From patchwork Mon Sep 16 11:07:06 2024 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jarkko Sakkinen X-Patchwork-Id: 13805288 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 40D7F149C57; Mon, 16 Sep 2024 11:07:26 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1726484847; cv=none; b=J8v5xE8h1AaOyEP1i71YsuEkOv1NkLQrHe3Xs4AnWaEfsGaNUBSJCdxIzC+p8aG8iTPPMBdUnXwEbM5qYlDiWvCCvttTdVpKODIEwy7cjJOdf1IbhR4wJ+kKLfDP7ogTNO+Hec4IjH2/lBqYi6l71lSjJQzwClv7nQYU6J3rtfE= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1726484847; c=relaxed/simple; bh=khBmSXOuLlVYvAwvZ+9x5G0EGtluhzmI2sB1ubUkQgI=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=af3pzNJhA1C6Cb4ngYtgEUhH7K2Ol3vbPV7NI3xQ6BZRAM7TrolGgh2dkl0x8T7SaBUZedev5oOu8LlwJ7SI9J2Nl162SIpvI7MUR2+ihYPiIJeYn5sr20/exlmSiorIqY63apLHW75GbAKmdrSBF63KMqUJRWCkjtCGtpR/Klw= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=Lon6fQqe; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="Lon6fQqe" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 53FEAC4CEC4; Mon, 16 Sep 2024 11:07:26 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1726484846; bh=khBmSXOuLlVYvAwvZ+9x5G0EGtluhzmI2sB1ubUkQgI=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=Lon6fQqe/GjDLNyi1VC44dqYI+3OlBrmsU8s91QsRqach08cYlVvw9ax3HpK16ZZJ p963NkwcgIK9mYh9AAdbS6CoyRG4KLmb3ZQljDGH9E79w6rtiFtluuDsV62H38QP9D mLS4KEZrDdktiT86mo5zOkkPEAwEWfmNVGwjSw4cihb39xBe4cRPAjE+IdWr2k6KlX SM+UQV114Y5QZ+StH/aFgSmPH9y+kehSgpoGEzhxv6lyo8GqRIUoGAPKht8TZv3qYu QBc9zJG8Sb3HAl6VP52WRv9kZwzxqInUOJUzmuMivvSzoMinH2rxk2Ja/OIDFDvrKo Tv0ybYaGCxixw== From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com, roberto.sassu@huawei.com, mapengyu@gmail.com, Jarkko Sakkinen , Peter Huewe , Jason Gunthorpe , Mimi Zohar , David Howells , Paul Moore , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org (open list), keyrings@vger.kernel.org (open list:KEYS-TRUSTED), linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org (open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM) Subject: [PATCH v2 1/6] tpm: Remove documentation from the header of tpm2-sessions.c Date: Mon, 16 Sep 2024 14:07:06 +0300 Message-ID: <20240916110714.1396407-2-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.46.0 In-Reply-To: <20240916110714.1396407-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20240916110714.1396407-1-jarkko@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 The documentation in the file header is duplicate documentation to kernel doc comments in the function declarations and tpm-security.rst. Wipe it off as nobody will ever take care of keeping it up to date. Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- v2: - Refine the commit message. --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 65 -------------------------------- 1 file changed, 65 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c index 44f60730cff4..6cc1ea81c57c 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c @@ -1,71 +1,6 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 - /* * Copyright (C) 2018 James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com - * - * Cryptographic helper routines for handling TPM2 sessions for - * authorization HMAC and request response encryption. - * - * The idea is to ensure that every TPM command is HMAC protected by a - * session, meaning in-flight tampering would be detected and in - * addition all sensitive inputs and responses should be encrypted. - * - * The basic way this works is to use a TPM feature called salted - * sessions where a random secret used in session construction is - * encrypted to the public part of a known TPM key. The problem is we - * have no known keys, so initially a primary Elliptic Curve key is - * derived from the NULL seed (we use EC because most TPMs generate - * these keys much faster than RSA ones). The curve used is NIST_P256 - * because that's now mandated to be present in 'TCG TPM v2.0 - * Provisioning Guidance' - * - * Threat problems: the initial TPM2_CreatePrimary is not (and cannot - * be) session protected, so a clever Man in the Middle could return a - * public key they control to this command and from there intercept - * and decode all subsequent session based transactions. The kernel - * cannot mitigate this threat but, after boot, userspace can get - * proof this has not happened by asking the TPM to certify the NULL - * key. This certification would chain back to the TPM Endorsement - * Certificate and prove the NULL seed primary had not been tampered - * with and thus all sessions must have been cryptographically secure. - * To assist with this, the initial NULL seed public key name is made - * available in a sysfs file. - * - * Use of these functions: - * - * The design is all the crypto, hash and hmac gunk is confined in this - * file and never needs to be seen even by the kernel internal user. To - * the user there's an init function tpm2_sessions_init() that needs to - * be called once per TPM which generates the NULL seed primary key. - * - * These are the usage functions: - * - * tpm2_start_auth_session() which allocates the opaque auth structure - * and gets a session from the TPM. This must be called before - * any of the following functions. The session is protected by a - * session_key which is derived from a random salt value - * encrypted to the NULL seed. - * tpm2_end_auth_session() kills the session and frees the resources. - * Under normal operation this function is done by - * tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(), so this is only to be used on - * error legs where the latter is not executed. - * tpm_buf_append_name() to add a handle to the buffer. This must be - * used in place of the usual tpm_buf_append_u32() for adding - * handles because handles have to be processed specially when - * calculating the HMAC. In particular, for NV, volatile and - * permanent objects you now need to provide the name. - * tpm_buf_append_hmac_session() which appends the hmac session to the - * buf in the same way tpm_buf_append_auth does(). - * tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session() This calculates the correct hash and - * places it in the buffer. It must be called after the complete - * command buffer is finalized so it can fill in the correct HMAC - * based on the parameters. - * tpm_buf_check_hmac_response() which checks the session response in - * the buffer and calculates what it should be. If there's a - * mismatch it will log a warning and return an error. If - * tpm_buf_append_hmac_session() did not specify - * TPM_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION then the session will be closed (if it - * hasn't been consumed) and the auth structure freed. */ #include "tpm.h"