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[v7,5/6] doc: trusted-encrypted: describe new CAAM trust source

Message ID 20220415205647.46056-6-a.fatoum@pengutronix.de (mailing list archive)
State New, archived
Headers show
Series KEYS: trusted: Introduce support for NXP CAAM-based trusted keys | expand

Commit Message

Ahmad Fatoum April 15, 2022, 8:56 p.m. UTC
Update documentation for trusted key use with the Cryptographic
Acceleration and Assurance Module (CAAM), an IP on NXP SoCs.

Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
v6 -> v7:
  - docs update split off as new Patch (Jarkko)
  - fixed typo in "Trusted Keys usage: CAAM" section

To: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: "Horia Geantă" <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Cc: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Jan Luebbe <j.luebbe@pengutronix.de>
Cc: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: Franck LENORMAND <franck.lenormand@nxp.com>
Cc: Matthias Schiffer <matthias.schiffer@ew.tq-group.com>
Cc: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
 .../security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst       | 40 ++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
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diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
index 2fe6fd1a2bbd..0bfb4c339748 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
+++ b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
@@ -35,6 +35,13 @@  safe.
          Rooted to Hardware Unique Key (HUK) which is generally burnt in on-chip
          fuses and is accessible to TEE only.
+     (3) CAAM (Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module: IP on NXP SoCs)
+         When High Assurance Boot (HAB) is enabled and the CAAM is in secure
+         mode, trust is rooted to the OTPMK, a never-disclosed 256-bit key
+         randomly generated and fused into each SoC at manufacturing time.
+         Otherwise, a common fixed test key is used instead.
   *  Execution isolation
      (1) TPM
@@ -46,6 +53,10 @@  safe.
          Customizable set of operations running in isolated execution
          environment verified via Secure/Trusted boot process.
+     (3) CAAM
+         Fixed set of operations running in isolated execution environment.
   * Optional binding to platform integrity state
      (1) TPM
@@ -63,6 +74,11 @@  safe.
          Relies on Secure/Trusted boot process for platform integrity. It can
          be extended with TEE based measured boot process.
+     (3) CAAM
+         Relies on the High Assurance Boot (HAB) mechanism of NXP SoCs
+         for platform integrity.
   *  Interfaces and APIs
      (1) TPM
@@ -74,10 +90,13 @@  safe.
          TEEs have well-documented, standardized client interface and APIs. For
          more details refer to ``Documentation/staging/tee.rst``.
+     (3) CAAM
+         Interface is specific to silicon vendor.
   *  Threat model
-     The strength and appropriateness of a particular TPM or TEE for a given
+     The strength and appropriateness of a particular trust source for a given
      purpose must be assessed when using them to protect security-relevant data.
@@ -104,6 +123,12 @@  selected trust source:
      from platform specific hardware RNG or a software based Fortuna CSPRNG
      which can be seeded via multiple entropy sources.
+  *  CAAM: Kernel RNG
+     The normal kernel random number generator is used. To seed it from the
+     CAAM HWRNG, enable CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_RNG_API and ensure the device
+     is probed.
 Users may override this by specifying ``trusted.rng=kernel`` on the kernel
 command-line to override the used RNG with the kernel's random number pool.
@@ -193,6 +218,19 @@  Usage::
 specific to TEE device implementation.  The key length for new keys is always
 in bytes. Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits).
+Trusted Keys usage: CAAM
+    keyctl add trusted name "new keylen" ring
+    keyctl add trusted name "load hex_blob" ring
+    keyctl print keyid
+"keyctl print" returns an ASCII hex copy of the sealed key, which is in a
+CAAM-specific format.  The key length for new keys is always in bytes.
+Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits).
 Encrypted Keys usage