diff mbox series

[v2,2/3] evm: add support to disable EVM on unsupported filesystems

Message ID 20231219175206.12342-3-zohar@linux.ibm.com (mailing list archive)
State New
Headers show
Series evm: disable EVM on overlayfs | expand

Commit Message

Mimi Zohar Dec. 19, 2023, 5:52 p.m. UTC 
Identify EVM unsupported filesystems by defining a new flag
SB_I_EVM_UNSUPPORTED.

Don't verify, write, remove or update 'security.evm' on unsupported
filesystems.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
---
 include/linux/fs.h                |  1 +
 security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

Comments

Mimi Zohar Dec. 19, 2023, 7:09 p.m. UTC | #1 
On Tue, 2023-12-19 at 12:52 -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:

> diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
> index 98b7a7a8c42e..db9350a734ef 100644
> --- a/include/linux/fs.h
> +++ b/include/linux/fs.h
> @@ -1164,6 +1164,7 @@ extern int send_sigurg(struct fown_struct *fown);
>  #define SB_I_USERNS_VISIBLE		0x00000010 /* fstype already mounted */
>  #define SB_I_IMA_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURE	0x00000020
>  #define SB_I_UNTRUSTED_MOUNTER		0x00000040
> +#define SB_I_EVM_UNSUPPORTED		0x00000050

This needs to be fixed.

Mimi

>  
>  #define SB_I_SKIP_SYNC	0x00000100	/* Skip superblock at global sync */
>  #define SB_I_PERSB_BDI	0x00000200	/* has a per-sb bdi */
> diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
Amir Goldstein Dec. 20, 2023, 4:23 a.m. UTC | #2 
On Tue, Dec 19, 2023 at 9:10 PM Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> wrote:
>
> On Tue, 2023-12-19 at 12:52 -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
>
> > diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
> > index 98b7a7a8c42e..db9350a734ef 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/fs.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/fs.h
> > @@ -1164,6 +1164,7 @@ extern int send_sigurg(struct fown_struct *fown);
> >  #define SB_I_USERNS_VISIBLE          0x00000010 /* fstype already mounted */
> >  #define SB_I_IMA_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURE      0x00000020
> >  #define SB_I_UNTRUSTED_MOUNTER               0x00000040
> > +#define SB_I_EVM_UNSUPPORTED         0x00000050
>
> This needs to be fixed.
>

With this fixed, you may add:

Acked-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>

Thanks,
Amir.
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index 98b7a7a8c42e..db9350a734ef 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -1164,6 +1164,7 @@  extern int send_sigurg(struct fown_struct *fown);
 #define SB_I_USERNS_VISIBLE		0x00000010 /* fstype already mounted */
 #define SB_I_IMA_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURE	0x00000020
 #define SB_I_UNTRUSTED_MOUNTER		0x00000040
+#define SB_I_EVM_UNSUPPORTED		0x00000050
 
 #define SB_I_SKIP_SYNC	0x00000100	/* Skip superblock at global sync */
 #define SB_I_PERSB_BDI	0x00000200	/* has a per-sb bdi */
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index 02adba635b02..cc7956d7878b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -151,6 +151,17 @@  static int evm_find_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry)
 	return count;
 }
 
+static int is_unsupported_fs(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+
+	if (inode->i_sb->s_iflags & SB_I_EVM_UNSUPPORTED) {
+		pr_info_once("%s not supported\n", inode->i_sb->s_type->name);
+		return 1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /*
  * evm_verify_hmac - calculate and compare the HMAC with the EVM xattr
  *
@@ -181,6 +192,9 @@  static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry,
 		     iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE))
 		return iint->evm_status;
 
+	if (is_unsupported_fs(dentry))
+		return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+
 	/* if status is not PASS, try to check again - against -ENOMEM */
 
 	/* first need to know the sig type */
@@ -408,6 +422,9 @@  enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 	if (!evm_key_loaded() || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name))
 		return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 
+	if (is_unsupported_fs(dentry))
+		return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+
 	if (!iint) {
 		iint = integrity_iint_find(d_backing_inode(dentry));
 		if (!iint)
@@ -491,15 +508,21 @@  static int evm_protect_xattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 	if (strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) == 0) {
 		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 			return -EPERM;
+		if (is_unsupported_fs(dentry))
+			return -EPERM;
 	} else if (!evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name)) {
 		if (!posix_xattr_acl(xattr_name))
 			return 0;
+		if (is_unsupported_fs(dentry))
+			return 0;
+
 		evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry);
 		if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) ||
 		    (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS))
 			return 0;
 		goto out;
-	}
+	} else if (is_unsupported_fs(dentry))
+		return 0;
 
 	evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry);
 	if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS) {
@@ -750,6 +773,9 @@  void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
 	if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC))
 		return;
 
+	if (is_unsupported_fs(dentry))
+		return;
+
 	evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len);
 }
 
@@ -814,8 +840,12 @@  int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
 	if (evm_initialized & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES)
 		return 0;
 
+	if (is_unsupported_fs(dentry))
+		return 0;
+
 	if (!(ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID)))
 		return 0;
+
 	evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry);
 	/*
 	 * Writing attrs is safe for portable signatures, as portable signatures
@@ -859,6 +889,9 @@  void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid)
 	if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC))
 		return;
 
+	if (is_unsupported_fs(dentry))
+		return;
+
 	if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID))
 		evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0);
 }