diff mbox series

[v2,1/2] KEYS: asymmetric: enforce that sig algo matches key algo

Message ID 20220208052448.409152-2-ebiggers@kernel.org (mailing list archive)
State New, archived
Headers show
Series Fix bugs in public_key_verify_signature() | expand

Commit Message

Eric Biggers Feb. 8, 2022, 5:24 a.m. UTC
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

Most callers of public_key_verify_signature(), including most indirect
callers via verify_signature() as well as pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(),
don't check that public_key_signature::pkey_algo matches
public_key::pkey_algo.  These should always match.  However, a malicious
signature could intentionally declare an unintended algorithm.  It is
essential that such signatures be rejected outright, or that the
algorithm of the *key* be used -- not the algorithm of the signature as
that would allow attackers to choose the algorithm used.

Currently, public_key_verify_signature() correctly uses the key's
algorithm when deciding which akcipher to allocate.  That's good.
However, it uses the signature's algorithm when deciding whether to do
the first step of SM2, which is incorrect.  Also, v4.19 and older
kernels used the signature's algorithm for the entire process.

Prevent such errors by making public_key_verify_signature() enforce that
the signature's algorithm (if given) matches the key's algorithm.

Also remove two checks of this done by callers, which are now redundant.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
---
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c    |  6 ------
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c      | 15 +++++++++++++++
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c |  6 ------
 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

Comments

Vitaly Chikunov Feb. 8, 2022, 8:50 a.m. UTC | #1
On Mon, Feb 07, 2022 at 09:24:47PM -0800, Eric Biggers wrote:
> From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
> 
> Most callers of public_key_verify_signature(), including most indirect
> callers via verify_signature() as well as pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(),
> don't check that public_key_signature::pkey_algo matches
> public_key::pkey_algo.  These should always match.  However, a malicious
> signature could intentionally declare an unintended algorithm.  It is
> essential that such signatures be rejected outright, or that the
> algorithm of the *key* be used -- not the algorithm of the signature as
> that would allow attackers to choose the algorithm used.
> 
> Currently, public_key_verify_signature() correctly uses the key's
> algorithm when deciding which akcipher to allocate.  That's good.
> However, it uses the signature's algorithm when deciding whether to do
> the first step of SM2, which is incorrect.  Also, v4.19 and older
> kernels used the signature's algorithm for the entire process.
> 
> Prevent such errors by making public_key_verify_signature() enforce that
> the signature's algorithm (if given) matches the key's algorithm.
> 
> Also remove two checks of this done by callers, which are now redundant.
> 
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
> Tested-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

Reviewed-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>

Thanks,

> ---
>  crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c    |  6 ------
>  crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c      | 15 +++++++++++++++
>  crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c |  6 ------
>  3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
> index 0b4d07aa8811..f94a1d1ad3a6 100644
> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
> @@ -174,12 +174,6 @@ static int pkcs7_find_key(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
>  		pr_devel("Sig %u: Found cert serial match X.509[%u]\n",
>  			 sinfo->index, certix);
>  
> -		if (strcmp(x509->pub->pkey_algo, sinfo->sig->pkey_algo) != 0) {
> -			pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 algo and PKCS#7 sig algo don't match\n",
> -				sinfo->index);
> -			continue;
> -		}
> -
>  		sinfo->signer = x509;
>  		return 0;
>  	}
> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
> index 4fefb219bfdc..e36213945686 100644
> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
> @@ -325,6 +325,21 @@ int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pkey,
>  	BUG_ON(!sig);
>  	BUG_ON(!sig->s);
>  
> +	/*
> +	 * If the signature specifies a public key algorithm, it *must* match
> +	 * the key's actual public key algorithm.
> +	 *
> +	 * Small exception: ECDSA signatures don't specify the curve, but ECDSA
> +	 * keys do.  So the strings can mismatch slightly in that case:
> +	 * "ecdsa-nist-*" for the key, but "ecdsa" for the signature.
> +	 */
> +	if (sig->pkey_algo) {
> +		if (strcmp(pkey->pkey_algo, sig->pkey_algo) != 0 &&
> +		    (strncmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "ecdsa-", 6) != 0 ||
> +		     strcmp(sig->pkey_algo, "ecdsa") != 0))
> +			return -EKEYREJECTED;
> +	}
> +
>  	ret = software_key_determine_akcipher(sig->encoding,
>  					      sig->hash_algo,
>  					      pkey, alg_name);
> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
> index fe14cae115b5..71cc1738fbfd 100644
> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
> @@ -128,12 +128,6 @@ int x509_check_for_self_signed(struct x509_certificate *cert)
>  			goto out;
>  	}
>  
> -	ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
> -	if (strcmp(cert->pub->pkey_algo, cert->sig->pkey_algo) != 0 &&
> -	    (strncmp(cert->pub->pkey_algo, "ecdsa-", 6) != 0 ||
> -	     strcmp(cert->sig->pkey_algo, "ecdsa") != 0))
> -		goto out;
> -
>  	ret = public_key_verify_signature(cert->pub, cert->sig);
>  	if (ret < 0) {
>  		if (ret == -ENOPKG) {
> -- 
> 2.35.1
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
index 0b4d07aa8811..f94a1d1ad3a6 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
@@ -174,12 +174,6 @@  static int pkcs7_find_key(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
 		pr_devel("Sig %u: Found cert serial match X.509[%u]\n",
 			 sinfo->index, certix);
 
-		if (strcmp(x509->pub->pkey_algo, sinfo->sig->pkey_algo) != 0) {
-			pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 algo and PKCS#7 sig algo don't match\n",
-				sinfo->index);
-			continue;
-		}
-
 		sinfo->signer = x509;
 		return 0;
 	}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
index 4fefb219bfdc..e36213945686 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
@@ -325,6 +325,21 @@  int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pkey,
 	BUG_ON(!sig);
 	BUG_ON(!sig->s);
 
+	/*
+	 * If the signature specifies a public key algorithm, it *must* match
+	 * the key's actual public key algorithm.
+	 *
+	 * Small exception: ECDSA signatures don't specify the curve, but ECDSA
+	 * keys do.  So the strings can mismatch slightly in that case:
+	 * "ecdsa-nist-*" for the key, but "ecdsa" for the signature.
+	 */
+	if (sig->pkey_algo) {
+		if (strcmp(pkey->pkey_algo, sig->pkey_algo) != 0 &&
+		    (strncmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "ecdsa-", 6) != 0 ||
+		     strcmp(sig->pkey_algo, "ecdsa") != 0))
+			return -EKEYREJECTED;
+	}
+
 	ret = software_key_determine_akcipher(sig->encoding,
 					      sig->hash_algo,
 					      pkey, alg_name);
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
index fe14cae115b5..71cc1738fbfd 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
@@ -128,12 +128,6 @@  int x509_check_for_self_signed(struct x509_certificate *cert)
 			goto out;
 	}
 
-	ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
-	if (strcmp(cert->pub->pkey_algo, cert->sig->pkey_algo) != 0 &&
-	    (strncmp(cert->pub->pkey_algo, "ecdsa-", 6) != 0 ||
-	     strcmp(cert->sig->pkey_algo, "ecdsa") != 0))
-		goto out;
-
 	ret = public_key_verify_signature(cert->pub, cert->sig);
 	if (ret < 0) {
 		if (ret == -ENOPKG) {