| Message ID | 20220201203735.164593-16-stefanb@linux.ibm.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
| Series | ima: Namespace IMA with audit support in IMA-ns | expand |
Hi Stefan,
Thank you for the patch! Perhaps something to improve:
[auto build test WARNING on v5.16]
[cannot apply to zohar-integrity/next-integrity linux/master linus/master jmorris-security/next-testing v5.17-rc2 v5.17-rc1 next-20220202]
[If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note.
And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch]
url: https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Stefan-Berger/ima-Namespace-IMA-with-audit-support-in-IMA-ns/20220202-044058
base: df0cc57e057f18e44dac8e6c18aba47ab53202f9
config: x86_64-randconfig-c003-20220131 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20220202/202202022159.CBH5XW23-lkp@intel.com/config)
compiler: gcc-9 (Debian 9.3.0-22) 9.3.0
If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag as appropriate
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
cocci warnings: (new ones prefixed by >>)
>> security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c:424:2-3: Unneeded semicolon
Please review and possibly fold the followup patch.
---
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service, Intel Corporation
https://lists.01.org/hyperkitty/list/kbuild-all@lists.01.org
On Tue, 2022-02-01 at 15:37 -0500, Stefan Berger wrote: > Implement hierarchical processing of file accesses in IMA namespaces by > walking the list of user namespaces towards the root. This way file > accesses can be audited in an IMA namespace and also be evaluated against > the IMA policies of parent IMA namespaces. > > Pass the user_namespace into process_measurement since we will be walking > the hierarchy of user_namespaces towards the init_user_ns and we can easily > derive the ima_namespace from the user_namespace. > > __process_measurement() returns either 0 or -EACCES. For hierarchical > processing remember the -EACCES returned by this function but continue > to the parent user namespace. At the end either return 0 or -EACCES > if an error occurred in one of the IMA namespaces. > > Currently the ima_ns pointer of the user_namespace is always NULL except > at the init_user_ns, so test ima_ns for NULL pointer and skip the call to > __process_measurement() if it is NULL. Once IMA namespacing is fully > enabled, the pointer may still be NULL due to late initialization of the > IMA namespace. > > Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> > > --- > > v10: > - Fixed compilation issue > > v9: > - Switch callers to pass user_namespace rather than ima_namespace with > potential NULL pointer > - Add default case to switch statement and warn if this happens > - Implement ima_ns_from_user_ns() in this patch now > --- > security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 8 ++++ > security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 76 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------- > 2 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h > index 0057b1fd6c18..aea8fb8d2854 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h > @@ -493,4 +493,12 @@ struct user_namespace *ima_user_ns_from_file(const struct file *filp) > return file_inode(filp)->i_sb->s_user_ns; > } > > +static inline struct ima_namespace > +*ima_ns_from_user_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns) > +{ > + if (user_ns == &init_user_ns) > + return &init_ima_ns; > + return NULL; > +} > + > #endif /* __LINUX_IMA_H */ > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > index ae0e9b14554a..917504319e7f 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c > @@ -196,10 +196,10 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file) > ima_check_last_writer(iint, inode, file); > } > > -static int process_measurement(struct ima_namespace *ns, > - struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, > - u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask, > - enum ima_hooks func) > +static int __process_measurement(struct ima_namespace *ns, > + struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, > + u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask, > + enum ima_hooks func) > { > struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); > struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL; > @@ -391,6 +391,41 @@ static int process_measurement(struct ima_namespace *ns, > return 0; > } > > +static int process_measurement(struct user_namespace *user_ns, > + struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, > + u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask, > + enum ima_hooks func) > +{ > + struct ima_namespace *ns; > + int ret = 0; > + > + while (user_ns) { > + ns = ima_ns_from_user_ns(user_ns); > + if (ns) { > + int rc; > + > + rc = __process_measurement(ns, file, cred, secid, buf, > + size, mask, func); > + switch (rc) { > + case 0: > + break; > + case -EACCES: > + /* return this error at the end but continue */ > + ret = -EACCES; > + break; > + default: > + /* should not happen */ > + ret = -EACCES; > + WARN_ON_ONCE(true); > + } > + } > + > + user_ns = user_ns->parent; > + }; > + > + return ret; > +} > + Very nice and concise! Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 0057b1fd6c18..aea8fb8d2854 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -493,4 +493,12 @@ struct user_namespace *ima_user_ns_from_file(const struct file *filp) return file_inode(filp)->i_sb->s_user_ns; } +static inline struct ima_namespace +*ima_ns_from_user_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns) +{ + if (user_ns == &init_user_ns) + return &init_ima_ns; + return NULL; +} + #endif /* __LINUX_IMA_H */ diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index ae0e9b14554a..917504319e7f 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -196,10 +196,10 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file) ima_check_last_writer(iint, inode, file); } -static int process_measurement(struct ima_namespace *ns, - struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, - u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask, - enum ima_hooks func) +static int __process_measurement(struct ima_namespace *ns, + struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, + u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask, + enum ima_hooks func) { struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL; @@ -391,6 +391,41 @@ static int process_measurement(struct ima_namespace *ns, return 0; } +static int process_measurement(struct user_namespace *user_ns, + struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, + u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask, + enum ima_hooks func) +{ + struct ima_namespace *ns; + int ret = 0; + + while (user_ns) { + ns = ima_ns_from_user_ns(user_ns); + if (ns) { + int rc; + + rc = __process_measurement(ns, file, cred, secid, buf, + size, mask, func); + switch (rc) { + case 0: + break; + case -EACCES: + /* return this error at the end but continue */ + ret = -EACCES; + break; + default: + /* should not happen */ + ret = -EACCES; + WARN_ON_ONCE(true); + } + } + + user_ns = user_ns->parent; + }; + + return ret; +} + /** * ima_file_mmap - based on policy, collect/store measurement. * @file: pointer to the file to be measured (May be NULL) @@ -404,13 +439,14 @@ static int process_measurement(struct ima_namespace *ns, */ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) { - struct ima_namespace *ns = &init_ima_ns; + struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns(); u32 secid; if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) { security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid); - return process_measurement(ns, file, current_cred(), secid, - NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK); + return process_measurement(user_ns, file, current_cred(), + secid, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, + MMAP_CHECK); } return 0; @@ -485,19 +521,19 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot) */ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { - struct ima_namespace *ns = &init_ima_ns; + struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns(); int ret; u32 secid; security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid); - ret = process_measurement(ns, bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, - 0, MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK); + ret = process_measurement(user_ns, bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, + NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK); if (ret) return ret; security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &secid); - return process_measurement(ns, bprm->file, bprm->cred, secid, NULL, 0, - MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK); + return process_measurement(user_ns, bprm->file, bprm->cred, secid, + NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK); } /** @@ -512,11 +548,12 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) */ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask) { - struct ima_namespace *ns = &init_ima_ns; + struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns(); u32 secid; security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid); - return process_measurement(ns, file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, + return process_measurement(user_ns, file, current_cred(), secid, + NULL, 0, mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC | MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK); } @@ -698,7 +735,7 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id, bool contents) { - struct ima_namespace *ns = &init_ima_ns; + struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns(); enum ima_hooks func; u32 secid; @@ -721,7 +758,7 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id, /* Read entire file for all partial reads. */ func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK; security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid); - return process_measurement(ns, file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, + return process_measurement(user_ns, file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, MAY_READ, func); } @@ -749,7 +786,8 @@ const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = { int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id) { - struct ima_namespace *ns = &init_ima_ns; + struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns(); + struct ima_namespace *ns = ima_ns_from_user_ns(user_ns); enum ima_hooks func; u32 secid; @@ -766,8 +804,8 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK; security_task_getsecid_subj(current, &secid); - return process_measurement(ns, file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size, - MAY_READ, func); + return process_measurement(user_ns, file, current_cred(), secid, + buf, size, MAY_READ, func); } /**
Implement hierarchical processing of file accesses in IMA namespaces by walking the list of user namespaces towards the root. This way file accesses can be audited in an IMA namespace and also be evaluated against the IMA policies of parent IMA namespaces. Pass the user_namespace into process_measurement since we will be walking the hierarchy of user_namespaces towards the init_user_ns and we can easily derive the ima_namespace from the user_namespace. __process_measurement() returns either 0 or -EACCES. For hierarchical processing remember the -EACCES returned by this function but continue to the parent user namespace. At the end either return 0 or -EACCES if an error occurred in one of the IMA namespaces. Currently the ima_ns pointer of the user_namespace is always NULL except at the init_user_ns, so test ima_ns for NULL pointer and skip the call to __process_measurement() if it is NULL. Once IMA namespacing is fully enabled, the pointer may still be NULL due to late initialization of the IMA namespace. Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> --- v10: - Fixed compilation issue v9: - Switch callers to pass user_namespace rather than ima_namespace with potential NULL pointer - Add default case to switch statement and warn if this happens - Implement ima_ns_from_user_ns() in this patch now --- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 8 ++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 76 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 2 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)