcr: pointer filled in if matched measure policy sets pcr=
* @template_desc: pointer filled in if matched measure policy sets template=
* @func_data: func specific data, may be NULL
+ * @allowed_hashes: whitelist of hash algorithms allowed for the IMA xattr
*
* The policy is defined in terms of keypairs:
* subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic=
@@ -188,14 +189,15 @@ int ima_get_action(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, int mask,
enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr,
struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
- const char *func_data)
+ const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_hashes)
{
int flags = IMA_MEASURE | IMA_AUDIT | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH;
flags &= ima_policy_flag;
return ima_match_policy(mnt_userns, inode, cred, secid, func, mask,
- flags, pcr, template_desc, func_data);
+ flags, pcr, template_desc, func_data,
+ allowed_hashes);
}
/*
@@ -77,8 +77,9 @@ int ima_must_appraise(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
return 0;
security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
- return ima_match_policy(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(), secid, func,
- mask, IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ return ima_match_policy(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(), secid,
+ func, mask, IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL,
+ NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
@@ -210,6 +210,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
int xattr_len = 0;
bool violation_check;
enum hash_algo hash_algo;
+ unsigned int appraisal_allowed_hashes = 0;
if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
return 0;
@@ -219,7 +220,8 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
* Included is the appraise submask.
*/
action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_user_ns(file), inode, cred, secid,
- mask, func, &pcr, &template_desc, NULL);
+ mask, func, &pcr, &template_desc, NULL,
+ &appraisal_allowed_hashes);
violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK) &&
(ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE));
if (!action && !violation_check)
@@ -327,6 +329,20 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
hash_algo = ima_get_hash_algo(xattr_value, xattr_len);
+ /* Ensure that the digest was generated using an allowed algorithm */
+ if (appraisal_allowed_hashes &&
+ !(appraisal_allowed_hashes & (1U << hash_algo))) {
+ rc = -EACCES;
+
+ if (!pathbuf) /* ima_rdwr_violation possibly pre-fetched */
+ pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf, filename);
+
+ integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, file_inode(file),
+ pathname, "collect_data", "forbidden-hash-algorithm", rc, 0);
+
+ goto out_locked;
+ }
+
rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, buf, size, hash_algo, modsig);
if (rc != 0 && rc != -EBADF && rc != -EINVAL)
goto out_locked;
@@ -433,7 +449,7 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot)
inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file);
action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_user_ns(vma->vm_file), inode,
current_cred(), secid, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK,
- &pcr, &template, NULL);
+ &pcr, &template, NULL, NULL);
/* Is the mmap'ed file in policy? */
if (!(action & (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)))
@@ -882,7 +898,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid);
action = ima_get_action(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(),
secid, 0, func, &pcr, &template,
- func_data);
+ func_data, NULL);
if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE))
return;
}
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
#define IMA_FSNAME 0x0200
#define IMA_KEYRINGS 0x0400
#define IMA_LABEL 0x0800
+#define IMA_VALIDATE_HASH 0x1000
#define UNKNOWN 0
#define MEASURE 0x0001 /* same as IMA_MEASURE */
@@ -79,6 +80,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
bool (*uid_op)(kuid_t, kuid_t); /* Handlers for operators */
bool (*fowner_op)(kuid_t, kuid_t); /* uid_eq(), uid_gt(), uid_lt() */
int pcr;
+ unsigned int allowed_hashes;
struct {
void *rule; /* LSM file metadata specific */
char *args_p; /* audit value */
@@ -90,6 +92,14 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
struct ima_template_desc *template;
};
+/*
+ * sanity check in case the kernels gains more hash algorithms that can
+ * fit in an unsigned int
+ */
+static_assert(
+ 8 * sizeof(unsigned int) >= HASH_ALGO__LAST,
+ "The bitfield allowed_hashes in ima_rule_entry is too small to contain all the supported hash algorithms, consider using a bigger type");
+
/*
* Without LSM specific knowledge, the default policy can only be
* written in terms of .action, .func, .mask, .fsmagic, .uid, and .fowner
@@ -646,6 +656,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
* @pcr: set the pcr to extend
* @template_desc: the template that should be used for this rule
* @func_data: func specific data, may be NULL
+ * @allowed_hashes: whitelist of hash algorithms allowed for the IMA xattr
*
* Measure decision based on func/mask/fsmagic and LSM(subj/obj/type)
* conditions.
@@ -658,7 +669,7 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, enum ima_hooks func,
int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
- const char *func_data)
+ const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_hashes)
{
struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
int action = 0, actmask = flags | (flags << 1);
@@ -684,8 +695,11 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
action &= ~IMA_HASH;
if (ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs)
action |= IMA_FAIL_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGS;
- }
+ if (allowed_hashes &&
+ entry->flags & IMA_VALIDATE_HASH)
+ *allowed_hashes = entry->allowed_hashes;
+ }
if (entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK)
actmask &= ~(entry->action | entry->action << 1);
This patch plugs in support for restricting the hash algorithms accepted for protecting the security.ima xattr when appraising files. Each ima policy rule can have a list of allowed hash algorithms, and a file matching the policy but whose IMA hash is not explicitly in the list will not pass appraisal. This do not apply only to IMA in hash mode, it also works with digital signatures, in which case it checks that the hash (which was then signed by the trusted private key) have been generated with one of the algortihms whitelisted for this specific rule. Signed-off-by: Simon Thoby <simon.thoby@viveris.fr> --- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 6 +++--- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 6 ++++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 5 +++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++--- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++-- 5 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)