From patchwork Thu Jul 4 08:57:03 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jarkko Sakkinen X-Patchwork-Id: 13723496 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 45D4716FF27; Thu, 4 Jul 2024 08:57:34 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1720083454; cv=none; b=MxcqZD9oprtsgD4ILvbEGCzekX+s+dLWd5cuQ8HUaOPjhq2FwxlmdVXlEutiqKxJerNK+Pg8t62C8eHj5wzXofXLLZFWvzzSkAqBEq4IH2+kjxoFEGMIOrwxf/CEmz7zpf183rwQSegfAODyIbbKbjeYZsNnqhwfE9fv995ZfWU= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1720083454; c=relaxed/simple; bh=NNLcwcCssGvjSm08rU9j5/39P2BCFR+lB+1OFhZuoPY=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=XjSAsJsoffEo3n/JeTBI2B2+zR41GquHEBGkGMAOxPYRjxtQhWpN/JB0qIvSe2zUcpwVROITWtXc9f8RHddmWZvfT8mRrgHLZdp4zImtVa12C57JWGGm/RW3cebAl6MfLCvmG0AS1w+BaUhYQy9QgB/Kritfr2QBt9gYKXSZnII= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=CUfOvfJM; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="CUfOvfJM" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 8461DC3277B; Thu, 4 Jul 2024 08:57:33 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1720083453; bh=NNLcwcCssGvjSm08rU9j5/39P2BCFR+lB+1OFhZuoPY=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=CUfOvfJMNEFFuiFKqrF1sAtW9hVOeqS5JiQbsKLM1VYY/TXvTlBTaWZIXeCY7Q97n nJXHn5jVZ6YZ6pM3vVj59A+FpQcugEONo98qPFKSEnBJYdZRfsoDwjhlfpe+WSk0mV IrOYO0CUiAlr5DSkTZ6vrytOPuH/hSCGFPRZ1wbXJfiT4nY1vIGtBDuv/kW147to3Z TDdsIwKYKOjdQ3RqdTVvUSUsct1T5fHkFW97FZ5uBCUxvkrTohDYo0Ge/E7Ufdp8oC 7XNBJcnyd3SWBTJURPPv5cmqFQ9wxgjt9CGk60bGmxSI7GGDl0WAZHsY5Y1MgCf9Gh tkHX0azeXT/lg== From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: Thorsten Leemhuis , Linus Torvalds , Jarkko Sakkinen , stable@vger.kernel.org, Stefan Berger , James Bottomley , Mimi Zohar , David Howells , Paul Moore , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v3 2/3] tpm: Address !chip->auth in tpm_buf_append_name() Date: Thu, 4 Jul 2024 11:57:03 +0300 Message-ID: <20240704085708.661142-3-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.45.2 In-Reply-To: <20240704085708.661142-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20240704085708.661142-1-jarkko@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Unless tpm_chip_bootstrap() was called by the driver, !chip->auth can cause a null derefence in tpm_buf_append_name(). Thus, address !chip->auth in tpm_buf_append_name() and remove the fallback implementation for !TCG_TPM2_HMAC. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10+ Reported-by: Stefan Berger Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20240617193408.1234365-1-stefanb@linux.ibm.com/ Fixes: d0a25bb961e6 ("tpm: Add HMAC session name/handle append") Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- v3: * Address: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/922603265d61011dbb23f18a04525ae973b83ffd.camel@HansenPartnership.com/ v2: * N/A --- drivers/char/tpm/Makefile | 2 +- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 217 +++++++++++++++++-------------- include/linux/tpm.h | 14 +- 3 files changed, 121 insertions(+), 112 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile b/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile index 4c695b0388f3..9bb142c75243 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile @@ -16,8 +16,8 @@ tpm-y += eventlog/common.o tpm-y += eventlog/tpm1.o tpm-y += eventlog/tpm2.o tpm-y += tpm-buf.o +tpm-y += tpm2-sessions.o -tpm-$(CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC) += tpm2-sessions.o tpm-$(CONFIG_ACPI) += tpm_ppi.o eventlog/acpi.o tpm-$(CONFIG_EFI) += eventlog/efi.o tpm-$(CONFIG_OF) += eventlog/of.o diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c index 2f1d96a5a5a7..179bcaac06ce 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c @@ -83,9 +83,6 @@ #define AES_KEY_BYTES AES_KEYSIZE_128 #define AES_KEY_BITS (AES_KEY_BYTES*8) -static int tpm2_create_primary(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 hierarchy, - u32 *handle, u8 *name); - /* * This is the structure that carries all the auth information (like * session handle, nonces, session key and auth) from use to use it is @@ -148,6 +145,7 @@ struct tpm2_auth { u8 name[AUTH_MAX_NAMES][2 + SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE]; }; +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC /* * Name Size based on TPM algorithm (assumes no hash bigger than 255) */ @@ -163,6 +161,120 @@ static u8 name_size(const u8 *name) return size_map[alg] + 2; } +static int tpm2_parse_read_public(char *name, struct tpm_buf *buf) +{ + struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; + off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE; + u32 tot_len = be32_to_cpu(head->length); + u32 val; + + /* we're starting after the header so adjust the length */ + tot_len -= TPM_HEADER_SIZE; + + /* skip public */ + val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset); + if (val > tot_len) + return -EINVAL; + offset += val; + /* name */ + val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset); + if (val != name_size(&buf->data[offset])) + return -EINVAL; + memcpy(name, &buf->data[offset], val); + /* forget the rest */ + return 0; +} + +static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, char *name) +{ + struct tpm_buf buf; + int rc; + + rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_READ_PUBLIC); + if (rc) + return rc; + + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, handle); + rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "read public"); + if (rc == TPM2_RC_SUCCESS) + rc = tpm2_parse_read_public(name, &buf); + + tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); + + return rc; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC */ + +/** + * tpm_buf_append_name() - add a handle area to the buffer + * @chip: the TPM chip structure + * @buf: The buffer to be appended + * @handle: The handle to be appended + * @name: The name of the handle (may be NULL) + * + * In order to compute session HMACs, we need to know the names of the + * objects pointed to by the handles. For most objects, this is simply + * the actual 4 byte handle or an empty buf (in these cases @name + * should be NULL) but for volatile objects, permanent objects and NV + * areas, the name is defined as the hash (according to the name + * algorithm which should be set to sha256) of the public area to + * which the two byte algorithm id has been appended. For these + * objects, the @name pointer should point to this. If a name is + * required but @name is NULL, then TPM2_ReadPublic() will be called + * on the handle to obtain the name. + * + * As with most tpm_buf operations, success is assumed because failure + * will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a + * kernel message. + */ +void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, + u32 handle, u8 *name) +{ + enum tpm2_mso_type __maybe_unused mso = tpm2_handle_mso(handle); + struct tpm2_auth __maybe_unused *auth; + int __maybe_unused slot; + + if (!__and(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC), chip->auth)) { + tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle); + /* count the number of handles in the upper bits of flags */ + buf->handles++; + return; + } + +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC + slot = (tpm_buf_length(buf) - TPM_HEADER_SIZE) / 4; + if (slot >= AUTH_MAX_NAMES) { + dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: too many handles\n"); + return; + } + auth = chip->auth; + WARN(auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf), + "name added in wrong place\n"); + tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle); + auth->session += 4; + + if (mso == TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT || + mso == TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE || + mso == TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) { + if (!name) + tpm2_read_public(chip, handle, auth->name[slot]); + } else { + if (name) + dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: Handle does not require name but one is specified\n"); + } + + auth->name_h[slot] = handle; + if (name) + memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, name_size(name)); +#endif /* CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC */ +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_name); + +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC + +static int tpm2_create_primary(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 hierarchy, + u32 *handle, u8 *name); + /* * It turns out the crypto hmac(sha256) is hard for us to consume * because it assumes a fixed key and the TPM seems to change the key @@ -567,104 +679,6 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session); -static int tpm2_parse_read_public(char *name, struct tpm_buf *buf) -{ - struct tpm_header *head = (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; - off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE; - u32 tot_len = be32_to_cpu(head->length); - u32 val; - - /* we're starting after the header so adjust the length */ - tot_len -= TPM_HEADER_SIZE; - - /* skip public */ - val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset); - if (val > tot_len) - return -EINVAL; - offset += val; - /* name */ - val = tpm_buf_read_u16(buf, &offset); - if (val != name_size(&buf->data[offset])) - return -EINVAL; - memcpy(name, &buf->data[offset], val); - /* forget the rest */ - return 0; -} - -static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, char *name) -{ - struct tpm_buf buf; - int rc; - - rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_READ_PUBLIC); - if (rc) - return rc; - - tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, handle); - rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "read public"); - if (rc == TPM2_RC_SUCCESS) - rc = tpm2_parse_read_public(name, &buf); - - tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); - - return rc; -} - -/** - * tpm_buf_append_name() - add a handle area to the buffer - * @chip: the TPM chip structure - * @buf: The buffer to be appended - * @handle: The handle to be appended - * @name: The name of the handle (may be NULL) - * - * In order to compute session HMACs, we need to know the names of the - * objects pointed to by the handles. For most objects, this is simply - * the actual 4 byte handle or an empty buf (in these cases @name - * should be NULL) but for volatile objects, permanent objects and NV - * areas, the name is defined as the hash (according to the name - * algorithm which should be set to sha256) of the public area to - * which the two byte algorithm id has been appended. For these - * objects, the @name pointer should point to this. If a name is - * required but @name is NULL, then TPM2_ReadPublic() will be called - * on the handle to obtain the name. - * - * As with most tpm_buf operations, success is assumed because failure - * will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a - * kernel message. - */ -void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, - u32 handle, u8 *name) -{ - enum tpm2_mso_type mso = tpm2_handle_mso(handle); - struct tpm2_auth *auth = chip->auth; - int slot; - - slot = (tpm_buf_length(buf) - TPM_HEADER_SIZE)/4; - if (slot >= AUTH_MAX_NAMES) { - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: too many handles\n"); - return; - } - WARN(auth->session != tpm_buf_length(buf), - "name added in wrong place\n"); - tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle); - auth->session += 4; - - if (mso == TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT || - mso == TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE || - mso == TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) { - if (!name) - tpm2_read_public(chip, handle, auth->name[slot]); - } else { - if (name) - dev_err(&chip->dev, "TPM: Handle does not require name but one is specified\n"); - } - - auth->name_h[slot] = handle; - if (name) - memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, name_size(name)); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm_buf_append_name); - /** * tpm_buf_check_hmac_response() - check the TPM return HMAC for correctness * @chip: the TPM chip structure @@ -1311,3 +1325,4 @@ int tpm2_sessions_init(struct tpm_chip *chip) return rc; } +#endif /* CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC */ diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index 21a67dc9efe8..d9a6991b247d 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -490,11 +490,13 @@ static inline void tpm_buf_append_empty_auth(struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 handle) { } #endif -#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC -int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip); void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 handle, u8 *name); + +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC + +int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip); void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase, int passphraselen); @@ -521,14 +523,6 @@ static inline int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) static inline void tpm2_end_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip) { } -static inline void tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, - struct tpm_buf *buf, - u32 handle, u8 *name) -{ - tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle); - /* count the number of handles in the upper bits of flags */ - buf->handles++; -} static inline void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase,