From patchwork Wed May 4 23:20:58 2022 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Evan Green X-Patchwork-Id: 12838911 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8E4DEC41535 for ; Wed, 4 May 2022 23:59:59 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S231922AbiEEABf (ORCPT ); Wed, 4 May 2022 20:01:35 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:41928 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1384172AbiEDXZU (ORCPT ); Wed, 4 May 2022 19:25:20 -0400 Received: from mail-pj1-x1035.google.com (mail-pj1-x1035.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::1035]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5ED3E4F45D for ; Wed, 4 May 2022 16:21:42 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-pj1-x1035.google.com with SMTP id iq10so2607342pjb.0 for ; Wed, 04 May 2022 16:21:42 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=chromium.org; s=google; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=QHH93xmv+A0zLDbaf0xl31cJD918S4ys6fTj0XupotY=; b=mgIoKXm4C8HzSOSziqq8qD637H7ijAYI9RGh0Apqfmn3wBQ0OVYH6Sxim8iJnXcAAg hOBOMoznNPbiugT3gq9sY+X2Jsr05ZA1/Zywon2+srSjDE2w3VC826AUCeC1RKsNa7AM FUURGhLyPILlGETJwFn0gFqJK0WJO7ruscK60= X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=QHH93xmv+A0zLDbaf0xl31cJD918S4ys6fTj0XupotY=; b=ihDR7rSI4qo2kn1MTLBfdFKiBrIZZV07P6zO4KqkSt6GeadzZ8djQEaVoOkn3UQFq4 nlVj/kAq0CYew6NYTbx8e8vOiuYbrkVGTrtEv7gZGXpXkk+K9pNw8ronwDIFDeYPfiFD uQ23eki041QtYGJ9L9LEcPNHqSaClS/nti2mUmpkqy6ZVIsc90+S50z5Z39aU6Htvchm ITVr27Mo/7uQB1PapJe68DzWYZR2ZKiTIiarlZF6987DzXdm8nXQQM0HO+DnDS2E/E4o D/Gpz+L8UfVUA6KpSw9KAZ9K288WVOp63xUzdKi4qZc8nlPiXbAPXyn56TDfdYObQYnb SUyg== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM532GDs6nTmgZM+ACotL1whVZk1tdS73uYaSerE05kcTw8WHY9VBJ gMkvejryGMexrSJaykFcuGZF0g== X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJwKC/yJmUO1MlGUMqiVqEHIOFzf4BeVmhNVFnBF3R9tgKK7RVMDeTTsL+EypB9kKDu1r1vnpQ== X-Received: by 2002:a17:902:b107:b0:15d:391c:5a72 with SMTP id q7-20020a170902b10700b0015d391c5a72mr24610238plr.46.1651706501830; Wed, 04 May 2022 16:21:41 -0700 (PDT) Received: from evgreen-glaptop.lan ([98.47.98.87]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id q12-20020a170902f78c00b0015e8d4eb2d6sm1901pln.288.2022.05.04.16.21.40 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Wed, 04 May 2022 16:21:41 -0700 (PDT) From: Evan Green To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Matthew Garrett , dlunev@google.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jejb@linux.ibm.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, corbet@lwn.net, rjw@rjwysocki.net, gwendal@chromium.org, jarkko@kernel.org, linux-pm@vger.kernel.org, Evan Green , Len Brown , Pavel Machek , "Rafael J. Wysocki" Subject: [PATCH 06/10] PM: hibernate: Add kernel-based encryption Date: Wed, 4 May 2022 16:20:58 -0700 Message-Id: <20220504161439.6.Ifff11e11797a1bde0297577ecb2f7ebb3f9e2b04@changeid> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.31.0 In-Reply-To: <20220504232102.469959-1-evgreen@chromium.org> References: <20220504232102.469959-1-evgreen@chromium.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Enabling the kernel to be able to do encryption and integrity checks on the hibernate image prevents a malicious userspace from escalating to kernel execution via hibernation resume. As a first step toward this, add the scaffolding needed for the kernel to do AEAD encryption on the hibernate image, giving us both secrecy and integrity. We currently hardwire the encryption to be gcm(aes) in 16-page chunks. This strikes a balance between minimizing the authentication tag overhead on storage, and keeping a modest sized staging buffer. With this chunk size, we'd generate 2MB of authentication tag data on an 8GB hiberation image. The encryption currently sits on top of the core snapshot functionality, wired up only if requested in the uswsusp path. This could potentially be lowered into the common snapshot code given a mechanism to stitch the key contents into the image itself. To avoid forcing usermode to deal with sequencing the auth tags in with the data, we stitch the auth tags in to the snapshot after each chunk of pages. This complicates the read and write functions, as we roll through the flow of (for read) 1) fill the staging buffer with encrypted data, 2) feed the data pages out to user mode, 3) feed the tag out to user mode. To avoid having each syscall return a small and variable amount of data, the encrypted versions of read and write operate in a loop, allowing an arbitrary amount of data through per syscall. One alternative that would simplify things here would be a streaming interface to AEAD. Then we could just stream the entire hibernate image through directly, and handle a single tag at the end. However there is a school of thought that suggests a streaming interface to AEAD represents a loaded footgun, as it tempts the caller to act on the decrypted but not yet verified data, defeating the purpose of AEAD. With this change alone, we don't actually protect ourselves from malicious userspace at all, since we kindly hand the key in plaintext to usermode. In later changes, we'll seal the key with the TPM before handing it back to usermode, so they can't decrypt or tamper with the key themselves. Signed-off-by: Evan Green --- Documentation/power/userland-swsusp.rst | 8 + include/uapi/linux/suspend_ioctls.h | 15 +- kernel/power/Kconfig | 13 + kernel/power/Makefile | 1 + kernel/power/snapenc.c | 491 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/power/user.c | 40 +- kernel/power/user.h | 101 +++++ 7 files changed, 657 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) create mode 100644 kernel/power/snapenc.c create mode 100644 kernel/power/user.h diff --git a/Documentation/power/userland-swsusp.rst b/Documentation/power/userland-swsusp.rst index 1cf62d80a9ca10..f759915a78ce98 100644 --- a/Documentation/power/userland-swsusp.rst +++ b/Documentation/power/userland-swsusp.rst @@ -115,6 +115,14 @@ SNAPSHOT_S2RAM to resume the system from RAM if there's enough battery power or restore its state on the basis of the saved suspend image otherwise) +SNAPSHOT_ENABLE_ENCRYPTION + Enables encryption of the hibernate image within the kernel. Upon suspend + (ie when the snapshot device was opened for reading), returns a blob + representing the random encryption key the kernel created to encrypt the + hibernate image with. Upon resume (ie when the snapshot device was opened + for writing), receives a blob from usermode containing the key material + previously returned during hibernate. + The device's read() operation can be used to transfer the snapshot image from the kernel. It has the following limitations: diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/suspend_ioctls.h b/include/uapi/linux/suspend_ioctls.h index bcce04e21c0dce..b73026ef824bb9 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/suspend_ioctls.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/suspend_ioctls.h @@ -13,6 +13,18 @@ struct resume_swap_area { __u32 dev; } __attribute__((packed)); +#define USWSUSP_KEY_NONCE_SIZE 16 + +/* + * This structure is used to pass the kernel's hibernate encryption key in + * either direction. + */ +struct uswsusp_key_blob { + __u32 blob_len; + __u8 blob[512]; + __u8 nonce[USWSUSP_KEY_NONCE_SIZE]; +} __attribute__((packed)); + #define SNAPSHOT_IOC_MAGIC '3' #define SNAPSHOT_FREEZE _IO(SNAPSHOT_IOC_MAGIC, 1) #define SNAPSHOT_UNFREEZE _IO(SNAPSHOT_IOC_MAGIC, 2) @@ -29,6 +41,7 @@ struct resume_swap_area { #define SNAPSHOT_PREF_IMAGE_SIZE _IO(SNAPSHOT_IOC_MAGIC, 18) #define SNAPSHOT_AVAIL_SWAP_SIZE _IOR(SNAPSHOT_IOC_MAGIC, 19, __kernel_loff_t) #define SNAPSHOT_ALLOC_SWAP_PAGE _IOR(SNAPSHOT_IOC_MAGIC, 20, __kernel_loff_t) -#define SNAPSHOT_IOC_MAXNR 20 +#define SNAPSHOT_ENABLE_ENCRYPTION _IOWR(SNAPSHOT_IOC_MAGIC, 21, struct uswsusp_key_blob) +#define SNAPSHOT_IOC_MAXNR 21 #endif /* _LINUX_SUSPEND_IOCTLS_H */ diff --git a/kernel/power/Kconfig b/kernel/power/Kconfig index a12779650f1529..8249968962bcd5 100644 --- a/kernel/power/Kconfig +++ b/kernel/power/Kconfig @@ -92,6 +92,19 @@ config HIBERNATION_SNAPSHOT_DEV If in doubt, say Y. +config ENCRYPTED_HIBERNATION + bool "Encryption support for userspace snapshots" + depends on HIBERNATION_SNAPSHOT_DEV + depends on CRYPTO_AEAD2=y + default n + help + Enable support for kernel-based encryption of hibernation snapshots + created by uswsusp tools. + + Say N if userspace handles the image encryption. + + If in doubt, say N. + config PM_STD_PARTITION string "Default resume partition" depends on HIBERNATION diff --git a/kernel/power/Makefile b/kernel/power/Makefile index 874ad834dc8daf..7be08f2e0e3b68 100644 --- a/kernel/power/Makefile +++ b/kernel/power/Makefile @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SUSPEND) += suspend.o obj-$(CONFIG_PM_TEST_SUSPEND) += suspend_test.o obj-$(CONFIG_HIBERNATION) += hibernate.o snapshot.o swap.o obj-$(CONFIG_HIBERNATION_SNAPSHOT_DEV) += user.o +obj-$(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_HIBERNATION) += snapenc.o obj-$(CONFIG_PM_AUTOSLEEP) += autosleep.o obj-$(CONFIG_PM_WAKELOCKS) += wakelock.o diff --git a/kernel/power/snapenc.c b/kernel/power/snapenc.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000000000..cb90692d6ab83a --- /dev/null +++ b/kernel/power/snapenc.c @@ -0,0 +1,491 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* This file provides encryption support for system snapshots. */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "power.h" +#include "user.h" + +/* Encrypt more data from the snapshot into the staging area. */ +static int snapshot_encrypt_refill(struct snapshot_data *data) +{ + + u8 nonce[GCM_AES_IV_SIZE]; + int pg_idx; + int res; + struct aead_request *req = data->aead_req; + DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait); + size_t total = 0; + + /* + * The first buffer is the associated data, set to the offset to prevent + * attacks that rearrange chunks. + */ + sg_set_buf(&data->sg[0], &data->crypt_total, sizeof(data->crypt_total)); + + /* Load the crypt buffer with snapshot pages. */ + for (pg_idx = 0; pg_idx < CHUNK_SIZE; pg_idx++) { + void *buf = data->crypt_pages[pg_idx]; + + res = snapshot_read_next(&data->handle); + if (res < 0) + return res; + if (res == 0) + break; + + WARN_ON(res != PAGE_SIZE); + + /* + * Copy the page into the staging area. A future optimization + * could potentially skip this copy for lowmem pages. + */ + memcpy(buf, data_of(data->handle), PAGE_SIZE); + sg_set_buf(&data->sg[1 + pg_idx], buf, PAGE_SIZE); + total += PAGE_SIZE; + } + + sg_set_buf(&data->sg[1 + pg_idx], &data->auth_tag, SNAPSHOT_AUTH_TAG_SIZE); + aead_request_set_callback(req, 0, crypto_req_done, &wait); + /* + * Use incrementing nonces for each chunk, since a 64 bit value won't + * roll into re-use for any given hibernate image. + */ + memcpy(&nonce[0], &data->nonce_low, sizeof(data->nonce_low)); + memcpy(&nonce[sizeof(data->nonce_low)], + &data->nonce_high, + sizeof(nonce) - sizeof(data->nonce_low)); + + data->nonce_low += 1; + /* Total does not include AAD or the auth tag. */ + aead_request_set_crypt(req, data->sg, data->sg, total, nonce); + res = crypto_wait_req(crypto_aead_encrypt(req), &wait); + if (res) + return res; + + data->crypt_size = total; + data->crypt_total += total; + return 0; +} + +/* Decrypt data from the staging area and push it to the snapshot. */ +static int snapshot_decrypt_drain(struct snapshot_data *data) +{ + u8 nonce[GCM_AES_IV_SIZE]; + int page_count; + int pg_idx; + int res; + struct aead_request *req = data->aead_req; + DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait); + size_t total; + + /* Set up the associated data. */ + sg_set_buf(&data->sg[0], &data->crypt_total, sizeof(data->crypt_total)); + + /* + * Get the number of full pages, which could be short at the end. There + * should also be a tag at the end, so the offset won't be an even page. + */ + page_count = data->crypt_offset >> PAGE_SHIFT; + total = page_count << PAGE_SHIFT; + if ((total == 0) || (total == data->crypt_offset)) + return -EINVAL; + + /* + * Load the sg list with the crypt buffer. Inline decrypt back into the + * staging buffer. A future optimization could decrypt directly into + * lowmem pages. + */ + for (pg_idx = 0; pg_idx < page_count; pg_idx++) + sg_set_buf(&data->sg[1 + pg_idx], data->crypt_pages[pg_idx], PAGE_SIZE); + + /* + * It's possible this is the final decrypt, and there are fewer than + * CHUNK_SIZE pages. If this is the case we would have just written the + * auth tag into the first few bytes of a new page. Copy to the tag if + * so. + */ + if ((page_count < CHUNK_SIZE) && + (data->crypt_offset - total) == sizeof(data->auth_tag)) { + + memcpy(data->auth_tag, + data->crypt_pages[pg_idx], + sizeof(data->auth_tag)); + + } else if (data->crypt_offset != + ((CHUNK_SIZE << PAGE_SHIFT) + SNAPSHOT_AUTH_TAG_SIZE)) { + + return -EINVAL; + } + + sg_set_buf(&data->sg[1 + pg_idx], &data->auth_tag, SNAPSHOT_AUTH_TAG_SIZE); + aead_request_set_callback(req, 0, crypto_req_done, &wait); + memcpy(&nonce[0], &data->nonce_low, sizeof(data->nonce_low)); + memcpy(&nonce[sizeof(data->nonce_low)], + &data->nonce_high, + sizeof(nonce) - sizeof(data->nonce_low)); + + data->nonce_low += 1; + aead_request_set_crypt(req, data->sg, data->sg, total + SNAPSHOT_AUTH_TAG_SIZE, nonce); + res = crypto_wait_req(crypto_aead_decrypt(req), &wait); + if (res) + return res; + + data->crypt_size = 0; + data->crypt_offset = 0; + + /* Push the decrypted pages further down the stack. */ + total = 0; + for (pg_idx = 0; pg_idx < page_count; pg_idx++) { + void *buf = data->crypt_pages[pg_idx]; + + res = snapshot_write_next(&data->handle); + if (res < 0) + return res; + if (res == 0) + break; + + if (!data_of(data->handle)) + return -EINVAL; + + WARN_ON(res != PAGE_SIZE); + + /* + * Copy the page into the staging area. A future optimization + * could potentially skip this copy for lowmem pages. + */ + memcpy(data_of(data->handle), buf, PAGE_SIZE); + total += PAGE_SIZE; + } + + data->crypt_total += total; + return 0; +} + +static ssize_t snapshot_read_next_encrypted(struct snapshot_data *data, + void **buf) +{ + size_t tag_off; + + /* Refill the encrypted buffer if it's empty. */ + if ((data->crypt_size == 0) || + (data->crypt_offset >= + (data->crypt_size + SNAPSHOT_AUTH_TAG_SIZE))) { + + int rc; + + data->crypt_size = 0; + data->crypt_offset = 0; + rc = snapshot_encrypt_refill(data); + if (rc < 0) + return rc; + } + + /* Return data pages if the offset is in that region. */ + if (data->crypt_offset < data->crypt_size) { + size_t pg_idx = data->crypt_offset >> PAGE_SHIFT; + size_t pg_off = data->crypt_offset & (PAGE_SIZE - 1); + *buf = data->crypt_pages[pg_idx] + pg_off; + return PAGE_SIZE - pg_off; + } + + /* Use offsets just beyond the size to return the tag. */ + tag_off = data->crypt_offset - data->crypt_size; + if (tag_off > SNAPSHOT_AUTH_TAG_SIZE) + tag_off = SNAPSHOT_AUTH_TAG_SIZE; + + *buf = data->auth_tag + tag_off; + return SNAPSHOT_AUTH_TAG_SIZE - tag_off; +} + +static ssize_t snapshot_write_next_encrypted(struct snapshot_data *data, + void **buf) +{ + size_t tag_off; + + /* Return data pages if the offset is in that region. */ + if (data->crypt_offset < (PAGE_SIZE * CHUNK_SIZE)) { + size_t pg_idx = data->crypt_offset >> PAGE_SHIFT; + size_t pg_off = data->crypt_offset & (PAGE_SIZE - 1); + *buf = data->crypt_pages[pg_idx] + pg_off; + return PAGE_SIZE - pg_off; + } + + /* Use offsets just beyond the size to return the tag. */ + tag_off = data->crypt_offset - (PAGE_SIZE * CHUNK_SIZE); + if (tag_off > SNAPSHOT_AUTH_TAG_SIZE) + tag_off = SNAPSHOT_AUTH_TAG_SIZE; + + *buf = data->auth_tag + tag_off; + return SNAPSHOT_AUTH_TAG_SIZE - tag_off; +} + +ssize_t snapshot_read_encrypted(struct snapshot_data *data, + char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *offp) +{ + ssize_t total = 0; + + /* Loop getting buffers of varying sizes and copying to userspace. */ + while (count) { + size_t copy_size; + size_t not_done; + void *src; + ssize_t src_size = snapshot_read_next_encrypted(data, &src); + + if (src_size <= 0) { + if (total == 0) + return src_size; + + break; + } + + copy_size = min(count, (size_t)src_size); + not_done = copy_to_user(buf + total, src, copy_size); + copy_size -= not_done; + total += copy_size; + count -= copy_size; + data->crypt_offset += copy_size; + if (copy_size == 0) { + if (total == 0) + return -EFAULT; + + break; + } + } + + *offp += total; + return total; +} + +ssize_t snapshot_write_encrypted(struct snapshot_data *data, + const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *offp) +{ + ssize_t total = 0; + + /* Loop getting buffers of varying sizes and copying from. */ + while (count) { + size_t copy_size; + size_t not_done; + void *dst; + ssize_t dst_size = snapshot_write_next_encrypted(data, &dst); + + if (dst_size <= 0) { + if (total == 0) + return dst_size; + + break; + } + + copy_size = min(count, (size_t)dst_size); + not_done = copy_from_user(dst, buf + total, copy_size); + copy_size -= not_done; + total += copy_size; + count -= copy_size; + data->crypt_offset += copy_size; + if (copy_size == 0) { + if (total == 0) + return -EFAULT; + + break; + } + + /* Drain the encrypted buffer if it's full. */ + if ((data->crypt_offset >= + ((PAGE_SIZE * CHUNK_SIZE) + SNAPSHOT_AUTH_TAG_SIZE))) { + + int rc; + + rc = snapshot_decrypt_drain(data); + if (rc < 0) + return rc; + } + } + + *offp += total; + return total; +} + +void snapshot_teardown_encryption(struct snapshot_data *data) +{ + int i; + + if (data->aead_req) { + aead_request_free(data->aead_req); + data->aead_req = NULL; + } + + if (data->aead_tfm) { + crypto_free_aead(data->aead_tfm); + data->aead_tfm = NULL; + } + + for (i = 0; i < CHUNK_SIZE; i++) { + if (data->crypt_pages[i]) { + free_page((unsigned long)data->crypt_pages[i]); + data->crypt_pages[i] = NULL; + } + } +} + +static int snapshot_setup_encryption_common(struct snapshot_data *data) +{ + int i, rc; + + data->crypt_total = 0; + data->crypt_offset = 0; + data->crypt_size = 0; + memset(data->crypt_pages, 0, sizeof(data->crypt_pages)); + /* This only works once per hibernate. */ + if (data->aead_tfm) + return -EINVAL; + + /* Set up the encryption transform */ + data->aead_tfm = crypto_alloc_aead("gcm(aes)", 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(data->aead_tfm)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(data->aead_tfm); + data->aead_tfm = NULL; + return rc; + } + + rc = -ENOMEM; + data->aead_req = aead_request_alloc(data->aead_tfm, GFP_KERNEL); + if (data->aead_req == NULL) + goto setup_fail; + + /* Allocate the staging area */ + for (i = 0; i < CHUNK_SIZE; i++) { + data->crypt_pages[i] = (void *)__get_free_page(GFP_ATOMIC); + if (data->crypt_pages[i] == NULL) + goto setup_fail; + } + + sg_init_table(data->sg, CHUNK_SIZE + 2); + + /* + * The associated data will be the offset so that blocks can't be + * rearranged. + */ + aead_request_set_ad(data->aead_req, sizeof(data->crypt_total)); + rc = crypto_aead_setauthsize(data->aead_tfm, SNAPSHOT_AUTH_TAG_SIZE); + if (rc) + goto setup_fail; + + return 0; + +setup_fail: + snapshot_teardown_encryption(data); + return rc; +} + +int snapshot_get_encryption_key(struct snapshot_data *data, + struct uswsusp_key_blob __user *key) +{ + u8 aead_key[SNAPSHOT_ENCRYPTION_KEY_SIZE]; + u8 nonce[USWSUSP_KEY_NONCE_SIZE]; + int rc; + /* Don't pull a random key from a world that can be reset. */ + if (data->ready) + return -EPIPE; + + rc = snapshot_setup_encryption_common(data); + if (rc) + return rc; + + /* Build a random starting nonce. */ + get_random_bytes(nonce, sizeof(nonce)); + memcpy(&data->nonce_low, &nonce[0], sizeof(data->nonce_low)); + memcpy(&data->nonce_high, &nonce[8], sizeof(data->nonce_high)); + /* Build a random key */ + get_random_bytes(aead_key, sizeof(aead_key)); + rc = crypto_aead_setkey(data->aead_tfm, aead_key, sizeof(aead_key)); + if (rc) + goto fail; + + /* Hand the key back to user mode (to be changed!) */ + rc = put_user(sizeof(struct uswsusp_key_blob), &key->blob_len); + if (rc) + goto fail; + + rc = copy_to_user(&key->blob, &aead_key, sizeof(aead_key)); + if (rc) + goto fail; + + rc = copy_to_user(&key->nonce, &nonce, sizeof(nonce)); + if (rc) + goto fail; + + return 0; + +fail: + snapshot_teardown_encryption(data); + return rc; +} + +int snapshot_set_encryption_key(struct snapshot_data *data, + struct uswsusp_key_blob __user *key) +{ + struct uswsusp_key_blob blob; + int rc; + + /* It's too late if data's been pushed in. */ + if (data->handle.cur) + return -EPIPE; + + rc = snapshot_setup_encryption_common(data); + if (rc) + return rc; + + /* Load the key from user mode. */ + rc = copy_from_user(&blob, key, sizeof(struct uswsusp_key_blob)); + if (rc) + goto crypto_setup_fail; + + if (blob.blob_len != sizeof(struct uswsusp_key_blob)) { + rc = -EINVAL; + goto crypto_setup_fail; + } + + rc = crypto_aead_setkey(data->aead_tfm, + blob.blob, + SNAPSHOT_ENCRYPTION_KEY_SIZE); + + if (rc) + goto crypto_setup_fail; + + /* Load the starting nonce. */ + memcpy(&data->nonce_low, &blob.nonce[0], sizeof(data->nonce_low)); + memcpy(&data->nonce_high, &blob.nonce[8], sizeof(data->nonce_high)); + return 0; + +crypto_setup_fail: + snapshot_teardown_encryption(data); + return rc; +} + +loff_t snapshot_get_encrypted_image_size(loff_t raw_size) +{ + loff_t pages = raw_size >> PAGE_SHIFT; + loff_t chunks = (pages + (CHUNK_SIZE - 1)) / CHUNK_SIZE; + /* + * The encrypted size is the normal size, plus a stitched in + * authentication tag for every chunk of pages. + */ + return raw_size + (chunks * SNAPSHOT_AUTH_TAG_SIZE); +} + +int snapshot_finalize_decrypted_image(struct snapshot_data *data) +{ + int rc; + + if (data->crypt_offset != 0) { + rc = snapshot_decrypt_drain(data); + if (rc) + return rc; + } + + return 0; +} diff --git a/kernel/power/user.c b/kernel/power/user.c index ad241b4ff64c58..52ad25df4518dc 100644 --- a/kernel/power/user.c +++ b/kernel/power/user.c @@ -25,18 +25,9 @@ #include #include "power.h" +#include "user.h" - -static struct snapshot_data { - struct snapshot_handle handle; - int swap; - int mode; - bool frozen; - bool ready; - bool platform_support; - bool free_bitmaps; - dev_t dev; -} snapshot_state; +struct snapshot_data snapshot_state; int is_hibernate_resume_dev(dev_t dev) { @@ -119,6 +110,7 @@ static int snapshot_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) } else if (data->free_bitmaps) { free_basic_memory_bitmaps(); } + snapshot_teardown_encryption(data); pm_notifier_call_chain(data->mode == O_RDONLY ? PM_POST_HIBERNATION : PM_POST_RESTORE); hibernate_release(); @@ -142,6 +134,12 @@ static ssize_t snapshot_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, res = -ENODATA; goto Unlock; } + + if (snapshot_encryption_enabled(data)) { + res = snapshot_read_encrypted(data, buf, count, offp); + goto Unlock; + } + if (!pg_offp) { /* on page boundary? */ res = snapshot_read_next(&data->handle); if (res <= 0) @@ -172,6 +170,11 @@ static ssize_t snapshot_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf, data = filp->private_data; + if (snapshot_encryption_enabled(data)) { + res = snapshot_write_encrypted(data, buf, count, offp); + goto unlock; + } + if (!pg_offp) { res = snapshot_write_next(&data->handle); if (res <= 0) @@ -302,6 +305,12 @@ static long snapshot_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd, break; case SNAPSHOT_ATOMIC_RESTORE: + if (snapshot_encryption_enabled(data)) { + error = snapshot_finalize_decrypted_image(data); + if (error) + break; + } + snapshot_write_finalize(&data->handle); if (data->mode != O_WRONLY || !data->frozen || !snapshot_image_loaded(&data->handle)) { @@ -337,6 +346,8 @@ static long snapshot_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd, } size = snapshot_get_image_size(); size <<= PAGE_SHIFT; + if (snapshot_encryption_enabled(data)) + size = snapshot_get_encrypted_image_size(size); error = put_user(size, (loff_t __user *)arg); break; @@ -394,6 +405,13 @@ static long snapshot_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd, error = snapshot_set_swap_area(data, (void __user *)arg); break; + case SNAPSHOT_ENABLE_ENCRYPTION: + if (data->mode == O_RDONLY) + error = snapshot_get_encryption_key(data, (void __user *)arg); + else + error = snapshot_set_encryption_key(data, (void __user *)arg); + break; + default: error = -ENOTTY; diff --git a/kernel/power/user.h b/kernel/power/user.h new file mode 100644 index 00000000000000..6823e2eba7ec53 --- /dev/null +++ b/kernel/power/user.h @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ + +#include +#include +#include + +#define SNAPSHOT_ENCRYPTION_KEY_SIZE AES_KEYSIZE_128 +#define SNAPSHOT_AUTH_TAG_SIZE 16 + +/* Define the number of pages in a single AEAD encryption chunk. */ +#define CHUNK_SIZE 16 + +struct snapshot_data { + struct snapshot_handle handle; + int swap; + int mode; + bool frozen; + bool ready; + bool platform_support; + bool free_bitmaps; + dev_t dev; + +#if defined(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_HIBERNATION) + struct crypto_aead *aead_tfm; + struct aead_request *aead_req; + void *crypt_pages[CHUNK_SIZE]; + u8 auth_tag[SNAPSHOT_AUTH_TAG_SIZE]; + struct scatterlist sg[CHUNK_SIZE + 2]; /* Add room for AD and auth tag. */ + size_t crypt_offset; + size_t crypt_size; + uint64_t crypt_total; + uint64_t nonce_low; + uint64_t nonce_high; +#endif + +}; + +extern struct snapshot_data snapshot_state; + +/* kernel/power/swapenc.c routines */ +#if defined(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_HIBERNATION) + +ssize_t snapshot_read_encrypted(struct snapshot_data *data, + char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *offp); + +ssize_t snapshot_write_encrypted(struct snapshot_data *data, + const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *offp); + +void snapshot_teardown_encryption(struct snapshot_data *data); +int snapshot_get_encryption_key(struct snapshot_data *data, + struct uswsusp_key_blob __user *key); + +int snapshot_set_encryption_key(struct snapshot_data *data, + struct uswsusp_key_blob __user *key); + +loff_t snapshot_get_encrypted_image_size(loff_t raw_size); + +int snapshot_finalize_decrypted_image(struct snapshot_data *data); + +#define snapshot_encryption_enabled(data) (!!(data)->aead_tfm) + +#else + +ssize_t snapshot_read_encrypted(struct snapshot_data *data, + char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *offp) +{ + return -ENOTTY; +} + +ssize_t snapshot_write_encrypted(struct snapshot_data *data, + const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *offp) +{ + return -ENOTTY; +} + +static void snapshot_teardown_encryption(struct snapshot_data *data) {} +static int snapshot_get_encryption_key(struct snapshot_data *data, + struct uswsusp_key_blob __user *key) +{ + return -ENOTTY; +} + +static int snapshot_set_encryption_key(struct snapshot_data *data, + struct uswsusp_key_blob __user *key) +{ + return -ENOTTY; +} + +static loff_t snapshot_get_encrypted_image_size(loff_t raw_size) +{ + return raw_size; +} + +static int snapshot_finalize_decrypted_image(struct snapshot_data *data) +{ + return -ENOTTY; +} + +#define snapshot_encryption_enabled(data) (0) + +#endif