diff mbox series

[3/4] ima: limit including fs-verity's file digest in measurement list

Message ID 20211129170057.243127-4-zohar@linux.ibm.com (mailing list archive)
State New, archived
Headers show
Series ima: support fs-verity signatures stored as | expand

Commit Message

Mimi Zohar Nov. 29, 2021, 5 p.m. UTC
Without the file signature included the IMA measurement list, the type
of file digest is unclear.  Limit including fs-verity's file digest in
the IMA measurement list based on whether the template name is ima-sig.
In the future, this could be relaxed to include any template format that
includes the file signature.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h              | 3 ++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c          | 3 ++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c     | 3 ++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c         | 7 ++++++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 3 ++-
 5 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

Comments

Eric Biggers Nov. 30, 2021, 2:35 a.m. UTC | #1
On Mon, Nov 29, 2021 at 12:00:56PM -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> Without the file signature included the IMA measurement list, the type
> of file digest is unclear.  Limit including fs-verity's file digest in
> the IMA measurement list based on whether the template name is ima-sig.
> In the future, this could be relaxed to include any template format that
> includes the file signature.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
> ---
>  security/integrity/ima/ima.h              | 3 ++-
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c          | 3 ++-
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c     | 3 ++-
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c         | 7 ++++++-
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 3 ++-
>  5 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> index be965a8715e4..ab257e404f8e 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> @@ -262,7 +262,8 @@ int ima_get_action(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
>  int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
>  int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
>  			    struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
> -			    enum hash_algo algo, struct modsig *modsig);
> +			    enum hash_algo algo, struct modsig *modsig,
> +			    bool veritysig);
>  void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
>  			   const unsigned char *filename,
>  			   struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> index 42c6ff7056e6..179c7f0364c2 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> @@ -217,7 +217,8 @@ int ima_get_action(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
>   */
>  int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
>  			    struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
> -			    enum hash_algo algo, struct modsig *modsig)
> +			    enum hash_algo algo, struct modsig *modsig,
> +			    bool veritysig)

'veritysig' is being added here but it doesn't actually do anything.  It seems
this patchset is not split up correctly.

> +	rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, NULL, 0, ima_hash_algo,
> +				     NULL, FALSE);
>  	if (rc < 0)
>  		return;

false should be used instead of FALSE.

>  
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> index 465865412100..a73e1e845ea8 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> @@ -216,6 +216,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
>  	bool violation_check;
>  	enum hash_algo hash_algo;
>  	unsigned int allowed_algos = 0;
> +	int veritysig = FALSE;

Likewise.

> +	if (xattr_value && xattr_value->type == IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG &&
> +	    strcmp(template_desc->name, "ima-sig") == 0)
> +		veritysig = TRUE;

Likewise, true instead of TRUE.

- Eric
Lakshmi Ramasubramanian Nov. 30, 2021, 5:46 a.m. UTC | #2
Hi Mimi,

Just one nit comment below in the patch description.

On 11/29/2021 9:00 AM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> Without the file signature included the IMA measurement list, the type
Without the file signature included in the IMA measurement list, the type...

  -lakshmi

> of file digest is unclear.  Limit including fs-verity's file digest in
> the IMA measurement list based on whether the template name is ima-sig.
> In the future, this could be relaxed to include any template format that
> includes the file signature.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
> ---
>   security/integrity/ima/ima.h              | 3 ++-
>   security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c          | 3 ++-
>   security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c     | 3 ++-
>   security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c         | 7 ++++++-
>   security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 3 ++-
>   5 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> index be965a8715e4..ab257e404f8e 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> @@ -262,7 +262,8 @@ int ima_get_action(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
>   int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
>   int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
>   			    struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
> -			    enum hash_algo algo, struct modsig *modsig);
> +			    enum hash_algo algo, struct modsig *modsig,
> +			    bool veritysig);
>   void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
>   			   const unsigned char *filename,
>   			   struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> index 42c6ff7056e6..179c7f0364c2 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> @@ -217,7 +217,8 @@ int ima_get_action(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
>    */
>   int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
>   			    struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
> -			    enum hash_algo algo, struct modsig *modsig)
> +			    enum hash_algo algo, struct modsig *modsig,
> +			    bool veritysig)
>   {
>   	const char *audit_cause = "failed";
>   	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> index d43a27a9a9b6..b31be383e668 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> @@ -510,7 +510,8 @@ void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file)
>   	    !(iint->flags & IMA_HASH))
>   		return;
>   
> -	rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, NULL, 0, ima_hash_algo, NULL);
> +	rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, NULL, 0, ima_hash_algo,
> +				     NULL, FALSE);
>   	if (rc < 0)
>   		return;
>   
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> index 465865412100..a73e1e845ea8 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> @@ -216,6 +216,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
>   	bool violation_check;
>   	enum hash_algo hash_algo;
>   	unsigned int allowed_algos = 0;
> +	int veritysig = FALSE;
>   
>   	if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
>   		return 0;
> @@ -333,8 +334,12 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
>   	}
>   
>   	hash_algo = ima_get_hash_algo(xattr_value, xattr_len);
> +	if (xattr_value && xattr_value->type == IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG &&
> +	    strcmp(template_desc->name, "ima-sig") == 0)
> +		veritysig = TRUE;
>   
> -	rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, buf, size, hash_algo, modsig);
> +	rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, buf, size, hash_algo,
> +				     modsig, veritysig);
>   	if (rc != 0 && rc != -EBADF && rc != -EINVAL)
>   		goto out_locked;
>   
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
> index ca017cae73eb..5bad251f3b07 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
> @@ -478,7 +478,8 @@ int ima_eventsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
>   {
>   	struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = event_data->xattr_value;
>   
> -	if ((!xattr_value) || (xattr_value->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG))
> +	if ((!xattr_value) || !(xattr_value->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG ||
> +				xattr_value->type == IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG))
>   		return ima_eventevmsig_init(event_data, field_data);
>   
>   	return ima_write_template_field_data(xattr_value, event_data->xattr_len,
>
Mimi Zohar Nov. 30, 2021, 1:15 p.m. UTC | #3
Hi Eric,

On Mon, 2021-11-29 at 18:35 -0800, Eric Biggers wrote:
> > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> > index 42c6ff7056e6..179c7f0364c2 100644
> > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> > @@ -217,7 +217,8 @@ int ima_get_action(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
> >   */
> >  int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
> >                           struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
> > -                         enum hash_algo algo, struct modsig *modsig)
> > +                         enum hash_algo algo, struct modsig *modsig,
> > +                         bool veritysig)
> 
> 'veritysig' is being added here but it doesn't actually do anything.  It seems
> this patchset is not split up correctly.

True, this patch just adds the plumbing.  Reversing 3 & 4 could result
in including the fs-verity digest, without the signature in the
measurement list.  The alternative is to squash patches 3 & 4.

thanks,

Mimi
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index be965a8715e4..ab257e404f8e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -262,7 +262,8 @@  int ima_get_action(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
 int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
 int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			    struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
-			    enum hash_algo algo, struct modsig *modsig);
+			    enum hash_algo algo, struct modsig *modsig,
+			    bool veritysig);
 void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 			   const unsigned char *filename,
 			   struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 42c6ff7056e6..179c7f0364c2 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -217,7 +217,8 @@  int ima_get_action(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
  */
 int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			    struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
-			    enum hash_algo algo, struct modsig *modsig)
+			    enum hash_algo algo, struct modsig *modsig,
+			    bool veritysig)
 {
 	const char *audit_cause = "failed";
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index d43a27a9a9b6..b31be383e668 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -510,7 +510,8 @@  void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file)
 	    !(iint->flags & IMA_HASH))
 		return;
 
-	rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, NULL, 0, ima_hash_algo, NULL);
+	rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, NULL, 0, ima_hash_algo,
+				     NULL, FALSE);
 	if (rc < 0)
 		return;
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 465865412100..a73e1e845ea8 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -216,6 +216,7 @@  static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
 	bool violation_check;
 	enum hash_algo hash_algo;
 	unsigned int allowed_algos = 0;
+	int veritysig = FALSE;
 
 	if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
 		return 0;
@@ -333,8 +334,12 @@  static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
 	}
 
 	hash_algo = ima_get_hash_algo(xattr_value, xattr_len);
+	if (xattr_value && xattr_value->type == IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG &&
+	    strcmp(template_desc->name, "ima-sig") == 0)
+		veritysig = TRUE;
 
-	rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, buf, size, hash_algo, modsig);
+	rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, buf, size, hash_algo,
+				     modsig, veritysig);
 	if (rc != 0 && rc != -EBADF && rc != -EINVAL)
 		goto out_locked;
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
index ca017cae73eb..5bad251f3b07 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c
@@ -478,7 +478,8 @@  int ima_eventsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
 {
 	struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = event_data->xattr_value;
 
-	if ((!xattr_value) || (xattr_value->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG))
+	if ((!xattr_value) || !(xattr_value->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG ||
+				xattr_value->type == IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG))
 		return ima_eventevmsig_init(event_data, field_data);
 
 	return ima_write_template_field_data(xattr_value, event_data->xattr_len,